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Train Wreck:
The U.S. Violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention
By David A. Koplow∗

The United States is violating a multilateral arms control treaty. Russia is,
too. It’s not just some minor accord at stake; it’s the 1993 Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), 1 the critical, near-universal undertaking to banish the
centuries-old scourge of chemical warfare. And it’s not just some trivial misstep;
it’s a blatant transgression of one of the treaty’s most fundamental provisions,
requiring the timely destruction of the massive inventories of chemical weapons
(CW) that the planet’s erstwhile superpowers had laboriously constructed and
assiduously maintained throughout the Cold War. And it won’t be a near-miss;
each country will fall years beyond complying with the treaty’s April 29, 2012 final
deadline for accomplishing the total dismantling of this noxious ordnance -- the
United States now figures to eclipse that mandatory mark by at least 11 years.
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1
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, April 29, 1997, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, 32 I.L.M. 800, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 103-21, (1993).
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How did we get into this mess? How did the United States, the leading
exponent of the rule of law and a prime mover in negotiating and implementing
the CWC, fall into such conspicuous violation? What can be done at this point to
extricate ourselves and the Russians from this grisly political and legal
predicament? And what can we do in the future to avoid other similar
international law train wrecks?

This article parses the problem of noncompliance with the CWC’s
dismantling obligations as a case study in the operation (or non-operation) of
international law. Section 1 provides the essential background on chemical
weapons and the treaty, highlighting the CWC’s vital role in reining in a horrific
global threat and outlining the treaty’s provisions regarding the safe, clean, and
verified elimination of chemical stockpiles. The CWC is one of the most
ambitious and one of the most successful multilateral arms control regimes in
history, but it is hardly without controversy.

Section 2 focuses on the U.S. chemical weapons program: its history,
current status, and, especially, the convoluted program for incinerating or
chemically neutralizing the lethal agents – and details why it has fallen so far
behind the legally-required schedule. Section 3 presents the comparable portrait
for Russia and other countries, describing how Moscow, too, despite significant
outside financial assistance, has been blatantly unable to comply with the CWC’s
negotiated timetables. The declared inventories of Albania, India, Iraq, Libya,
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and South Korea pale in comparison to those of the United States and Russia,
but their travails have been similar; some have succeeded in timely elimination in
conformity with the treaty, but there are some interesting precedents of treaty
breach here, too.

Section 4 describes the political remediation efforts that the United States
has undertaken to date, in the largely successful effort to manage the violation on
a low-key political plane, through increased transparency and a renewed
commitment to the ultimate goal of a CW-free planet. These efforts have surely
been helpful, and are worth retaining, but they are hardly sufficient to solve the
overall legal and political problem. Section 5 then turns to international law,
concluding that the ostentatious failure places the United States and Russia into
a position of “material breach” of the CWC, even if their violations are not the
result of bad faith or deception and even if the retained CW inventories carry little
true military significance. This section also argues that international law’s
putative excuses for non-performance of a treaty obligation (such as
impossibility, changed circumstances, and force majeure) are unavailing in this
case, and it evaluates the effects of a peculiar tension between competing types
of CWC obligations. This section also inspects the array of remedies that
international law affords to innocent parties aggrieved by these ongoing
violations (such as suspension or termination of counter-performance, suit in the
International Court of Justice, and invocation of the specialized procedures
created by the CWC itself.)
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To put this specific CW case study into a larger context, Section 6 asks
how previous arms control treaties have managed to resolve this sort of dilemma
in the past, and how future accords could handle cognate challenges better. On
those rare occasions when the international political stars align in favor of a
disarmament measure, we do want the legal documents to exert pressure on the
weapons-holding states to eliminate their newly-banned inventories as soon as
practicable, but we do not want to again demand the impossible, or to jeopardize
the treaty structure if an unavoidable delay crops up. New treaties regulating
anti-personnel land mines and cluster munitions already implicate these same
dismantling concerns, and others may someday do likewise.

Returning to the CWC, Section 7 next surveys an array of possible
responses to the 2012 deadline crisis – it evaluates a roster of options that the
United States, Russia, the other CWC parties, and various international
institutions may be able to exercise to mitigate the problem. None of these
alternatives is perfect (and there may be something of an inverse relationship
between the options that would be “best” in some sense and the options that
would be most attainable), but consideration of the full cadre of possibilities may
be illuminating.

Section 8 offers some recommendations. Despite the fullyunderstandable and remarkably-successful U.S. government efforts to finesse
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this issue, missing this treaty deadline is a big deal. Rarely has the international
community been compelled to confront such an open-and-shut case of an
important violation of an important arms control treaty – and by the planet’s
leading players, no less. It may not be possible to avoid all the damage from this
collision, but perhaps some principles of value can still be salvaged.

Finally, Section 9 offers some concluding thoughts. What is at stake here
is not merely conformity with a single international obligation. Instead, each
occasion where international law is, or is not, adhered to constitutes an
expression of support or rejection of the global rule of law – and when the
planet’s leading military powers fail to perform as they have promised, the entire
fabric of the legal order is called into question. This is an occasion to set an
important precedent -- when the United States, in particular, should take the
opportunity to “model” for the rest of the world how an honorable country should
behave, if it finds itself in the unfortunate situation of violating a solemn
international agreement.

Overall, the animating force behind this article is an argument that the
long-term interests of the United States lie in validating the importance of full,
timely compliance with treaties – especially arms control agreements. Even if, in
a particular case, it might be possible to “finesse” an act of U.S. non-compliance
with a treaty, achieving by skillful diplomacy an agreement to a muted and nonpunitive global response, that short term accomplishment disserves the bigger
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picture. Instead, the United States should publicly own up to its breach, take its
medicine, and thereby demonstrate in the most powerful manner that compliance
with international law really is an enduring U.S. principle, applicable even to
ourselves, even when it comes with some pain.

Section 1: The Problem of Chemical Weapons and the Solution in the CWC
The story of chemical weaponry is long, sad, and convoluted. Throughout
the centuries and around the world, armies have regularly attempted to employ
poisons of varying formulae against their enemies; sometimes this scientific zeal
has resulted in telling battlefield advantage; even more often it has inspired
indiscriminate pain, horror and public revulsion. 2

2

See generally: John Ellis Van Courtland Moon, Controlling Chemical and Biological
Weapons Through World War II, in Richard Dean Burns (ed.), Encyclopedia of Arms Control and
Disarmament, 1993, vol II, p. 657; Charles C. Flowerree, Chemical and Bilogical Weapons and
Arms Control, in Richard Dean Burns (ed.), Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament,
1993, vol II, p. 999; Jean Pascal Zanders, International Norms Against Chemical and Biological
Warfare: An Ambiguous Legacy, 8 Journal of Conflict And Security Law No. 2, 2003, p. 391;
Frederick J. Vogel, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Strategic Implications for the United
States, January 8, 1997, available at
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=322; Paul F. Walker,
Abolishing Chemical Weapons: Progress, Challenges, and Opportunities, 40 Arms Control
Today No. 9, November 2010; Jonathan B. Tucker, War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from World
War I to Al-Qaeda, 2006; U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Technology, The Militarily Critical Technologies List Part II: Weapons
of Mass Destruction Technologies (ADA 330102), "Chemical Weapons Technology",
February 1998, available at http://www.fas.org/programs/bio/chemweapons/production.html
(describing CW production technology, military applications, and foreign state capabilities);
Senate Executive Report 104-33, The Chemical Weapons Convention, Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, September 11, 1996, p. 12-13 [hereinafter Report 104-33]; Federation of
American Scientists, Introduction to Chemical Weapons, and Types of Chemical Weapons, 2011,
available at http://www.fas.org/programs/bio/chemweapons/; Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons, Basic Facts on Chemical Disarmament, http://www.opcw.org/newspublications/publications/history-of-the-chemical-weapons-convention [hereinafter, Basic Facts];
Russian Munitions Agency, Chemical Disarmament, Chemical Weapons website,
http://www.munition.gov.ru/eng/zapasho.html, History of CW Development.

6

Pre-biblical literature from India (1500 B.C.), Greece (429 B.C.) and Rome
(150 B.C.) as well as subsequent lore from other combatants carry sagas of
fulminating gases wafted toward an adversary’s encampment, lethal potions
strategically dumped into enemy wells or rivers, contaminants insinuated into
foreign food supplies, and arrows and artillery shells laced with toxins. 3 World
War I married modern chemistry with that longstanding lethal intent, and 125,000
tons of mustard gas, phosgene, lewisite, cyanide and other insidious concoctions
polluted the European trenches, inflicting 1.3 million casualties and nearly
100,000 deaths. 4

In contrast, the central battlefields of World War II were remarkably CWfree, despite the fact that partisans on both sides were armed to the teeth with
enormous arsenals of much more deadly generations of nerve gases –
apparently primitive deterrence drove both sides toward mutual (if uncomfortably
unsteady) self-restraint. 5 A handful of notorious episodes of CW use after 1945 - especially the large-scale invocation of poisons by both sides in the 1980-1988
Iran-Iraq conflict, and by Iraq against its own Kurdish minority in 1987-1988 --

3

Moon, supra note __, p. 657-58; Zanders, supra note __, p. 392-93; Adrienne Mayor, Greek
Fire, Poison Arrows, and Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World,
2003.
4
Moon, supra note __, p. 659-62; Zanders, supra note __, p. 395; Basic Facts, supra note __;
Robert Noyes, Chemical Weapons Destruction and Explosive Waste/Unexploded Ordnance
Remediation, 1996, p. 3-6.
5
Moon, supra note __, p. 668-70. Chemical weapons were used by Italy in Ethiopia in 19351936, and by Japan in China in 1937-1945, as well as by Germany in many of the concentration
and death camps. Moon, supra note __, p. 666-68; Frederick J. Vogel, The Chemical Weapons
Convention: Strategic Implications for the United States,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub322.pdf
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kept the issue in the world’s attention, even if massive casualties and decisive
military victories were not necessarily achieved by this form of attack. 6

The counterpoint to the use of chemicals – the widespread public loathing
of this form of combat – provides a parallel history. Ancient civilizations recorded
their antipathy toward these invisible, insidious toxins, 7 and the public rejection of
the scourge of CW prompted some of the earliest arms control treaties: the St.
Petersburg Declaration of 1868, 8 the Brussels Declaration of 1874, 9 and the
Hague Conventions of 1899 10 and 1907 11 reflected the participants’ visceral
rejection of “asphyxiating or deleterious gases.” 12

6

Flowerree, supra note __, p. 1002-04; Walker, supra note __ (reporting that “[c]hemical
weapons have been used in warfare and terrorist attacks a dozen times or more in the last three
decades”); J.P. Perry Robinson, Origins of the Chemical Weapons Convention, in Morel and
Olson, supra note __, p. 37, 42-43 (listing dozens of instances after World War I in which CW use
was alleged); Report 104-33, supra note __, at 163, 169 (noting that in 1996, “[s]ome 20 nations
are now suspected of having chemical weapons or developing a chemical weapons capability.”);
Vogel, supra note __; Hearing 103-869, supra note __, p. 8 (statement of John D. Holum) (stating
that “Approximately 25 nations are now suspected of either possessing chemical weapons or
having the ability to produce them.”) In the 1980s, the United States alleged that the Soviet
Union and its allies used “yellow rain” chemical and biological weapons in Laos, Cambodia, and
Afghanistan; these reports were subsequently largely discredited. See U.S. Department of State,
Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan: An Update, Special Report No. 104,
November 1982.
7
Moon, supra note __, p. 657-58.
8
Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Certain Explosive Projectiles, Nov.
29/Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 474, 138 Consol. T.S. 297.
9
Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War, signed in
Brussels, August 27, 1874 (never entered into force), available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/135?OpenDocument.
10
Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II), concluded
July 29, 1899, entered into force September 4, 1900, Annex to the Convention, article 23 (“it is
especially prohibited…To employ poison or poisoned arms) and Declaration 2, Declaration on the
Use of Projectiles the Object of Which is the Diffusion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases (“The
Contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of projectiles the object of which is the diffusion
of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.”), 32 Stat. 1803, TS 403, 1 Bevans 247, 187 CTS (189899), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/dec99-02.asp.
11
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex:
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, concluded October
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, TS 539, 1 Bevans 631, Annex, article 23 (“it is especially forbidden…To
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The first modern arms control treaty, the Geneva Protocol of 1925, 13
placed the train of CW control firmly onto a steadier international track. That
accord (which is still in force and has attracted 137 parties14) binds countries to
abjure “the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all
analogous liquids, materials or devices.” 15 This treaty now constitutes essentially
a ban only against the first use of CW; it does not restrict countries’ possession
of lethal arsenals nor their application in retaliation for an enemy’s opening
chemical salvo. 16

The diplomatic process therefore continued unsated toward a more
comprehensive CW accord, but the post-World War II efforts largely succumbed
to Cold War politics and other distractions. 17 Three related international
agreements did help fill part of the void: the multilateral 1972 Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC)18 dealt with the related issue of disease-causing agents (as

employ poison or poisoned weapons”), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague04.asp.
12
1899 Hague Declaration No. 2, 1899, supra note __.
13
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare [hereinafter, Geneva Protocol], June 17, 1925,
available at http://unhq-appspub-01.un.org/UNODA/TreatyStatus.nsf.
14
See http://unhq-appspub-01.un.org/UNODA/TreatyStatus.nsf. The United States did not
join the Geneva Protocol until April 10, 1975.
15
Geneva Protocol, supra note __, second preambular paragraph.
16
See Report 104-33, supra note __, at 164; Moon, supra note __, p. 664; Flowerree, supra
note __, p. 1000-02.
17
See Report 104-33, supra note __, at 165-66; Flowerree, supra note __, p. 1011-14; Victor
A. Utgoff, The Challenge of Chemical Weapons: An American Perspective, 1991.
18
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 UST
583, TIAS 8062, 1015 UNTS 163 [hereinafter BWC].
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partially contrasted with pure poisons19); the bilateral 1989 Wyoming
Memorandum of Understanding 20 provided an interim U.S.-U.S.S.R. mechanism
for exchanging data and inspection visits in anticipation of a forthcoming broader
multilateral CW treaty; and the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement reflected
the two superpowers’ consensus to initiate promptly the process for destroying
most of their CW, even prior to the conclusion of a universal treaty. 21

That long-sought comprehensive treaty, the Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and

19

The precise distinction between “chemical” and “biological” agents is elusive. Essentially,
the concept of a biological weapon focuses upon living microorganisms that cause diseases in
humans, animals or plants. A chemical weapon operates through poison, rather than disease. A
“toxin” is a sort of middle ground, containing some of the characteristics of both CW and BW, and
being regulated by both the BWC and the CWC. See Julian Perry Robinson, Chemical and
Biological Weapons, in Nathan E. Busch and Daniel H. Joyner (eds.), Combating Weapons of
Mass Destruction: The Future of International Nonproliferation Policy, 2009, p. 74; Krutzsch and
Trapp, supra note __, at 31-32.
20
Memorandum of Understanding Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data
Exchange Related to Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Sept. 23, 1989, United States-U.S.S.R.,
reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1438 (1989) [hereinafter Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding]. This
agreement inaugurated a two-phase program of data exchanges about chemical weapons stocks
and reciprocal on-site visits. The contemplated exchange program was never fully implemented,
as U.S. authorities were unsatisfied with the accuracy and completeness of the data provided by
Soviet officials. U.S. Department of State, U.S.-Russian Wyoming Memorandum of
Understanding on Chemical Weapons, fact sheet,
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/factsheets/wmd/cw/cwmou.html; United States General
Accounting Office, Report, Arms Control: Status of U.S.-Russian Agreements and the Chemical
Weapons Convention, GAO/NSIAD-94-136, March 1994 [hereinafter, Status of U.S.-Russian
Agreements]; Report 104-33, supra note __, at 26-28, 166-67, 203-04.
21
U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Destruction and Non-production of Chemical Weapons and on
Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention, June 1, 1990, 29 I.L.M.
934, 1990; 56 Fed.Reg. 25,404 (1991) [hereinafter, Bilateral Destruction Agreement]. This
agreement called for each party to begin destroying most, but not all, of its CW and CW
production facilities, subject to verification inspections conducted by the other side. The
agreement was never operational, and was superseded by the CWC. Federation of American
Scientists, Bilateral Destruction Agreement, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/bda/index.html;
Report 104-33, supra note __, at 26-28, 166-67, 203-04.
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on Their Destruction (CWC), 22 finally ripened in 1993. It has now attracted 188
parties; two more states (Israel and Myanmar) have signed, but not yet ratified;
and only six countries (Angola, Egypt, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, and the
recently-formed South Sudan) have shunned the document altogether. 23

As its title suggests, the CWC aims to erect a permanent, allencompassing prohibition on chemical weapons. It exceeds the accomplishment
of the Geneva Protocol by banning all production, acquisition, retention, use,
preparation for use, and assistance to others for the use of chemical weapons; 24
and it establishes an elaborate mechanism for data exchanges, inspection by an
international organization, and dispute resolution mechanisms to ensure verified
compliance with the underlying obligations. 25 The treaty defines the prohibited
items expansively – it covers active chemical weapons agents and substances
that could be their “precursors”; 26 it likewise regulates even “non-lethal” tear gas

22

CWC, supra note __. The authoritative interpretative source regarding the CWC is Walter
Krutzsch and Ralf Trapp, A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention, 1994
[hereinafter, Krutzsch and Trapp].
23
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, website page, OPCW Member
States, http://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/member-states/; http://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/nonmember-states/. See also Daniel Feakes, Getting Down to the Hard Cases: Prospects for CWC
Universality, 38 Arms Control Today No. 2, March 2008 (discussing challenges of achieving
universal adherence to the CWC).
24
CWC, supra note __, art. I.1.
25
CWC, supra note __, arts. III (Declarations), VIII (the Organization), and IX (Consultations,
Cooperation and Fact-Finding). The OPCW has undertaken more than 4680 inspections of 195
chemical weapons-related sites and 1103 chemical industry sites in 81 countries. OPCW
Website, statistics column, http://www.opcw.org/; Walker, supra note __; OPCW, Executive
Council, Draft Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction in 2011, EC-69/3, July 11, 2012, p. 7-12 (reporting numbers of different types of
inspections conducted by OPCW in 2011).
26
CWC, supra note __, art. II.3. The treaty establishes three main categories of toxic
chemicals. Schedule 1 includes the most dangerous materials, those that have previously been
used as weapons; Schedule 2 includes substances that pose risks as weapons, but that are also
used in the civilian economy; Schedule 3 covers those of lesser, but still noteworthy risk. The
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and other riot control agents; 27 and it embraces even old, obsolete, and
abandoned chemical munitions that failed to detonate in combat or were
discarded carelessly in test ranges. 28 It requires dismantling or conversion of
facilities formerly used to produce CW,29 and it regulates international commerce
in substances and equipment that could be diverted for weapons purposes. 30
The CWC may be the longest, most detailed, most elaborately-crafted
multilateral arms control agreement in history. It has properly been hailed by UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon as “one of the greatest achievements in the
history of multilateral efforts to achieve disarmament and non-proliferation” and
“a fundamental pillar of international peace and security.” 31

treaty’s provisions regarding declarations of inventories, destruction of weapons, international
commerce, and verification of compliance vary according to which schedule covers the specific
chemical. This article concentrates on the provisions relevant to Schedule 1, the most salient
problem. See generally, CWC, supra note __, Annex on Chemicals. See also Ralf Trapp,
Advances in Science and Technology and the Chemical Weapons Convention, 38 Arms Control
Today No. 2, March 2008.
27
CWC, supra note __, arts. I.5, II.7. See also Kyle M. Ballard, Convention in Peril? Riot
Control Agents and the Chemical Weapons Ban, 37 Arms Control Today No. 7, September 2007.
28
CWC, supra note __, arts. I.3, II.5, II.6, and Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part
IV(B). See John Hart, Looking Back: The Continuing Legacy of Old and Abandoned Chemical
Weapons, 38 Arms Control Today No. 2, March 2008; OPCW, Conference of the States Parties,
Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in
2010, C-16/4, November 30, 2011, para. 1.14 (noting that ten countries reported new discoveries
of old or abandoned CW during 2010.)
29
CWC, supra note __, arts. I.4 and V.
30
CWC, supra note, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part VI.B, VII.C, and VIII.C.
31
“We Cannot Rest Until We Destroy All Chemical Arms,” Secretary-General Tells Meeting of
States Parties to Chemical Weapons Convention, UN Department of Public Information,
SG/SM/13974, DC/3316, November 28, 2011. See also OPCW, Conference of the States
Parties, Note by the Technical Secretariat, Review of the Operation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention Since the First Review Conference, RC-2/S/1, March 31, 2008, para 2.1 (noting that
the CWC “is widely appreciated as a unique multilateral agreement that, alone among treaties of
a similar nature, effectively bans an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, for all
countries and in a non-discriminatory fashion and under strict international control.”)
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In support of those aspirations, the CWC creates an implementing body,
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), 32 sitting in
The Hague and consisting of a Conference of the States Parties (comprising all
treaty members), 33 an Executive Council (composed of 41 member states) 34 and
a Technical Secretariat (the professional staff, headed by a Director-General). 35
The organization’s 2012 budget is approximately 70.6 million Euros (about $93
million). 36

Adjunct to the basic bans on production, stockpiling, and use of CW, the
treaty also requires each party to destroy all the chemical weapons it owns or
possesses or that are located at any place within its jurisdiction or control, 37 and
to do so “in an essentially irreversible way to a form unsuitable for production of
chemical weapons.”38 The CWC further specifies an “agreed rate and sequence
of destruction,” known as the “order of destruction.” 39 Specifically, each party is
obligated:
32

CWC, supra note __, art. VIII; OPCW Basic Facts, supra note __.
CWC, supra note __, art. VIII. B. The Conference of the States Parties is the “principal
organ” of the OPCW, authorized to consider any questions and to make recommendations and
decisions on all matters related to the CWC, including setting the budget, selecting members of
the Executive Council, appointing the Director-General, and taking “the necessary measures to
ensure compliance” with the Convention. Id. at article VIII.19, 21.
34
CWC, supra note __, art. VIII. C. The Executive Council is the “executive organ” of the
OPCW; it is to “promote the effective implementation of, and compliance with,” the Convention.
Id. at article VIII.31.
35
CWC, supra note __, art. VIII. D. The Technical Secretariat assists the other OPCW organs
in carrying out their functions, by preparing draft budgets, programs and reports, and conducts
the Convention’s verification measures. Id. at article VIII.37, 38.
36
OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Decision: Programme and Budget of the OPCW
for 2012, C-16/DEC.12, December 2, 2011. The approved 2012 figure (EUR 70,561,800)
represents a 5.4 percent decrease from the 2011 budget. Id. at Annex p. 9. See also OPCW
Today, Vol. 1, No. 1, April 2012, p. 10.
37
CWC, supra note __, art. I.1.2.
38
CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.12.
39
CWC, supra note __, art. IV.6.
33
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-to commence destruction operations within two years after the treaty
enters into force for it; 40
-to submit detailed annual plans for the destruction process; 41
-to destroy not less than one percent of its chemical weapons within three
years after entry into force; 42
-to destroy not less than 20 percent of the inventory within five years; 43
-to destroy not less than 45 percent within seven years; 44 and
-to destroy all its chemical weapons not later than ten years after entry into
force. 45

If a party, “due to exceptional circumstances beyond its control,”46 will be
unable to achieve any of these benchmarks in the order of destruction, it may
propose a modification of the timetable. In the extreme case, a party may submit
to the Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties a request for
an extension of the ten-year completion requirement, but “in no case shall the
deadline for a State Party to complete its destruction of all chemical weapons be
extended beyond 15 years after the entry into force of this Convention.” 47 The
CWC entered into force on April 29, 1997, so that ultimate, non-renewable
deadline for the destruction of all CW was April 29, 2012.

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

CWC, supra note __, art. IV.6.
CWC, supra note __, art. IV.7.
CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.17(a)(i).
CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.17(a)(ii).
CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.17(a)(iii).
CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.17(a)(iv).
CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.21.
CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.26.
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The request for an extension is to include: the duration of the proposed
continuance, a “detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension,”
and the party’s detailed plan for pursuing the destruction operations. 48 In
granting a prolongation, the Executive Council and the Conference of the States
Parties may set conditions, including specifying additional verification measures;
the party is to meet the costs of verification during the extension period. 49

The treaty leaves to each party the determination of what mechanism or
technique to employ for destroying its CW inventory, 50 subject to the conditions
that: a) each “shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people
and to protecting the environment”; 51 b) each will avoid the simple but intolerable
precedents of ocean dumping, land burial, or open-pit burning of the detritus; 52 c)
each shall bear the costs of its destruction process; 53 and d) the entire operation
must be undertaken in a transparent fashion, accessible to the international
inspectorate. 54

48

CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.25. A detailed
annual plan for destruction is to include: the quantity of each type of chemical weapon to be
destroyed at each destruction facility and the dates of operation; a detailed site diagram of each
facility; and a schedule of activities at each facility, including design, construction, installation of
equipment, operator training, scheduled periods of inactivity, etc. Id. at C.29.
49
CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.26.
50
CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.13.
51
CWC, supra note __, art. IV.10. Similar provisions, requiring parties to assign the highest
priority to ensuring the safety of people and protecting the environment, are included in articles
V.11 and VII.3. Notably, both art. IV.10 and art. V.11 specify that the destruction operations shall
be conducted “in accordance with [the party’s] national standards for safety and emissions.”
52
CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.13.
53
CWC, supra note __, art. IV.16.
54
CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).D.
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Unsurprisingly, a treaty of this ambitious scope and prominence – despite
its bipartisan origins -- attracted considerable political controversy in the United
States and elsewhere. 55 The U.S. Senate pondered its advice and consent to
ratification of the CWC for four years, ultimately endorsing the instrument on April
24, 1997, 56 subject to 28 conditions. These provisos addressed issues such as
mandatory detailed reporting to Congress about other parties’ compliance with
the treaty; enhancement of U.S. chemical defenses; and the level of dues and
other voluntary contributions to the OPCW that the United States would pay. 57
But none of the Senate’s expressed limitations concerned the obligation for
destruction or the accompanying timetable – on that point, at least, there was a
clear consensus both within the United States and internationally. 58 The treaty

55

Report 104-33, supra note __, at 173 (discussing issues addressed in the CWC ratification
debate). See Thomas Moore, Six Faulty Reasons for Supporting the Chemical Weapons
Convention, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, April 23, 1997; Kathleen C. Bailey, Problems
with the Chemical Weapons Convention, in Benoit Morel and Kyle Olson (eds.), Shadows and
Substance: The Chemical Weapons Convention, 1993, p. 17. The Convention had been
negotiated and signed under President George H.W. Bush; President Bill Clinton won the advice
and consent of the Senate and ratified the Convention.
56
United States Senate Conditions to Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, S.
75, 105th Congress (1997). In addition, the CWC implementing legislation, contained in the
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Public Law
105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, October 21, 1998, provides the authority for domestic implementation of
the CWC’s provisions.
57
Resolution of advice and consent, supra note __, condition 10 (“Monitoring and verification
of compliance”), condition 11 (“Enhancements to robust chemical and biological defenses”), and
condition 22 (“Limitations on the scale of assessment”).
58
See Report 104-33, supra note __, at 186 (noting that “The administration anticipates that
the United States will be able to meet the 2004 deadline, provided that environmental issues can
be resolved in a ‘timely manner.’”), 187 (“the present program can ensure environmentally safe
destruction within the 10-year timeline of the [Convention.]”), 189 (discussing the possibility that if
the United States became unable to destroy the stockpile within 10 years, it would be possible to
seek a 5-year extension, but cautioning that “Any delay on the part of the United States would
probably result in an equal or greater delay on the part of Russia….In addition, in the eyes of
many, the status of the United States as a major proponent of the Convention and arguably the
most technologically advanced Nation places a greater responsibility on its adherence to
Convention provisions.”), and 227 (concluding “Meeting the destruction schedule laid out in the
CWC will be a major challenge. Important political, environmental, and economic barriers lie
ahead. If the destruction effort does not keep pace with implementation of other provisions of the
CWC, however, the credibility of the entire Convention will be undermined.”)
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entered into force for the United States (and simultaneously for all the other
original parties) on April 29, 1997. 59

Finally, it must be noted that even a comprehensive, near-universal treaty
cannot by itself irrevocably solve the problem of CW. Indeed, rumors and
allegations persist of covert evasions, attempts to sneak something past the
OPCW inspectorate, or sputtering intentions to sustain a clandestine military CW
program on behalf of renegade countries. 60 The United States has publicly
charged China, Iran, Russia and Sudan with violating the CWC, 61 and similar

The Senate did attach conditions that required the president to explore “alternative
technologies” for the destruction of U.S. CW, “in order to ensure that the United States has the
safest, most effective and environmentally sound plans and programs for meeting its obligations”
and to consult with Congress about whether to submit a request to the OPCW Executive Council
for an extension of the deadline for destroying the CW stocks, if “the President determines that
alternatives to the incineration of chemical weapons are available that are safer and more
environmentally sound but whose use would preclude the United States from meeting the
deadlines of the Convention.” Resolution of advice and consent, supra note __, condition 27.
That condition also extended until April 29, 2007, the prior 2004 statutory deadline (established
by the Department of Defense Authorization Act for 1986, Public Law 99-145, sec. 1412, 99 Stat.
583, 50 U.S.C. 1521) for destroying U.S. CW. Condition 27 (B).
59
OPCW Website, page on OPCW Member States, http://www.opcw.org/nc/aboutopcw/memberstates/?tx_opcwmemberstate_pi1%5BsortField%5D=0&tx_opcwmemberstate_pi1%5BsortRevers
e%5D=0&tx_opcwmemberstate_pi1%5BASP_PAGE%5D=2&tx_opcwmemberstate_pi1%5Bpoint
er%5D=0. The treaty entered into force for Russia on May 12, 1997. Id.
60
U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, July 2010 [hereinafter, State
Compliance Report], p. 37 (general), 43 (China), 45 (Iran), 50 (Russia); U.S. Department of State,
Compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Condition (10)(C) Report, August 2010;
U.S. Department of State, Compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction,
Condition (10)(C) Report, August 2011; Status of U.S.-Russian Agreements, supra note __
(reporting that in 1994, “[t]he number of countries suspected of having or developing [chemical]
weapons has increased to 24.”); Jonathan B. Tucker, The Future of Chemical Weapons, New
Atlantis, Fall 2009/Winter 2010, p. 3.
61
Jonathan B. Tucker, Verifying the Chemical Weapons Ban: Missing Elements, 37 Arms
Control Today No. 1, January/February 2007; Stephen G. Rademaker, “National Statement to the
First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” April 28, 2003,
http://www.cwc.gov/outreach_industry_speeches_004.html; U.S. Department of State, Adherence
to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and
Commitments, August 2005, p. 50-62.
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apprehensions have been raised regarding CWC non-parties North Korea and
Syria. 62

Additionally, the threats of non-state actors – terrorist groups from Aum
Shinrikyo 63 (the Japanese cult that unleashed sarin nerve gas in the Tokyo
subway in 1995, killing 12 and injuring scores more) to al Qaeda 64 – were not at
the forefront of the CWC negotiators’ minds, but have come to loom large in
evaluating CW dangers and the treaty today. 65 Chemical (and biological)

62

Global Security Newswire, U.N. to Investigate North Korean Attempt to Export Reagents to
Syria, January 6, 2012; Joby Warrick, Syrian Unrest Raises Fears About Chemical Arsenal,
Washington Post, August 28, 2011; Major Ground Force Likely Needed to Guard Syrian
Chemical Arms: Pentagon, Global Security Newswire, February 23, 2012 (U.S. Department of
Defense estimates Syria has 50 CW manufacturing and storage facilities). Syria’s CW arsenal
became a special concern in the spring of 2012, as the ongoing insurgency there raised
apprehension that a sudden collapse of the government might leave a substantial quantity of
weaponized CW vulnerable to theft or seizure by terrorists. Joby Warrick, U.S., Allies
Accelerating Plans to Secure Chemical Arsenal as Syrian Crisis Worsens, Washington Post, May
19, 2012; Global Security Newswire, Syrian Resistance Develops Plan to Protect Chemical
Arsenal: Report, May 29, 2012.
63
Richard Danzig, et.al., Aum Shinrikyo: Insights into How Terrorists Develop Biological and
Chemical Weapons, Center for a New American Security, July 2011 (describing Aum Shinrikyo’s
program for developing a CW capability); Martin Martishak, Report: Cult Demonstrates Chemical
Terrorism Threat, Global Security Newswire, July 29, 2011 (concluding that CW is a more viable
and accessible option than biological weapons for terrorists).
64
Global Security Newswire, Al-Qaeda Magazine Urges Chemical, Biological Strikes Against
Foes, May 3, 2012 (describing recent article by the Yemen affiliate of al-Qaeda, recommending
the use of chemical and biological weapons for the mass killing of nonbelievers); Rolf MowattLarssen, Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality? Belfer Center,
January 2010, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/al-qaeda-wmd-threat.pdf (arguing that the
al Qaeda leadership is more interested in acquiring nuclear or biological weapons, leaving
chemical weapons to the initiative of individual cells; citing examples of prominent small-scale
CW terrorist activities); Rene Pita, Assessing al Qaeda’s Chemical Threat, Athena Paper Vol. 2,
No. 2, April 17, 2007; Chris Quillen, Three Explanations for al-Qaeda’s Lack of a CBRN Attack, 5
Terrorism Monitor No. 3, February 21, 2007.
65
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, The Global
Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism, Country Reports on
Terrorism 2010, August 18, 2011 (noting that “preventing chemical terrorism is particularly
challenging”); Walker, supra note __ (noting that Iraqi insurgent forces have employed crude
chemical weapons, by affixing improvised explosive devices to vehicles carrying tanks of chlorine
gas); Report 104-33, supra note __, at 209-11 (assessing the CWC’s likely impact on antiterrorism efforts); Global Security Newswire, Israel Concerned Syrian Chemical Arms May Be
Proliferating to Extremists, January 3, 2012; DG 2011 Statement, supra note __, paragraphs 114-
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weapons have frequently been referred to as “the poor man’s atomic bomb” -but with the bonus factor of greater accessibility, since as many as 70 different
compounds have been stockpiled as weapons by various countries. 66 The allure
of CW as an inexpensive, obtainable “equalizer” in international conflict has held
a great appeal. 67

Section 2: The U.S. Chemical Weapons Program
Just as American weaponeers have pursued virtually every other form of
possible military advantage over the years, so, too, did they explore the realm of
chemistry for hostile applications. Before and during World War II, the United
States manufactured untold quantities of varying chemical concoctions, which it
thankfully never applied in combat. 68 After the war, batches of the excess
chemicals were unceremoniously disposed of (often via insanely hazardous
techniques such as dumping in shallow waters or burial in unmarked trenches), 69

117; Jonathan B. Tucker, The Future of Chemical Weapons, New Atlantis, Fall 2009/Winter 2010,
p. 3.
66
Daniel H. Joyner, International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
2009, p. 80.
67
Neil C. Livingstone and Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., CBW: The Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb,
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, National Security Paper 1, February 1984.
68
In 1943, President Roosevelt, speaking about chemical weapons, declared, “I have been
loath to believe that any nation, even our present enemies, would or would be willing to loose
upon mankind such terrible and inhumane weapons…Use of such weapons has been outlawed
by the general opinion of civilized mankind. This country has not used them. I state categorically
that we shall in no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by
our enemies.” Quoted in Leonard A. Cole, Clouds of Secrecy: The Army’s Germ Warfare Tests
Over Populated Areas, 1990, p. 12.
69
U.S. Centers for Disease Control, History of U.S. Chemical Weapons Elimination,
http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/demil/history.htm (noting Operation CHASE (an acronym for “Cut Holes
And Sink ‘Em,” a 1960s program for loading unwanted CW onto obsolete ships which were then
scuttled).
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but an enduring inventory of nearly 30,000 metric tonnes of lethal chemicals was
retained, and research persisted on new and better agents. 70

By 1993, the stockpile consisted of some 3.3 million chemical weapons of
three general types: a) rockets, land mines, projectiles, and cartridges, equipped
with “energetic” components such as fuzes, propellants, or bursters; b) bombs,
which lack energetics; and c) bulk storage drums, especially ton containers and
spray tanks. 71 The two major categories of lethal CW are nerve agents
(denominated GA or tabun, GB or sarin, and VX), which are colorless, odorless,
and tasteless organophosphorus compounds that attack the central nervous
system, with even a tiny amount proving lethal; and vesicant or blister agents
(including mustard gas and lewisite), which kill via inhalation or infiltration through
exposed skin. 72

These apocalyptic devices and materials were stored at nine star-crossed
locations: Aberdeen, Maryland; Lexington, Kentucky; Newport, Indiana; Anniston,
70

CDC, supra note __.
Measurements of the quantities of chemical weapons are expressed inconsistently –
sometimes in metric tonnes (1000 kg or approximately 2200 pounds) and sometimes in tons
(2000 pounds). For example, in many sources, the original U.S. CW inventory is stated as
containing approximately 31,500 tons of agent. Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Chemical Weapons: Better
Management Tools Needed to Guide DOD’s Stockpile Destruction Program, General Accounting
Office, GAO-04-221T, October 30, 2003, p. 1.
71
United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Committees, Chemical
Weapons and Materiel: Key Factors Affecting Disposal Costs and Schedule, GAO/NSIAD-97-18,
February 1997 [hereinafter, Key Factors], p. 25.
72
Claudine McCarthy and Julie Fischer, Inching Away From Armageddon: Destroying the U.S.
Chemical Weapons Stockpile, Henry L. Stimson Center report, April 2004, p. 21-30; Report 10433, supra note __, at 167-69 (describing the various chemical weapons, their destructive effects,
and their utility); FAS, Introduction to Chemical Weapons, and Types of Chemical Weapons,
supra note __; Noyes, supra note __, p. 2 (noting that 3000 chemicals have been studied for use
as possible CW agents; 45 have seen widespread application in combat; and about a dozen have
been used in quantity.)
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Alabama; Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Pueblo, Colorado; Tooele, Utah; Umatilla,
Oregon; and Johnston Atoll in the Pacific. 73 Most of the ordnance remained in
reasonably stable condition, but the United States had stopped producing new
chemical weapons after 1969, 74 so by 1993, the inventory was seriously aging,
and deterioration of some of the components became inevitable. Leakage,
especially from the corroded 40-year old M55 rockets, became a recurrent
problem. 75

In addition to those components of the “active stockpile,” a vast quantity of
abandoned and obsolete “non-stockpile materiel” must also be accounted for
under the CWC. Nobody really knows how much noxious chemical waste was
inconspicuously dumped or buried over the decades, or where and when it might

73

McCarthy and Fischer, supra note __, at 3-19 (noting that each of the nine locations
provides its own mixture of types of chemicals and containers: Aberdeen, for example, held only
1625 tons of CW, almost all of it in the form of mustard agent in ton containers; Pine Bluff
contained 3850 tons, including sarin in rockets, VX in rockets and land mines, and mustard in ton
containers; Umatilla housed 3717 tons including sarin and VX in projectiles, rockets, bombs, land
mines and spray tanks, as well as mustard in ton containers.)
74
Report 104-33, supra note __, p. 185. Between 1987 and 1990, the United States
manufactured a small quantity of “binary” chemical weapons – devices in which two relatively
less-toxic chemicals are produced and handled separately, and they are combined to create a
lethal agent only when the shell or bomb is in flight en route to its target. These weapons were all
destroyed by 2007. U.S. Army, Chemical Materials Agency, Binary Chemical Weapons,
http://www.cma.army.mil/completedmissions.aspx; FAS, Introduction to Chemical Weapons,
supra note __.
75
McCarthy and Fischer, supra note __, p. 33, 49-54 (listing dozens of incidents involving
leaks, shutdowns and malfunctions at the CW storage and disposal sites); Global Security
Newswire, Pueblo Chemical Neutralization Plant Almost Finished, September 28, 2011 (reporting
101 documented instances of mustard agents leaks at the Pueblo arsenal alone); Amy E.
Smithson, The U.S. Chemical Weapons Destruction Program: Views, Analysis, and
Recommendations, Henry L. Stimson Center Report No. 13, September 1994, p. 15; U.S.
Department of Defense, Annual Status Report on the Destruction of the United States Stockpile
of Lethal Chemical Agents and Munitions for Fiscal Year 2011, September 30, 2011, p. 2, B-1
(noting five leaking CW munitions discovered in 2011; listing 5,183 incidents since 1980); Noyes,
supra note __, p. 31-34 (discussing leaks, especially from M55 rockets). See also Thousands of
Sites Could Be Altered to Produce Chemical Weapons, Expert Says, Global Security Newswire,
March 5, 2012 (noting that Russia, too, has experienced problems with leaking CW; in September
2010 four people at the Kirov destruction facility exhibited symptoms of nerve gas poisoning.)
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turn up – an Army survey in 1993 suggested that as many as 215 sites in 33
states might contain hidden repositories. 76 Some of the chemicals can retain
their lethality for decades, so whenever a potential deposit is revealed by an
unlucky construction crew’s backhoe, a farmer’s plow, or a fishing trawler’s net,
emergency response teams must immediately don their HAZMAT gear for a
delicate recovery and disposal operation. 77

The United States, with the Army in the lead role, had initiated efforts to
whittle down the CW arsenal in the 1970s, long before the CWC began to require
it. American authorities had already concluded that much of the weaponry was
so unstable, so unusable on the battlefield, and so undesirable strategically that
the United States should proceed with dismantling and destruction unilaterally,

76

U.S. Army, Guide to Non-Stockpile Chemical Warfare Materiel, October 2003; Walker,
supra note __ (citing 224 burial sites in 38 states); National Research Council, Committee on
Reivew of the Conduct of Operations for Remediation of Recovered Chemical Warfare Materiel
from Burial Sites, Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel, 2012 (considering
approximately 250 sites in 40 states); Key Factors, supra note __, at 40-54 (describing issues
affecting destruction of non-stockpile CW items); Milton E. Blackwood, Jr., Beyond the Chemical
Weapons Stockpile: The Challenge of Non-Stockpile Materiel, 28 Arms Control Today No. 5,
June/July 1998; U.S. Army, Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project, Guide to Non-Stockpile
Chemical Warfare Materiel, October 2005.
77
Walker, supra note __ (reporting that the most conspicuous such cleanup operation, in
Spring Valley, an upscale section of Washington, D.C., near American University, has cost more
than $250 million, recovering “dozens of buried chemical munitions, related toxic materials, and
unexploded ordnance over the last 17 years, all dumped after World War I.”); H.Q. Le and S.J.
Knudsen, Exposure to a First World War Blistering Agent, 23 Emergency Medicine Journal p.
296, 2006 (reporting serious injury to a U.S. military male who had suffered a short, small
exposure to decades-old mustard agent.)

22

independent of what other states might eventually do. 78 In 1985, Congress
mandated and funded the destruction operations. 79

Significant efforts to “neutralize” some of the toxins via chemical reactions
were undertaken during the 1970s and 1980s, but these proved slow, expensive,
and hazardous – and they generated even larger quantities of non-weaponized,
but still parlous, byproducts. 80

Attention next turned to incineration of the ordnance, and in the mid-1980s
the Army undertook to construct a series of state-of-the-art combustion chambers
at the nine sites where the weapons were housed. 81 The first such facility, on

78

McCarthy and Fischer, supra note __, at 45, Report 104-33, supra note __, at 187 (noting a
Congressional Research Service report that in the early 1980s, the U.S. Department of Defense
had declared 90% of the U.S. CW stockpile to be obsolete); U.S. Army, Chemical Materials
Agency, Fact Sheet: Milestones in U.S. Chemical Weapons Storage and Destruction, August
2009.
79
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY1986, H.R. 3616, Public Law 99-145, § 1412
(a), 99 Stat. 583, 50 USC 1521, November 8, 1985; Report 104-33, supra note __, at 185.
80
Committee on Alternative Chemical Demilitarization Technologies, National Research
Council, Alternative Technologies for the Destruction of Chemical Agents and Munitions, 1993, p.
54-62 (noting that between 1973 and 1976, the Army destroyed nearly 4,200 tons of CW via
chemical neutralization (also referred to as “hydrolysis”), but concluded that the process was too
complex and too expensive, and produced too much hazardous waste); Key Factors, supra note
__, at 11; CDC, supra note __, Methods Used to Destroy Chemical Warfare Agents; Thomas
Stock, Chemical Weapon Destruction Technologies for the Russian CW Stockpile, in Hart and
Miller, supra note __, at 75, 78-83 (identifying neutralization campaigns to destroy CW stocks);
J.F. Bunnett, Some Problems in the Destruction of Chemical Munitions, and Recommendations
Toward Their Amelioration, 67 Pure and Applied Chemistry No. 5, p. 841, 1995; U.S. Congress,
Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTABP-ISC-115, December 1993; Ronald Sutherland, The Destruction of Chemical Weapons and
Chemical Weapons Production Facilities, in M. Bothe, N. Ronzitti and A. Rosas (eds.), The New
Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation and Prospects, 1998, p. 185.
81
Key Factors, supra note __, at 18 (reporting that the Army, based upon a 1984 study by the
National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, concluded that incineration was
a more desirable mechanism for CW destruction, because neutralization was more expensive
and produced larger quantities of toxic byproducts); CDC, supra note __, Incineration. The
incinerators burn the CW at 2700 degrees Fahrenheit, with additional treatment in a 2000
degrees Fahrenheit afterburner, destroying 99.9999 percent of the agent. OPCW Website,
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Johnston Atoll, was erected in 1988 and began operating in 1990; larger versions
were then to be erected at most of the stateside locations, beginning with Tooele,
Utah, which retained the largest CW inventory. Some 1436 tonnes of CW (5
percent of the U.S. total) had already been destroyed in that fashion before the
CWC entered into force in 1997. 82 The original 1985 expectation was that the
destruction process could be efficiently completed within nine years, at a cost of
$1.7 billion. 83 Although that initial time frame quickly became obsolete, U.S.
government officials were again willing to stick out their collective necks on this
point during the 1994 Senate ratification hearings for the Convention, saying,
“We are confident that we can complete the destruction within the 10-year
timeline of the CWC.” 84

Destruction Technologies, http://www.opcw.org/our-work/demilitarisation/destructiontechnologies/.
82
Walker, supra note __.
83
McCarthy and Fischer, supra note __, p. 39.
84
Hearing 103-869, supra note __, p. 61 (statement of Harold P. Smith, Jr.), p. 66 (in
response to questioning about whether the destruction could be completed within the allowed ten
years, Smith responded, “Yes, sir, it can. One can never predict the effects of obtaining permits,
the effects of litigation, et cetera. But if the program proceeds on the path that it is now
embarked…we can, indeed, meet the timetable for the CWC. It is technically well within our
grasp. Our planning and budgeting is realistic.”), 20 (statement of John D. Holum) (legislation
could inhibit the process of destroying the CW, but “we have some cushion there.”)
Administration officials were less sanguine regarding Russia’s ability to complete the
destruction process within ten years, even with U.S. assistance and advice. Hearing 103-869,
supra note __, at 37 (statement of Stephen Ledogar) (recounting that during the CWC
negotiations, “the Russians noted there would be problems in meeting this deadline, making it
difficult for the Russian federation to ratify. Therefore, a compromise was struck, whereby the
ten-year destruction period was retained, with extension an unlikely, but not entirely impossible
event.”), 67 (statement of Walter B. Slocombe) (in addressing the likelihood of Russia meeting
the Convention deadlines, “I do not say unequivocally that they can meet the deadline. But it is a
far more optimistic, realistic situation than people may have thought.”), p. 84 (statement of Donald
Mahley) (“The official statements by the Russian federation to us, which we, of course, have no
formal way to refute, indicate that they can, with the appropriate priorities and the appropriate
resources, complete their destruction program within the 10-year period.”), p. 185 (questions for
the record for Stephen Ledogar) (“We believe that despite the political and economic situation in
Russia, there is sufficient administrative ability to get a CW destruction program functioning to
meet the CWC’s destruction deadline, given U.S. financial and technical assistance.”) See also
Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 63 (CWC negotiators included the possible five-year
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Those sanguine projections, however, soon proved illusory. Delays in
obtaining the portfolio of required federal and state permits and in drafting and
finalizing a series of programmatic and site-specific environmental impact
statements led to slippage of the timetable. 85 Those delays, in turn, drove
inflation in the budget estimates, especially when coupled with the erratic
adjustments compelled by the need to incorporate new features of the cuttingedge destruction technologies. 86 Whistle-blower charges of insufficient attention
to safety threw further spotlight on the problem, as did occasional accidents in
the construction and operations processes -- even while the continuing incidence
of weapon leakage demonstrated that simply maintaining the status quo was not
a viable course. 87

extension of the CW deadline in recognition of the special economic and other problems Russia
was facing).
85
See United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Committees,
Chemical Weapons: Sustained Leadership, Along with Key Strategic Management Tools, Is
Needed to Guide DOD’s Destruction Program, GAO-03-1031, September 2003 [hereinafter,
Sustained Leadership], p. 20 (destruction operations at several facilities were delayed due to
environmental permitting issues, sometimes due to “unanticipated engineering changes related to
reprogramming software and design changes that required permit modifications”); Key Factors,
supra note __ (concluding that due to lack of consensus about the destruction method to use, the
cost and schedule for the CW disposal program were uncertain.)
86
One chronology of cost and time overruns in the CW destruction process charts the
following coordinates relating the date that an official estimate was made, the projected cost (in
billions of dollars), and the anticipated time of completion: 1985: $1.7, 1994; 1989: $3.0, 1997;
1990: $3.4, 1997; 1992: $7.9, 2000; 1993: $8.6, 2003; 1994: $10.0, unspecified; 1995: $11.9,
2004; 1996: $12.0, 2004; 1997: $12.4, 2004; 1998: $12.7, 2007; 2000: $15.3, 2007; 2001: $24.0,
2011; 2002: $24.0, 2016; 2003: $25.1, 2007. McCarthy and Fischer, supra note __, p. 39. See
also Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 10.
87
See Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 20 (CW destruction operations at the Tooele
facility (the largest in the system) were suspended between July 2002 and March 2003 because
of an incident involving a plant worker who accidentally came into contact with nerve agent while
performing routine maintenance; even after a corrective action plan was instituted, several
temporary shutdowns occurred); Chemical Weapons Convention (Treaty Doc. 103-21), Hearings
rd
nd
before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 103 Congress, 2 session, March-June 1994,
S.Hrg. 103-869 [hereinafter, Hearing 103-869], p. 9 (statement of John D. Holum) (stating that the
dangers of leakage and contamination from continuing to hold CW in storage outweigh any
potential risks from destroying the weapons), 53 (statement of Walter B. Slocombe (risks of
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Two crucial political decisions then intervened, further complicating and
delaying the CW destruction process. The first negated a plausible efficiency
option, to concentrate the CW inventory into fewer locations, so fewer expensive
new incinerators would have to be constructed. The Army at one point had
contemplated erecting only three stateside incinerators, in centralized sites, but
Congress, responding to constituents’ NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) concerns
about the safety and security of transporting the huge quantities of such lethal
and sometimes fragile materials via truck or rail, forbade the executive branch
from pursuing relocation options. 88 This fateful decision, to construct multiple,
arguably redundant facilities, in order to avoid hazardous interstate transfers of

delaying the destruction of the aging stockpile are greater than the advantages of developing an
alternative technology other than incineration). See also Key Factors, supra note __, at 33-34
(concluding that the CW stockpile would be basically stable through 2013); Hinton, supra note __,
at 2 (judging that the U.S. CW demilitarization program “has suffered from several long-standing
and unresolved leadership, organizational, and strategic planning issues.”) See also several
reports of conflicting episodes of high regard for safety – but also conspicuous violations of basic
codes – at CW destruction facilities: U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, News Release: Pine
Bluff Chemical Agent Disposal Facility Achieves Safety Milestone – 1,000,000 Safe Work Hours
without a Recordable Injury, July 17, 2009; Utah Chemical Depot Clinic Wins Safety Award, Salt
Lake Tribune, January 26, 2011; Global Security Newswire, Umitilla Contractor Fined Over Nerve
Agent Monitoring, July 25, 2011; URS Fined for Violations at Umatilla Chemical Depot, Tri-City
Herald, November 30, 2010; Global Security Newswire, Anniston Chemical Weapons Disposal
Plant Operator Fined, September 15, 2010; Global Security Newswire, Umatilla Contractor Fined
Over Permit Breaches, February 2, 2012.
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National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1995, Public Law 103-337, sec. 143, 108 Stat.
2663 (1994), 50 U.S.C.A. 1512a (prohibiting transport of a chemical weapon outside the state in
which it was located on October 5, 1994); Key Factors, supra note __, at 11, 35-36; Amy E.
Smithson, The U.S. Chemical Weapons Destruction Program: Views, Analysis, and
Recommendations, Henry L. Stimson Center Report No. 13, September 1994; John Norton,
Pueblo’s Chem Demil Program Hits $3.6 Billion and Rising, Pueblo Chieftain, April 3, 2012. By
2010, the Department of Defense concluded that transportation of the remaining CW stockpiles to
existing incineration sites (instead of proceeding with construction of two neutralization facilities)
was “the only option with any reasonable probability of success” to achieve the destruction of the
stockpile by 2017, “however, this option is currently precluded by law.” U.S. Department of
Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Chemical
Demilitarization Program, Semi-Annual Report to Congress, September 2010.
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the noxious products, eventually came to carry momentous, irreversible
implications for the overall destruction timetable.

Second, simultaneously, some of the communities surrounding the eight
continental U.S. CW storage sites became especially interested in alternative
technologies, demanding consideration of options other than incineration, to seek
mechanisms that would not emit even the tiniest quantities of hazardous
byproducts from a smokestack. 89 The Army, relying upon determinations by the
National Academy of Sciences that incineration was a fully safe mechanism, 90

89

Committee on Alternative Chemical Demilitarization Technologies, National Research
Council, Alternative Technologies for the Destruction of Chemical Agents and Munitions, 1993;
Robert F. Durant, The Greening of the U.S. Military: Environmental Policy, National Security and
Organizational Change, 2007, p. 179-83; Alfred Picardi, Paul Johnston and Ruth Stringer,
Alternative Technologies for the Detoxification of Chemical Weapons: An Information Document,
Greenpeace, May 24, 1991; Citizens’ Solution for Safe Chemical Weapons Disposal, Chemical
Weapons Working Group, April 29, 2007, www.cwwg.org/citsol.07.html; Greenpeace Report
Finds Serious Health Hazards Linked to Waste Incinerators, www.cwwg.org/gppr.html, Triana
Silton, Out of the Frying Pan…Chemical Weapons Incineration in the United States, 23 The
Ecologist No. 1, January/February 1993, p. 18; U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Background Paper, Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies, OTA-BP-O-95,
June 1992; Pat Costner, Chemical Weapons Demilitarization and Disposal: Johnston Atoll
Chemical Disposal System, GB and VX Campaigns, Greenpeace, May 12, 1993.
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National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Disposal of Chemical Munitions
and Agents, 1984,
http://books.google.com/books?id=JGArAAAAYAAJ&pg=PR9&lpg=PR9&dq=%22Disposal+of+ch
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AQ&ved=0CCkQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=%22Disposal%20of%20chemical%20munitions%20an
d%20agents%22%201984&f=false. See also National Academy of Sciences, National Research
Council, Evaluation of Chemical Events at Army Chemical Agent Disposal Facilities, 2002,
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=10574&page=2; National Academy of Sciences,
National Research Council, Alternative Technologies for the Destruction of Chemical Agents and
Munitions, 1993, http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=2218&page=1; National Academy
of Sciences, National Research Council, Recommendations for the Disposal of Chemical Agents
and Munitions, 1994, http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=2348&page=2; National
Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Review and Evaluation of Alternative
Technologies for Demilitarization of Assembled Chemical Weapons, 1999,
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=9660&page=1; Report 104-33, supra note __, p.
186-87; CDC, supra note __, fact sheets on Incineration, Incinerator Air Emissions – Inhalation
Exposure Perspectives, and Safe Disposal of Chemical Weapons; Amy E. Smithson, The U.S.
Chemical Weapons Destruction Program: Views, Analysis, and Recommendations, Henry L.
Stimson Center Report No. 13, September 1994.
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resisted. Again, Congress waded into the fray, mandating non-incineration
methods at two of the locations housing the smallest inventories (Lexington and
Pueblo), 91 despite the fact that no chemical neutralization or other alternatives
had been demonstrated to be safe, effective and affordable on anything like the
requisite scale and cadence of the treaty-required operations. 92

91

In a series of enactments, Congress directed the U.S. Army to pursue alternatives to
incineration. First, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Public
Law 100-180, 101 Stat. 1019, sec. 125, December 4, 1987, required the Department of Defense
to evaluate non-incineration technologies and present to Congress “an alternative concept plan”
by March 15, 1998. Then, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Public
Law 102-484, 106 Stat. 2315, sec. 173-75, October 23, 1992, required additional study of
alternatives to incineration. Next, the National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year
1997, Public Law 104-201, 110 Stat. 2422, October 1996, sec. 142, required further study and
demonstration of alternatives. Then, the 1997 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Public
Law 104-208, sec. 8065, required pilot funding for two non-incineration alternatives. The Strom
Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1999, Public Law 105-261, sec. 142,
reorganized the Army’s chemical demilitarization apparatus and underscored the pursuit of
alternatives to incineration. The Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2000, Public Law
106-52, sec. 131 and the Fiscal Year 2000 Supplemental Appropriations, Public Law 106-246,
114 Stat. 511 (2000), prohibited construction of any CW destruction facility at Lexington until six
different alternatives to incineration were demonstrated. The Floyd D. Spence National Defense
Authorization Act for FY 2001, Public Law 106-398, sec. 151, limited the operations at Pueblo to
incineration and the alternative technologies that had been demonstrated by May 1, 2000.
The Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2008, Public Law 110-116, sec. 8119,
the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008, Public Law 110-181, sec. 922, and the Ike
Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2011, Public Law 112-383, sec. 1421 all
directed the Department of Defense to destroy all U.S. CW by the deadline established by the
CWC, or in no circumstances later than December 31, 2017.
In 1994, the Army decided to use nonincineration technologies at Aberdeen and Newport,
because each of those sites housed only a single chemical agent, stored only in ton containers,
making the demilitarization process simpler. In 1997, pilot testing of neutralization technology
was approved for those two facilities. Sustained Leadership, supra note __, at 5; Durant, supra
note __, at 182.
92
Noyes, supra note __, p. 40 (reporting that the National Academy of Sciences had
concluded in 1984 that neutralization processes would be more expensive and generate large
quantities of toxic wastes), p. 58-70 (critically assessing other alternative technologies); Key
Factors, supra note __, at 35 (concluding that “alternative technologies may not reduce costs or
shorten disposal operations”).
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Eventually, a patchwork of five incinerators (at Johnston, Tooele, Umatilla,
Anniston, and Pine Bluff) and four neutralization facilities (at Newport, Aberdeen,
Pueblo, and Lexington) was created. 93

The United States succeeded in meeting its initial CWC deadlines,
destroying one percent of the CW inventory by September 1997 and 20 percent
by July 2001. 94 In October 2003, the United States solicited and received a
three-year extension of the original April 2004 deadline for destroying 45 percent
of the stocks. 95

By 2003, it had also become abundantly clear that the mandate to
eliminate the entire CW legacy by the 10-year point – April 2007 – could not be
satisfied, and concerns were rising about the program’s compatibility with even a
2012 target. 96 The United States therefore took advantage of the CWC
procedure to request the single allowable five-year extension of the original
93

Walker, supra note __; Blue Grass Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant, fact sheets on
Hydrolysate Overview, Neutralization Followed by Supercritical Water Oxidation, and Chemical
Weapons Destruction at Blue Grass (describing the destruction technology to be used in
Kentucky).
At each site, some “reject” weapons are destroyed using alternative technologies, such
as the Detonation of Ammunition in a Vacuum Integrated Chamber (DAVINCH), an explosive
mechanism applicable to units that have leaked, are unstable, contain solidified residues, or are
otherwise unsuitable for routine processing. U.S. Army Element, Assembled Chemical Weapons
Alternatives, Information Sheet: DAVINCH Overview, December 2009,
https://www.pmacwa.army.mil/info/dl/DAVINCH_fact_sheet.pdf.
94
Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 6; Statement by U.S. Ambassador Robert P.
th
Mikulak at the 16 Session of the Conference of the States Parties, OPCW, C-16/NAT.31,
November 29, 2011 [hereinafter, Mikulak November 29, 2011 Statement], p. 1 (the United States
also met the treaty deadline for destroying all of its prior CW production facilities).
95
OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Decision: Extension of the Intermediate and Final
Deadlines for the Destruction by the United States of America of Its Category 1 Chemical
Weapons, C-8/DEC.15, October 24, 2003
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Hinton, supra note __, at 2, 7-8. See also Semi-Annual Report, supra note __, at 4 (noting
2008 assessments of options for destruction).
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milestone. 97 Pursuant to a recommendation from the OPCW Executive Council,
the Conference of the States Parties granted the request on December 8, 2006,
fixing the firm final date for completion of the destruction as April 29, 2012. 98

Even that 2006 extension was addressed with tongues firmly planted in
cheeks: the United States estimated, and the other CWC states heard, that only
about 2/3 of the existing American CW inventory would, in fact, be destroyed by
April 29, 2012. 99 In a series of presentations over the succeeding years, the
United States made clear (typically in “informal,” but quite authoritative,
statements) that it was not on a pathway that would get close to full, timely
compliance with the treaty’s basic obligation. 100

In an unusual bit of good news since 2007, a variety of corrective
measures (based on “learning the lessons” from the initial incinerator
experiences, adopting risk mitigation efforts, and providing additional financial
97

OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Decision: Extension of the Intermediate and Final
Deadlines for the Destruction by the United States of America of Its Category 1 Chemical
Weapons, C-8/DEC.15, October 24, 2003; Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,
Report of the Executive Council on the Performance of Its Activities in the Period from 2 July
2005 to 7 July 2006, EC-47/3, C-11/2, November 8, 2006, para. 2.17.
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OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Decision, C-11/DEC.17, December 8, 2006.
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Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States Delegation to the OPCW at the
th
65 Session of the Executive Council, EC-65/NAT.8, July 12, 2011, [hereinafter, Mikulak July 12,
2011 Statement]; Rumsfeld: U.S. Will Miss Chemical Weapons Disposal Deadline, Army Times,
April 13, 2006.
100
See, e.g., Mikulak July 12, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 1, 5; Statement by
th
Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States Delegation to the OPCW at the 64 Session of the
Executive Council, EC-64/NAT.5, May 3, 2011, p. 1; Statement by Ambassador Robert P.
Mikulak, United States Delegation to the OPCW at the 63rd Session of the Executive Council,
EC-63/NAT.16, February 15, 2011, p. 1; Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United
th
States Delegation to the OPCW at the 15 Session of the Conference of the States Parties, C15/NAT.3, November 29, 2010, p. 4; Statement by Andrew C. Weber, U.S. Delegation to the
th
OPCW, at the 14 Session of the Conference of the States Parties, C-14/NAT.7, November 30,
2009, p. 5.
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performance incentives to the construction and operations companies) produced
a significant acceleration in the destruction timetable. 101 Exploiting those
benefits, a major milestone was reached on January 21, 2012: the incineration of
the last CW munition stored at the Tooele site. With that accomplishment, all five
of the incineration sites and the first two of the neutralization sites had finished
their demilitarization work, totaling almost 90 percent of the U.S. treaty-required
destruction; only the last two alternative technology sites now linger past the
treaty deadline. 102

But those two locations will be drawn much further “to the right” on the
timeline: Pueblo, which contained 8.5 percent of the original U.S. inventory
(some 2371 tonnes of mustard variants HD and HT in 4.2 inch mortars, 105mm
projectiles and 155mm projectiles) will commence operations in 2015 and finish
in 2019. Lexington, which is home to 1.7 percent of the original stockpile (475
101

Among the tactics adopted to accelerate the timetable have been recruiting experienced
operators from the sites that have completed operations, to retain their expertise; using smallscale systems (such as mobile explosive chambers) to destroy individual munitions that are in
such weakened or deteriorating condition that standardized handling operations would be
hazardous; off-site treatment or disposal of energetics, contaminated wastes and filters; and
development of improved systems to lessen the impact of mercury contamination from certain
weapons.
102
U.S. Army, Chemical Materials Agency, CMA News, February 2012; U.S. Army Element,
Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives, Information sheet, Quick Facts: ACWA Program
Certification 2011 [hereinafter, Quick Facts]. Cleanup work, such as destroying the infrastructure
of the incineration facility, including the incinerator itself, will continue for some additional years at
each site, even after the CW stocks are eliminated.
Pursuant to statute, the executive branch reports frequently to Congress regarding
progress in CW demilitarization. The Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2008, Public
Law 110-116, sec. 8119; the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008, Public Law 110181, sec. 922 (c). See Semi-Annual Report, supra note __. The United States also provides
regular reports to the OPCW and its subsidiary bodies. See Mikulak November 29, 2011
Statement, supra note __, p. 2 (noting the pattern of reporting every 90 days on progress);
Mikulak July 12, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 2; OPCW, Note by the Director-General,
Status Report on the Progress Made by Those States Parties That Have Been Granted
Extensions of Deadlines for the Destruction of Their Chemical Weapons, EC-58/DG.11, October
7, 2009.
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tonnes of agents GB, VX and H in M55/56 rockets, 155mm projectiles, and 8 inch
projectiles) will begin destruction operations in 2020 and not finish until late
2023. 103 Thus, even with an expenditure now pegged at over $38 billion, the
United States is not projected to complete the task of destroying all its CW until
the fourth quarter of 2023, more than 11½ years after the treaty’s absolute
deadline. 104

Multiple factors account for the protracted delays. First, the job itself is
simply very difficult and complex. The weapons are old and extremely
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U.S. Army Element, Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives, News Release,
Department of Defense Approves New Cost and Schedule Estimates for Chemical Weapons
Destruction Plants, April 17, 2012 [hereinafter, New Cost Estimates]; Global Security Newswire,
Pentagon Pushes Back Chemical Weapons Disposal Schedule, April 17, 2012; Quick Facts,
supra note __; Kentucky Chemical Weapons Disposal Facility Half Finished, Global Security
Newswire, May 22, 2012 (construction of the CW destruction plant is slightly more than 50
percent complete; four of the 11 major technical systems are still being built or undergoing trials).
Note that this schedule also introduces two “gap” periods, when the United States will not
be undertaking any ongoing CW destruction operations at all, despite being in violation of the
CWC: from the conclusion of the incineration operations (January 2012) until the start of
neutralization operations at Pueblo (2015) and from the conclusion of operations at Pueblo (2019)
to the beginning of operations at Lexington (2020). These gaps do not legally worsen the treaty
breach, but they do look bad to the international community, aggravating the adverse political
impression. See Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States Delegation to the
th
OPCW at the 69 Session of the Executive Council, EC-69/NAT.15, July 11, 2012, p. 1
(characterizing the U.S. CW “destruction” program as currently being a “construction” program,
because the United States is building, but not yet operating, new facilities).
104
Chris Schneidmiller, U.S. Chemical Weapons Disposal Slippage “No Surprise,” Expert
Says, Global Security Newswire, April 18, 2012 (noting that the United States has spent or
committed $28 billion for the destruction of CW at the first several sites, and expects to spend an
additional $10.6 billion for operations at the final two locations); Mikulak November 29, 2011
speech, supra note __, p. 2 ($23.7 billion spent so far); Quick Facts, supra note __; Ahmet
th
Uzumcu, address to 15 Chemical Weapons Demilitarization Conference, Glasgow, United
Kingdom, May 22, 2012, p. 2 (noting a September 2023 projected completion date).
Note that not only is there a mismatch between the U.S. destruction program and the
CWC, there is a similar disconnect between the reality of the program’s timetable and the
applicable U.S. statutory law. Congress has not yet adjusted the legislated 2017 date for 100
percent completion of the destruction program, even while approving Army plans that are
considerably in excess of that date. The Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2008,
Public Law 110-116, sec. 8119, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008, Public Law
110-181, sec. 922, and the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2011, Public
Law 112-383, sec. 1421 all directed the Department of Defense to destroy all U.S. CW by the
deadline established by the CWC, or in no circumstances later than December 31, 2017.
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hazardous (both because of the toxic chemicals themselves, and because of the
explosives in most units); some of them are quite fragile, corroded or already
leaking; and in some instances, the liquid chemical has partially solidified into
congealed “heels” that resist ordinary treatment algorithms. The disassembly
and destruction processes must be conducted under rigidly controlled conditions
in a hermitically sealed environment, to preempt any unwarranted excursions by
lethal agents. The various destruction technologies are all novel, not previously
proven (or even invented) and few firms are qualified to undertake the massive
design, construction and operation requirements. In many instances, there is
simply no way to “bake this cake faster,” because the construction of the
necessary facilities is an intricate, multi-step process, and is followed by a
lengthy “systemization” phase, involving the progressive testing of all
components, systems and subsystems and a working demonstration that the
plant and its personnel are ready to commence agent operations. 105

Of special interest, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 also imposed unforeseen
disruptions on the CW demilitarization effort. Previously, factors such as the type
of weapons, the size of each local stockpile, and the difficulty of the particular
destruction operation had been the principal drivers in determining the priority of
operations among the various sites and within each site. After 9/11, however,
the assessed vulnerability to terrorist attack or seizure also became an overriding
consideration, triggering a significant reallocation of resources toward the
relatively small inventories housed at Aberdeen and Newport. There, bulk
105

See Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 30 (describing the systemization process).
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mustard agent was held in voluminous container tanks, which were judged to be
at greater risk than the warheads or artillery projectiles stored elsewhere.
Responding well to that increased sense of urgency, the program succeeded in
eliminating those two repositories relatively quickly (almost two years ahead of
the original schedule, in the case of Aberdeen 106), but the sudden reorientation of
the planned sequence imposed some costs and delays. 107

Moreover, the U.S. CW destruction program did itself no favor by creating,
and too-frequently revising, a rickety bureaucratic apparatus that provided
inconsistent oversight, poor coordination, and unclear goals, seriously
undercutting performance. The U.S. General Accounting Office (now the
Government Accountability Office) has issued dozens of reports on various
aspects of the CW program, concluding as early as May 2000 that “Effective
management of the Chemical Demilitarization Program has been hindered by its
complex management structure and ineffective coordination among program
offices and with state and local officials.”108 The GAO amplified that judgment in
2003, scolding that “the program remains in turmoil, affecting management
performance because of long-standing and unresolved leadership,
organizational, and strategic planning issues.” 109
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McCarthy and Fischer, supra note __, p. 4.
Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 5, 22-23.
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U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons Disposal: Improvements Needed in
Program Accountability and Financial Management, Report to Congressional Committees, May
2000, GAO/NSIAD-oo-80, p. 15.
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Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 3. See also McCarthy and Fischer, supra note __,
at 45-47 (presenting a time line highlighting organizational changes in oversight of the CW
demilitarization program); Alexander Kelle, Chemical Weapons Destruction Deadline Missed,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 24, 2012 (citing drastic budget cuts in 2006 as impeding
107
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The GAO critiques focused on management and bureaucratic
weaknesses, shifting leadership, changes in oversight responsibilities, and
ineffective reorganizations, as well as safety incidents during operations, delays
in environmental permitting, and insecurities about community protection – all of
which contributed to plagues of schedule delays and cost overruns. 110 Even the
Department of Defense concurred in those harsh judgments. 111

The most recent programmatic introspection, a six-month assessment
culminating in June 2011, was occasioned by the mushrooming cost projections
at the final two neutralization sites. Under the Nunn-McCurdy Act, a searching
federal review is required when a major defense program exceeds its projected
budget by 25 percent. 112 For Pueblo and Lexington together, the estimates
surged 33% from the previous (April 2007) $7.9 billion to $10.6 billion. 113 The

development of the last two CW destruction sites); Rumsfeld: U.S. Will Miss Chemical Weapons
Disposal Deadline, Army Times, April 13, 2006.
110
Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 12, 18, 20. See also Durant, supra note __, at
178-79.
111
Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 36.
In 1997, Congress established the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment program
(later renamed as Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives), which assumed responsibility for
destruction of the CW at the Pueblo and Lexington sites. CDC, supra note __, fact sheet on
Methods used to Destroy Chemical Warfare Agents. The Army Chemical Materials Agency
remained responsible for destroying the larger quantity of U.S. CW at the incineration sites.
112
Continued Financing of Government Operations, Public Law 111-123 § 206, 123 Stat. 3483
(2009), May 22, 2009, codified at 10 U.S.C.A. 2433a. A “significant” Nunn-McCurdy breach
occurs when a major defense acquisition program experiences an increase of 15 percent in
budgeted costs; these must be notified to Congress. For the chemical destruction program, that
notification was provided on July 21, 2010. A “critical” Nunn-McCurdy breach occurs when the
program’s costs exceed the baseline estimates by 25 percent. Any such programs must be
terminated unless the Department of Defense makes specified findings and notifies Congress.
Quick Facts, supra note __.
113
Chris Schneidmiller, U.S. Chemical Weapons Disposal Slippage “No Surprise,” Expert
Says, Global Security Newswire, April 18, 2012; New Cost Estimates, supra note __; Quick
Facts, supra note __; Ji S. Byun, Caolionn L. O’Connell, and Patricia F. Bronson, Chemical
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Department of Defense therefore reviewed and restructured these final aspects
of the CW destruction program, certifying to Congress that:
--continuation of the program is essential to the national security;
--there are no alternatives to the program that can meet the requirements
at less cost;
--the new estimates of total program costs are reasonable;
--the program has a higher priority than other programs whose funding
must be reduced in order to accommodate the increases here; and
--the program’s management structure is adequate to control costs. 114

Concluding that the main cause of the Nunn-McCurdy violation had been
the unrealistic earlier budget and risk profiles, rather than a fundamental problem
with the CW destruction program itself, the Department of Defense did not
impose significant changes in the activities or plans at Lexington or Pueblo, but
grafted on some additional options for responding to future difficulties, and

Demilitarization—Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA): Root Cause Analysis,
Institute for Defense Analysis Paper P-4677, July 2011, p. iii, 9 (reporting that the revised cost
overrun reaches 39.22 percent from the 2007 estimate); U.S. Department of Defense, Annual
Status Report on the Destruction of the United States Stockpile of Lethal Chemical Agents and
Munitions for Fiscal Year 2011, September 30, 2011, p. 4 (citing a 37 percent increase);
Chemical Demilitarization Work at Blue Grass Estimated to Cost $5.3B, Global Security
Newswire, June 18, 2012.
114
Letter dated June 14, 2011 from Under Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter to President
of the Senate Joseph R. Biden, Jr. The letter addresses the five elements that must be resolved
in a Nunn-McCurdy justification, arguing a) that the destruction of the remaining CW arsenal was
essential to U.S. security because it was necessary to comply with the federal law and the CWC;
b) that detailed metrics were examined to determine that no other program could accomplish the
mission more successfully; c) that the adjusted cost estimates were based on a 50 percent
confidence level; d) that the high priority for this program had been affirmed by both Congress
and the executive branch; and e) that the management structure was evaluated in eight primary
areas to facilitate evaluation. See also Byun, et. al., supra note __, p. 9 (noting that the CW
destruction program had triggered a previous Nunn-McCurdy violation in 2006).
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inserted a more realistic set of estimates. 115 Most significantly, these revisions
included prolonging the previously-announced timetable by the additional two
years, to culminate in 2023. 116

With the adjustments, the Pueblo facility will employ a chemical
neutralization (hydrolysis) operation, followed by secondary bio-treatment of the
hydrolysate (the byproduct of neutralization). 117 In (partial) contrast, Lexington
will use neutralization followed by supercritical water oxidation. 118 Although
these two sites contain only a small fraction of the original U.S. CW inventory,
they include some of the most troublesome types of munitions (always more
difficult to deal with than bulk containers, because of the presence of the
explosive components), and the risks of designing, erecting and operating firstof-a-kind systems and equipment are profound.
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For example, if, following the neutralization operations at Pueblo or Lexington, problems
are encountered in the on-site treatment of the hydrolysate, the restructured program could turn
to off-site treatment or disposal. Likewise, a supplementary Explosive Destruction Technology
could be employed at Lexington to deal with selected problematic mustard munitions. Quick
Facts, supra note __.
116
New Cost Estimates, supra note __.
117
U.S. Army, Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant, Fact Sheet: Neutralization
Followed by Biotreatment, June 18, 2008,
https://www.pmacwa.army.mil/info/dl/pcapp_neut_bio_18june08.pdf. In this process, the first
stage uses hot water to neutralize the agent, destroying the mustard molecules; the second stage
uses bacteria to consume the remaining organic components.
Some of the weapons at Pueblo will be destroyed by controlled detonation in a portable
chamber, because they are so unstable that the standard method is unsuitable (and also to
speed up the process). Global Security Newswire, Pentagon Trims Plan for Detonating Pueblo
Mustard Munitions, September 14, 2010; Associated Press, Army Cuts Back Plan to Blow Up
Colo. Chemical Arms, Denver Post, September 14, 2010.
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first neutralizes the agent, and then the resulting material is exposed to very high temperatures
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In sum, by April 29, 2012, the U.S. CW demilitarization program had
accomplished a heroic task, completing the destruction of 24,923.671 tonnes of
CW -- all the inventory held at the incineration sites – some 89.75 percent of the
original total American inventory. 119 Moreover, progress in the construction of
the final two facilities (the neutralization sites at Lexington and Pueblo) has been
proceeding apace, and full financial support for the operation has been retained
to date, despite the national economic difficulties. 120 Still, the United States will
run well past the CWC’s full obligation – 100 percent destruction of the inventory
– by at least 11 years.

Section 3: Soviet, Russian, and Other Parties’ Chemical Weapons Programs
The story of the rise and fall of the chemical weapons program in the
Soviet Union (and Russia) is distressingly similar to that described above. 121
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Like the United States, the U.S.S.R. willingly invested time, technology, talent,
and treasure in developing, refining, and producing a massive, varied CW
armada. In fact, by the 1990s, Moscow commanded an unparalleled CW
infrastructure, having developed even more types of chemical weapons and
having integrated them into the national military planning and training even more
fully than did the United States. 122 In 1989, the U.S.S.R. declared an inventory of
40,000 metric tonnes of lethal CW, including the nerve agents sarin, soman and
VX, as well as mustard, lewisite, phosgene, and other horrors, at seven sites. It
estimated at that time that $5-6 billion would be required to destroy that
inventory. 123

The fact that Soviet and Russian military forces had not used modern
chemical weapons in combat did not mean that it was easy to surrender that
capability. Indeed, defectors alleged that even in the era of Presidents Mikhail
Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, secret research and development continued
unabated, to create entire new categories of novel chemical agents, possessing
increased lethality and the ability to circumvent existing Western detection and
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protection equipment. 124 Moreover, severe national financial restrictions in the
immediate post-Cold War era hobbled Russia’s ability to undertake the
expensive operations necessary to destroy its mountainous CW stockpiles and
the associated production and storage facilities. 125

To help mitigate the continuing threat posed by this looming Russian CW
legacy, the United States and other developed Western nations volunteered
significant financial, technological and managerial assistance. The U.S. NunnLugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program provided the most substantial
support, totaling $1 billion in aid toward the planning and construction of a CW
neutralization plant at Shchuch’ye. 126 Others in the Global Partnership Against
the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (established by the
Group of Eight at Kananaskis, Canada in 2002) also contributed greatly:
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Germany ($475 million), Canada ($82 million) and the United Kingdom ($39
million). 127

These cooperative ventures were not without perturbations; controversies
about the relative size of the respective contributions by Russia and its partner
nations, about allocation of legal liabilities for possible mishaps, and about the
continuing Russian penchant for secrecy in the demilitarization operations were
continuous irritants. 128 Still, funding for Russia’s CW destruction program now
seems to have stabilized at last, and progress toward complete destruction has
accelerated. 129
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Unlike the United States, Russia avoided incineration as a disposal
mechanism, considering it a “primitive” solution – unsafe, costly and politically
unsustainable – and opted instead for a variety of chemical neutralization
processes. 130 These technologies generated their own controversies, including a
debate about how much chemical processing of the lethal agent would be
required to meet the CWC standard of destroying the CW “in an essentially
irreversible way,” 131 to ensure that the residue could not readily be “reverse
engineered” back into chemical weapons form. 132

The current status of the Russian CW destruction program depicts an
enterprise that is still running well behind that of the United States on the track
toward total elimination of the stockpiles, but that is projected to catch up and
surpass the American level of success in the coming years. Seven destruction
facilities have been built (again, as with the United States, one at each of the CW
storage sites, to minimize transportation.) Russia did not begin CW destruction
130
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operations until December 2002, and the country reached the CWC’s first
milestone (for eliminating one percent of the inventory) in April 2003, almost
three years late. 133

On October 26, 2001, Russia requested, and on December 8, 2006, the
OPCW Conference of the States Parties granted, the single treaty-allowed fiveyear extension of the original 10-year deadline for complete destruction of the
stockpile, creating for Russia the parallel April 29, 2012 deadline applicable for
the United States. 134 On May 30, 2011, Russia declared that it had destroyed 50
percent of its inventory, 135 and at the April 29, 2012 deadline, it announced that it
had reached the 62 percent level, having destroyed 24,961 tonnes of CW.136

Russia also projected that it would reach complete destruction by the end
of 2015, some three years later than permissible, but still eight years ahead of
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the current U.S. timetable. 137 However, some doubt those projections, predicting
that Russia’s program may require until 2017 or 2018 to finish the task. 138

In addition, it is instructive to note that five other countries, too, have
contributed their own lethal drops into the CWC bucket of chemical weapons
destruction. 139 South Korea eliminated its modest declared inventory of
approximately 2000 tonnes by July 2008 (having received an extension of its
original deadline). 140 Likewise, India destroyed its 2000 tonnes by March 16,
2009, pursuant to an extension. 141 Both those states have been quite secretive
regarding their CW activities, and little is known about the size, composition, or
location of their inventories, or about the process through which they were
eliminated. In fact, South Korea is so sensitive about this whole matter that at its
insistence, in all official OPCW documents, South Korea is not even identified by
137
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name as having possessed and destroyed CW, but is referred to obliquely as “a
State Party.” 142

Albania experienced more difficulty; it initially possessed only 16 tonnes of
CW, the smallest of any declared national inventory, and a destruction deadline
was set for April 29, 2007. In the two months before that date, however, Albania
indicated that it would have difficulty meeting the schedule, and on April 27,
2007, it formally notified the OPCW Executive Council that it would be unable to
complete the task on time – but it never submitted an actual request for an
extension. Albania did continue to make frequent reports to the OPCW about its
progress in destroying the weapons, and the Executive Council noted that the
country was quite close to finishing the process. The Conference of the States
Parties did not address the issue. On July 4 and 11, 2007, the Technical
Secretariat notified the Executive Council that Albania had accomplished the
destruction – about ten weeks late, with no formal extension or other legal
approval from the OPCW.143 Albania thereby became the first country to
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complete the destruction of its CW inventory, 144 and the first to violate its
obligations – and there was no overt, formal OPCW response to this tardiness.

Libya, too, presents a somewhat anomalous situation: Under Muammar
Gaddafi, Libya had attempted to construct a significant indigenous CW
production infrastructure, and it had succeeded in acquiring a noteworthy arsenal
of weaponized and bulk mustard agent. Following a major reversal of its foreign
policy in 2003, Libya joined the CWC in 2004, and declared a CW inventory of 23
tonnes. 145 Libya was then largely on track for timely destruction (pursuant to an
extension from the OPCW), until the “Arab Spring” outbreak of fighting in the
country in February, 2011 froze the operation. 146 The OPCW immediately
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underscored Libya’s continuing responsibility for safeguarding the CW stocks
during the insurrection and for resuming verified destruction procedures as soon
as possible, and the organization extended the country’s deadline for
destruction. 147

When the fighting abated, the new government of Libya suddenly
discovered and announced that the Gaddafi regime had acquired and retained
several hundred additional, undeclared CW munitions loaded with sulfur mustard
agent and hundreds of kilograms of additional agent stored in plastic containers
that it had illegally secreted away from OPCW authorities. 148
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The original CW destruction facility has now been repaired, and additional
work on improving the infrastructure and security arrangements is underway;
destruction operations should resume in March 2013, to deal with both the
original residual and the newly-discovered detritus, under OPCW monitoring. But
it is clear that the April 29, 2012 deadline was not met, and the current
projections indicate that the new government of Libya will not finish the job until
December 2016. 149

Finally, Iraq, which did not join the CWC until February 12, 2009, declared
possession of an unspecified quantity of CW, entombed in two large
underground bunkers at Muthanna that had been bombed by U.S. and coalition
forces during the 1991 Gulf War. Because of the highly unstable condition of the
bunkers, no inventory of the CW remains has been undertaken, and it is still
undetermined how, when, or even whether, orderly excavation, recovery and
destruction operations may be safely initiated. 150
149
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In addition, U.S. and United Kingdom forces in Iraq recovered 4,530 olden
(pre-1991) Iraqi chemical weapons during the interval between the end of major
combat operations in 2003 and Iraq’s accession to the CWC in 2009. These
included degraded artillery projectiles loaded with sarin and mustard, which the
occupying forces took custody of, examined, and destroyed, in order to preclude
their use by insurgents or terrorists. These operations were eventually disclosed
to the Iraqi authorities and to the OPCW, but the CWC provisions for
transparency in CW destruction operations were not followed – the U.S. position
was that the treaty was simply inapplicable to combat-related recovery
operations of this sort undertaken on the territory of a non-party. Iran, on the
other hand, has charged the United States and United Kingdom with violating
their treaty commitments – citing a party’s obligation to declare CW “located in
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any place under its jurisdiction and control” 151 -- and has invoked the CWC’s
procedures for clarification and dispute-resolution. 152

Beyond all this, it should be noted that other CWC-related chemical
weapons destruction operations are ongoing, but are beyond the scope of this
article. Old, abandoned, obsolete and deteriorated chemical weapons and their
components routinely turn up in unrecognized land and water dump sites in
Europe, Australia, the United States, and elsewhere and are disposed of as toxic
waste. 153 Likewise, Japan has accepted the responsibility for finding, recovering,
and destroying hundreds of thousands of chemical weapons it abandoned in
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Destroying Its Legacy Chemical Weapons, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Features Stories,
March 4, 2010; Letter from Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte to the Honorable
Peter Hoekstra, Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of
Representatives, providing declassified "Key Points" from a National Ground Intelligence Center
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Statement, supra note __, p. 5 (noting that Iran has alleged that the U.S. and UK actions were
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these weapons were necessary to support the object and purpose of the Convention. Extensive
exchanges of communications between Iran and the United States and United Kingdom have not
resolved the issue); U.S. Department of State, U.S. Exercises the Right of Reply to Iran Regarding the
Recovery and Destruction of Pre-1991 Chemical Weapons in Iraq, December 23, 2011,
http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/179692.htm; John Hart and Peter Clevestig, Reducing Security Threats
from Chemical and Biological Materials, SIPRI Yearbook 2011, p. 389, 398.
153
Walker, supra note __ (noting that in 2009, 13 states had reported recovery of 87,000 old
chemical weapons awaiting destruction); Bob Drogin, Digging Up Chemical Weapons in D.C., Los
Angeles Times, May 10, 2010, p. 1 (World War I era chemical weapons unearthed in the Spring
Valley area of Washington, D.C.); Stuart Cumming, Mustard Gas Shells to Be Destroyed, The
Chronicle, June 9, 2010 (144 mustard gas shells recovered near U.S. military base in Australia);
Paul Walker, Sea-Dumped Chemical Munitions, briefing slides for United Nations Second
Committee, November 11, 2010 (describing tons of CW dumped after World War II in ocean
areas around the world).
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China during and after World War II. 154 This is an undertaking of monumental
scope, and China has complained that Japan has fallen far behind the promised
schedule 155 – and disquiet over this unfulfilled commitment may become
politically linked to any OPCW resolution of the U.S. and Russian CW destruction
deadline. 156 However, because the CWC treats these two kinds of issues
separately 157 – the obligation to destroy current inventories of functional chemical
weapons is an even more urgent task than the obligation to deal with old and
abandoned weapons, which pose a serious safety and environmental danger, but
not a risk of use in chemical warfare – this article will not substantively address
the latter set of issues.

In sum, the CWC’s global “box score” to date indicates that as of April 29,
2012, about 51,128 metric tonnes of CW agent stocks had been destroyed,
154

Walker, supra note __ (calling Japan’s actions in China “the most serious case of
abandoned chemical weapons”); Status Report, supra note __, paras. 31-36; OPCW, Executive
Council Decision: Arrangement for the Destruction at the Abandoned Chemical Weapons Mobile
Destruction Facility of Chemical Weapons Abandoned by Japan on the Territory of the People’s
Republic of China, EC-61/DEC.2, June 29, 2010; OPCW Website, Ceremony Marks Start of
Destruction of Chemical Weapons Abandoned by Japan in China, September 8, 2010,
http://www.opcw.org/news/article/ceremony-marks-start-of-destruction-of-chemical-weaponsabandoned-by-japan-in-china/; DG 2011 Statement, supra note __, paragraphs 50 (noting that
Japan has destroyed 35,203 chemical weapons abandoned in Nanjing, China, 74.6% of the total
identified there).
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The Unresolved Japanese Legacy, Global Green, May 2011,
http://globalgreen.org/docs/publication-183-1.pdf;
Shari Oliver and Stephanie Lieggi, Program to Clean-up Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China
Moves Sluggishly, WMD Insights, June 2008; China Presses Japan on Abandoned Chemical
Weapons, Global Security Newswire, January 23, 2009; OPCW Council Backs Deadline
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or located at a place under its jurisdiction and control) and I.3 (obligation to destroy CW
abandoned on the territory of another party) and Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part
IV(A) (destruction of chemical weapons) and Part IV(B) (destruction of old and abandoned CW).
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reaching 73.64 percent of the worldwide goal. This also amounts to 3.95 million
of the 8.67 million declared CW muntions and containers subject to the treaty
(45.56 percent). 158 Three of the seven declared “possessor states” had
completed the process of destroying their inventories (two of them doing so on
time); the other four are, and will continue for some time to be, in arrears.

Section 4: Political Remediation Efforts to Date
For several years, the basic U.S. strategy for dealing with the “2012
problem” was fairly low-key; the effort was generally to deflect attention from the
forthcoming inevitability, and to display the ugly projections about the future CW
destruction timetable mostly via “unofficial” or “informal” presentations. 159 Some
of this modesty in public affairs sprang from a simple desire not to trigger
international political controversy before it was unavoidable (why deal with
tomorrow’s problems today?) and some of it emerged from apprehension that
premature clarity about the coming failure to meet the 2012 deadline could be

158
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Ahmet Uzumcu, address to 15 Chemical Weapons Demilitarization Conference, Glasgow,
United Kingdom, May 22, 2012, p. 2; http://www.opcw.org/our-work/demilitarisation/; OPCW,
Executive Council, Draft Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction in 2011, EC-69/3, July 11, 2012, p. 48 (summarizing, by type of chemical agent,
the amount of CW destroyed by the end of 2011).
159
Supra note __ (citing U.S. statements to OPCW organs regarding the anticipated timetable
for U.S. CW destruction operations in 2006 and thereafter.) The June 28, 2011 letter from
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates was the first “official” top level statement of the U.S.
inability to meet the 2012 deadline. See Gates letter, supra note __.
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interpreted as an “anticipatory breach”160 of the treaty, immediately triggering
other parties’ responsive rights, as elaborated in Section 5 below.

More recently, in more overt recognition of its plight, the United States has
instituted several noteworthy efforts at political course correction (or at least
transparency), to reassure its treaty partners of its continuing good faith and
principled commitment to the CWC, 161 including:
--accelerating the destruction process, by leveraging the successful
experiences from the earliest sites and applying them to the latter locations, and
by providing additional financial incentives to corporations that are building and
operating the facilities;
--sustaining full funding for the construction of the final two sites, even in
an era of extreme financial austerity, enabling the program to proceed apace; 162
--providing frequent, detailed reporting to the OPCW about the progress
and problems in the demilitarization process, including quarterly presentations in
160

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, discussed infra, text accompanying notes
__, does not explicitly employ the concept of “anticipatory breach,” but includes within the
definition of “material breach” a “repudiation” of a treaty. Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention], article 60.3.a. It is
unclear whether under international law, a treaty party’s announcement of a forthcoming inability
to perform the obligations of a treaty, accompanied by a commitment to pursue the treaty’s
ultimate objective, would amount to a “repudiation” of the agreement. See Mohammed M.
Gomaa, Suspension or Termination of Treaties on Grounds of Breach, 1996, p. 26-28, 123
(arguing that article 60 “does not accommodate preemptive or preventive measures,” so only any
actual breach, not a potential breach, is relevant); Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein (eds.), The
Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties (2011) [hereinafter, Corten and Klein], p. 1358.
In domestic U.S. contract law, the cognate concept of anticipatory breach by repudiation
does include a statement by the obligor that it will not or cannot perform the contract without
breach, or a voluntary act that renders the obligor unable or apparently unable to perform without
breach. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second, Contracts 2d, 1979, sec. 250.
161
See generally, Mikulak November 29, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 2 (outlining U.S.
practices over the prior five and one-half years in keeping the OPCW and CWC parties aware of
its progress and difficulties in meeting the destruction obligations); Mikulak July 12, 2011
Statement, supra note __, p. 2.
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Quick Facts, supra note __; Carter letters, supra note __.
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The Hague by U.S. governmental officials responsible for oversight of the
activities; 163
--hosting OPCW visitors (including the chair and selected members of the
Executive Council, the Director-General, and representatives of the Technical
Secretariat) for briefings and tours at the sites where CW destruction was
occurring and at the sites where construction of the final two facilities was
underway, to display first-hand the immense challenges, the efforts to overcome
them, and the engagement of local Citizens Advisory Committees in the
process; 164 and
--reaffirming at the most senior levels the absolute U.S. commitment to
achieving complete destruction of the CW inventory. Secretary of Defense
Robert M. Gates, 165 Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, 166 and other
senior officials 167 have made this point with crystalline clarity.

163

Mikulak November 29, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 2; Mikulak July 12, 2011
Statement, supra note __, p. 2; OPCW, Executive Council, Note by the Director-General,
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reports to the Executive Council every 90 days).
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and Holds High-Level Meetings in Washington DC, March 4, 2011,
http://www.opcw.org/news/article/opcw-delegation-visits-us-chemical-weapons-destructionfacilities-and-holds-high-level-meetings-in/; OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Decision:
Visits by Representatives of the Executive Council, C-11/DEC.20, December 8, 2006
(establishing the program for OPCW officials to visit the Russian and U.S. CW destruction
facilities). See also National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1993, Public Law 102-484, sec.
172 (legislation directing the Army to establish Citizens’ Advisory Commissions).
165
Robert M. Gates, letter to Ahmet Uzumcu, Director-General of the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, June 28, 2011.
166
Hillary Rodham Clinton, United States’ Commitment to the Complete Destruction of U.S.
Chemical Weapons Stockpiles, press statement, October 3, 2011.
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Remarks by Ambassador Kennedy at the IISS Global Strategic Review Meeting, September
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Delegation to the OPCW at the 66 Session of the Executive Council, EC-66/NAT.19, October 4,
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The United States has explained that its inability to meet the treaty
deadline is due to the delays (perhaps foreseeable in principle, but impossible to
circumvent nonetheless) in incorporating the novel, untried neutralization
technologies at the final two sites. 168 Compounding the difficulty, the United
States adds, is the CWC’s completely appropriate insistence that a party’s
chosen destruction methodology must “assign the highest priority to ensuring the
safety of people and to protecting the environment,” 169 and must be undertaken
in full international transparency, with punctilious monitoring by OPCW
experts. 170 Despite a commitment of over $38 billion, developing a viable
method for solving that multi-variant equation has simply taken longer than
anticipated, and now, unfortunately, cannot reasonably be accelerated sooner
than 2023.

To date, the strongest resistance to the U. S. approach has come from
Iran. Iranian authorities have not blinked at labeling the United States and
Russia as moving into “non-compliance” and “blatant contradiction with the

2011, p. 1-2; Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States Delegation to the
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OPCW at the 64 Session of the Executive Council, EC-64/NAT.5, May 3, 2011, p. 1.
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Mikulak November 29, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 2, 5; Mikulak July 12, 2011
Statement, supra note __, p. 2; Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States
th
Delegation to the OPCW at the 15 Session of the Conference of the States Parties, C-15/NAT.3,
November 29, 2010, p. 3-4.
169
CWC, supra note __, art. IV.10. The importance of this provision is underscored by the fact
that the treaty essentially repeats it two more times: in article V.11 (regarding destruction of CW
production facilities) and article VII.3 (concerning national implementation of CWC obligations).
Notably, the CWC specifies that in conducting the destruction operations, each party is to
conform to “its national standards for safety and emissions.” CWC, supra note __, arts. IV.10,
V.11. See Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 119 (summarizing numerous CWC provisions
regarding environmental protection).
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obligations” of the CWC, and have argued that those countries “should be held
accountable.” 171 Teheran has asserted that it is not acceptable to conclude
simply that those CW possessor states are “well-intentioned”; the rest of the
treaty parties cannot “take it lightly, and forget about recognizing noncompliance.”172 Iran has rejected the effort to resolve the problem through a lowkey “political” process, but insisted upon invoking the “legal” remedies of the
CWC, including the judgment that such a “breach” of the convention should be
brought formally to the attention of the United Nations Security Council and
General Assembly. 173

Iran has reminded the parties that it was the victim of widespread CW use
not that long ago (during its 1980s war with Iraq), and warned that, “The
continued existence of even one chemical bomb will compromise the
international peace and security and the nightmare of employment of such
destructive and lethal weapons will be perpetuated.” 174 Iran calls its position one
of “principle,” founded in respect for the credibility and integrity of the CWC. 175
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Statement by H.E. Mr. Kazem Gharib Abadi, Ambassador and Permanent Representative
th
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Gharib Abadi, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the
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OPCW at the 65 Session of the Executive Council, EC-65/NAT.13, July 12, 2011.
172
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(asserting that timely destruction of the CW stocks could be accomplished, if the United States
and Russia allocate “required funds, good will and strong determination,” because “As the saying
goes, if there is a will, there is a way.”) See also Mikulak November 29, 2011 Statement, supra
note __, p. 5 (rejecting Iran’s accusation that the United States is deliberately violating the CWC.)
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Similar critical sentiments – although perhaps more muted rhetoric – might also
be expected from countries such as India, Pakistan, China, and Cuba, although
observers anticipated that Iran would be “quite isolated” if it sought to impose
meaningful sanctions. 176

One important climax to these debates came in the November-December
2011 meeting of the Conference of the States Parties, which adopted a
“Decision” regarding the impending April 29, 2012 deadline. 177 That instrument
failed to attract “consensus,” the Conference’s preferred mode of decisionmaking, but won a 101-1 vote, with Iran as the sole nay-sayer. 178 It followed
more than two years of intense consultations under the aegis of successive
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th
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th
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of the States Parties, Report of the 16 Session of the Conference of the States Parties, 28
November – 2 December 2011, C-16/5, December 2, 2011.
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chairs of the Executive Council, with informal negotiations and punctilious
wordsmithing to balance the competing national interests and perspectives. 179

The December 1 Decision:
--recalled the evolution of the problem, with some states timely meeting
their treaty obligations for destruction of the CW stocks, but the United States,
Russia and Libya not meeting even the extended final April 29, 2012 deadline; 180
--noted statements from those three possessor states “underlining their
unequivocal commitment to their Obligations” under the Convention, and “taking
note that the inability to fully meet the final extended deadline of 29 April 2012
would come about due to reasons that are unrelated to the commitment of these
States Parties to the General Obligations for the destruction of chemical
weapons established under Article I of the Convention”; 181
--decided that the destruction of the remaining CW “shall be completed in
the shortest time possible,” 182 in accordance with the Convention’s provisions,
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In October 2009, the Executive Council requested its chair “to engage in informal
consultations with interested delegations on how and when to initiate discussion by the Council
on issues related to meeting the final extended deadlines for the destruction of chemical weapons
and to keep the Council informed of these consultations.” Subsequent Conference sessions
welcomed these discussions and urged that they continue. OPCW, Conference of the States
th
Parties, Report of the 14 Session, December 4, 2009, C-14/5, paragraph 9.7 (welcoming the EC
request “to engage in informal consultations on how and when to initiate discussion by the
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th
weapons”); OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Report of the 15 Session, December 3,
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also OPCW, Executive Council, Statement by Kenya on Behalf of the African Group of States
th
Parties at the 66 Session of the Executive Council, EC-66/NAT.9, October 4, 2011 (African
parties to the Convention largely endorse negotiations on what became the December 1
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December 1 Decision, supra note __, preamble. Notably, the document does not employ the
terms “violate,” “breach,” or even “fail to comply.”
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182
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and that the costs of verifying the destruction shall be borne by the possessor
states; 183
--decided that each possessor state will submit a detailed plan for the
destruction of its remaining CW, specifying a planned completion date, a
schedule for destruction, and a description of the destruction facilities, and that
each state shall report quarterly to the Executive Council in closed session on its
progress; 184
--decided that the Conference of the States Parties will undertake annual
reviews of the implementation of this agreement, with a special session at the
annual meeting in 2017; 185
--decided that the Director-General will prepare written reports about the
destruction process to the Executive Council and the Conference, based on
independent information obtained by the Technical Secretariat from OPCW
inspectors; 186
--decided that the issue will be comprehensively addressed at the next
Review Conference for the Convention; 187 and
--decided that the possessor states will invite OPCW leadership officials to
conduct biannual on-site visits at the destruction facilities and to meet with
parliamentarians and government officials in capitals. 188

183
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This decision hardly “resolves” the problem – the organization and the
parties will be grappling with the predicament of lingering CW stocks for years to
come, including at the treaty’s Third Review Conference, April 8-19, 2013. 189
Nonetheless, it does provide the United States and Russia with quite a favorable
benchmark: it is a pragmatic, non-confrontational, almost-unanimous posture,
avoiding stark legal sanctions and harsh political rhetoric. It enables the United
States and the OPCW to “declare victory” (or at least “success”) based upon a
judgment about the United States’ “unwavering commitment” to complete the
task. 190 The organization’s Director-General, Ahmet Üzümcü, concluded that:
States Parties have dealt with this issue with characteristic wisdom and
sagacity. Their decision to enable the major possessor States to complete
the task within a reasonable period of time confirms the reputation of the
OPCW as a cooperative and purposeful multilateral body. Our members
have remained focussed on the mission and what is best to accomplish
it. 191

But is this, overall, the best way to address the problem?

Section 5: Treaty Breach
This section invokes “black letter” international law standards to assess
U.S. behavior regarding the CWC. The primary document in this area is the

188
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1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 192 widely accepted as
the authoritative international law source regarding the negotiation,
implementation, interpretation, and termination of international agreements. Four
primary questions are presented: a) Does U.S. behavior amount to a “material
breach” of the CWC? b) If so, may the U.S. actions nonetheless be excusable
under any of several plausible doctrines available under general international
law? C) In the alternative, is any relief available due to a peculiar tension
between disparate obligations of the CWC? and d) If there is a breach, what
remedies or responses may be available to other states who regard themselves
as injured by the American failure to meet the treaty deadline?

The analysis begins with observance of the time-honored principle of
pacta sunt servanda, requiring that agreements must be kept; binding treaty
commitments must be honored. 193 This maxim is perhaps the most fundamental
proposition of the international community; the Restatement of the Law of
Foreign Relations concludes that it “lies at the core of the law of international
agreements and is perhaps the most important principle of international law.” 194

192

Vienna Convention, supra note __. The United States has signed, but not ratified, the
Vienna Convention, and has accepted many of its provisions as reflective of customary
international law, binding even upon non-party states. Restatement, supra note __, vol. 1, p. 14445; see also Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary vs. Slovakia), 1997
International Court of Justice reports, p. 7, 35, paragraph 46 (International Court of Justice
accepts key provisions of the Vienna Convention as statements of customary international law).
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Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2009), p. 361-68; Anthony
Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2d ed., 2007), p. 178-81; Oliver Dorr and Kirsten
Schmalenbach (eds.), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (2012)
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in international relations,” p. 430); Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 659-85.
194
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In furtherance of this notion, the Vienna Convention asserts that a treaty
must be performed “in good faith” 195 and that “A party may not invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.” 196
Excuses for non-performance, largely akin to the excuses for non-performance of
a contract under the domestic law of many states, are few and rarely invoked. 197

Of particular note, the longstanding official American position regarding
compliance with arms control agreements in general, and with the CWC in
particular, stakes out an appropriately “high road”: “The United States believes
that States Parties should be held to their obligations under the CWC, and places
a high premium upon their compliance both with specific detailed declaration and
implementation provisions (e.g., Articles III, IV, V, and VII) and with the “general
obligations” of Article I.” 198

a. Is the United States in “material breach” of the CWC?

The United

States has consistently declined to characterize its CWC behavior as a “breach,”
“violation,” or “failure to comply,” favoring instead more gentle (and diplomatic)

195
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vocabulary such as simple “inability to meet the deadline.”199 Likewise, the other
CWC parties (with the conspicuous exception of Iran) have avoided critical or
conclusory language, including dodging the issue in the December 1 Decision.
No competent international authority – the ICJ, U.N. Security Council, or any
organ of the OPCW – has reached a judgment on the applicability of the term
“breach.”

Despite these verbal gymnastics, however, nothing could be clearer than
this prominent transgression: the Convention requires that all chemical weapons
must be destroyed by April 29, 2012; the United States nonetheless continues to
possess chemical weapons after that date – ipso facto, there is an ongoing
violation.

International law, however, differentiates between a “material breach” of a
treaty and other, less consequential violations; which variety is present here?
The VCLT defines the relevant legal term with only a parsimonious measure of
clarity: a material breach of a treaty consists in “[t]he violation of a provision
essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty.” 200 The
VCLT offers no further elaboration of the term “object or purpose.”

199
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Certainly, not every manifest or serious breach of a treaty rises to the level
of “material”; it is an intensely fact-based judgment. The United States, for
example, has criticized other CWC parties for failing to comply with the
Convention’s mandates to designate a “National Authority” as the responsible
point of contact for the Organization; to adopt necessary domestic legislation to
implement the Convention as part of their internal law; and to emplace
appropriate administrative measures to control international transfers of
regulated chemicals. 201 Still, the United States has not applied the “breach” or
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to the effective execution of the treaty may have been material in inducing that state to join the
treaty, even if the provision was of an ancillary character); David S. Jonas and Thomas N.
Saunders, The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretive Methods, 43 Vanderbilt
Journal of Transnational Law No. 3, p. 565 (2010); Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 1350-78;
Villiger, supra note __, at 742-46; Aust, supra note __, at 295-96; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra
note __, at 545-49, 1029; Ulf Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties, 2007, p. 203-34;
Richard K. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, 2008, p. 189-202; International Court of Justice,
Judgment in Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (The Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia v. Greece), December 5, 2011, http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/142/16827.pdf, paragraph 162-63 (finding that Macedonia’s violation of the
agreement with Greece did not amount to a material breach). See also Kirgis, supra note __, at
550 (treating article 60 as a reflection of customary international law).
Domestic U.S. contract law incorporates a similar distinction. A “material breach” of a
contract consists of a failure of performance that is sufficiently substantial to discharge the
contract; a lesser violation would leave the contract intact, and afford the injured party a claim for
damages or other compensation due to the shortcomings. American Law Institute, Restatement
of the Law, Second, Contracts 2d, 1979, sec. 237, comment d and sec. 241.
201
State Compliance Report, supra note __, p. 39. See also OPCW Today, Vol. 1, No. 1, April
2012, p. 28 (reporting numbers and percentages of CWC parties who had not yet completed the
required implementation steps); Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States
th
Delegation to the OPCW at the 68 Session of the Executive Council, EC-68/NAT.15, May 1,
2012, p. 2 (saying the United States is “seriously concerned” that CWC requirements for national
implementation have not been met by all parties). Arguably, these violations could legitimately be
characterized as “material,” especially if they resulted in behavior that contravened a central
purpose of the CWC, such as by allowing a state to evade its treaty obligations through the
subterfuge of operating through a private citizen or corporation, or by interfering with the OPCW’s
ability to exercise its functions inside the territory of that state. Moreover, these breaches are
entirely within the political control of the state; there are no technical impediments that complicate
compliance with these CWC obligations, as there are with the requirement to destroy the CW on
time.
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“material breach” designators to these violations, and has not sought to enforce
the corresponding remedies. This self-restraint reflects both political and legal
strategy, but does not much inform a judgment about whether a persistent failure
to meet the fundamental CW destruction deadline would appropriately be
deemed “material.” (The consequences of the distinction between a material
breach and a lesser violation, in terms of the legally available remedies, are
considered further in section d, infra.)

It is important to observe at this point that the United States and Russia
are behaving in good faith, and are not seeking or attaining any military
advantage by exceeding the 2012 deadline. The two states are not being
sneaky, are not attempting to nullify the CWC by subterfuge or evasion, and are
not trying to retain operational CW arsenals for any longer than necessary
(although Iran has expressed doubts about U.S. bona fides in this regard. 202) In
this sense, their behavior is quite different – much less threatening and legally
offensive – than that of Libya’s Gaddafi, who deliberately concealed militarily
significant quantities of functional chemical weapons, with the intention of
retaining a covert, illicit capability.

But “good faith” alone is not a complete escape; indeed, no mens rea
concept is included in the VCLT definition of “material breach.” The fact that a
treaty party is not being deliberately malicious, and is neither seeking nor
achieving a significant benefit from its violation, is surely relevant. But its
202

See Iran’s statements, supra note __.
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behavior may nonetheless amount to material breach, where it is sufficiently
important, persistent, and large scale to defeat the original interests and
legitimate negotiating expectations of its treaty partners. 203

Looking first to the importance of the provision in question, as directed by
the Vienna Convention, the negotiators’ goals in creating the CWC, to preclude
forever the possibility of use of CW by ensuring the complete elimination of all
parties’ CW stocks, are manifest by:
a) the title of the treaty (“Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction” 204 (emphasis added));
b) the inclusion in the treaty’s preamble of a concluding paragraph
explaining that the parties are “Convinced that the complete and effective
prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention,
transfer and use of chemical weapons, and their destruction, represent a
necessary step towards the achievement of these common objectives,” 205
(emphasis added); and

203

Commentators have noted a drafting anomaly in the VCLT definition of material breach.
That is, the concept is applicable, on its face, to a violation of a provision essential to the treaty –
it appears that the critical element is not necessarily how important or fundamental the breach is,
but whether it contravenes an especially important or fundamental portion of the treaty. However,
this oddity may not reflect the drafters’ true intentions, and has not proven to affect the outcome
of any reported cases or controversies. See Kirgis, supra note __, at 552-55; Corten and Klein,
supra note __, at 1358-60; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 1031 (stating that not only
“central” provisions of a treaty, but also “ancillary” provisions, could be deemed “essential” for this
purpose, and noting that an obstruction of the CWC’s inspection obligations could therefore
qualify as a “material” breach).
204
CWC, supra note __, title.
205
CWC, supra note __, preamble, tenth paragraph. See also Report 104-33, supra note __,
p. 2 (asserting that “The goals of the CWC are to eliminate the possession of chemical weapons,
to reverse chemical weapons proliferation, and to preclude any future use of these weapons.”)
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c) the treaty’s very blunt mandate for, 206 and the elaborate and detailed
mechanisms governing, the destruction of parties’ CW, 207 including the precise
interim deadlines specified in the above-noted “order of destruction,”208 and the
insistence that the final deadline for elimination of CW may be extended one
time, but “in no case” any further. 209

In the same vein, the OPCW, responsible for implementing the CWC, has
unambiguously affirmed that “The most important obligation under the
Convention is the destruction of chemical weapons.”210 Even the United States
has confirmed that “The destruction of chemical weapons is fundamental to the
Convention.”211

It might be argued, however, that the parties’ true intention was simply to
accomplish the “elimination” of CW, not necessarily their “timely elimination.”
Under this view, the specifics of the “order of destruction” would be of secondary
206

CWC, supra note __, article I.2, 3, and 4.
CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).
208
CWC, supra note __, article IV.6.
209
CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.26.
210
OPCW website, Our Work: Demilitarisation, http://www.opcw.org/our-work/. See also
OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Report of the Second Special Session of the
Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention
(Second Review Conference), RC-2/4, April 18, 2008, paragraph 9.4,
http://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=1837 (Review Conference
reaffirms that “complete destruction of chemical weapons…is essential for the realisation of the
object and purpose of the Convention” and reaffirms “the importance of the obligation of the
possessor States Parties to complete the destruction of their chemical weapons stockpiles within
the final extended deadlines”); John Freeman (Deputy Director General of the OPCW), The
Experience of the Chemical Weapons Convention: Lessons for the Elimination of Nuclear
Weapons, in Barry M. Blechman and Alexander K. Bollfrass (eds.), Elements of a Nuclear
Disarmament Treaty (2010), p. 117, 140 (observing that among CWC parties “there has been a
general, continuing and unsurprising preoccupation with the core objective of destruction (in
terms of both verifiability and the prescribed timeframe for completion)”).
211
Eric M. Javits, Statement to the Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, April 7, 2008.
207
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importance – they are merely a metric, not the goal. From this perspective, the
principal “object and purpose” of the CWC is to ensure that CW destruction is
complete; dilatory performance may be accounted as a “breach” of the CWC, but
not necessarily a “material breach.” 212

Certainly, the parties could have based the Convention on that sort of
proposition; they could have exhibited a less fastidious concern with timing, and
been more relaxed about compliance with a final deadline for CW destruction.
But in reality, the negotiators devoted considerable energy and text to specifying
a schedule. They deliberately combined elements of rigidity (with precise
benchmarks at the three, five, seven, and ten year points) with elements of
flexibility (allowing extensions of specified duration, pursuant to prescribed
justifications.) They did as much as they could have to demonstrate that the
cadence was fundamental to their bargain – it could “in no case” run beyond 15
years. 213

212

See Oliver Meier, OPCW Chiefs Ponder Chemical Arms Deadlines, 40 Arms Control Today
No. 1, January/February 2010 (quoting Rogelio Pfirter, then Director-General of the OPCW,
saying that the CWC’s core purpose is to ensure the full, irreversible, complete and universal
destruction of existing stockpiles by possessor states; but that “we need not…make the ultimate
success of the treaty dependent on any particular date.”)
Domestic U.S. contract law incorporates a similar concept: parties to a contract may
stipulate that “time is of the essence,” meaning that a failure to perform on time constitutes a
material breach, allowing the aggrieved party to rescind the contract. See Samuel Williston, A
th
Treatise on Contracts, 4 ed., by Richard A. Lord (2000), chapter 46.
213
See Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 347, n. 34 (noting that a party may request only
one extension of the ten-year deadline, to a maximum of five additional years; if a party
requested, say, only a three-year extension, it could not thereafter request an additional two-year
extension. If such a state failed to meet the 13-year deadline, “it will become non-compliant with
the Convention, which could trigger mechanisms under Article XII.”)
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In this regard, even 90 percent compliance (which the United States
achieved before April 29, 2012, and which Russia will reach some time
thereafter) is insufficient. Especially in the vital realm of arms control and
national security, merely getting “close” to full conformity is inadequate, and the
United States, in particular, has long been a vigorous leader in insisting upon the
highest standards of fidelity to international weapons-related obligations. 214
Imagine, for comparison, how the United States would respond if, say, North
Korea or Iran were to reply to complaints about their illegal nuclear weapons
programs by explaining that they possessed only very small numbers of the
contraband weapons – less than ten percent or even one percent of the nuclear
stockpiles retained by the United States or Russia. 215

Moreover, even the last ten percent of the initial stockpile held by the
United States and the last 40 percent or so of Russia’s original holdings – the
overages by which they are now violating the treaty – are greater than the
initially-reported CW inventories of any other CWC party. And as noted, the
infraction here is not a “near miss” – in the case of the United States, the
violation will persist for 11½ years.

214

See generally, State Compliance Report, supra note __; U.S. Department of State,
Compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Condition (10)(C) Report, August 2011.
215
Under the 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21
U.S.T. 483, TIAS 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter, NPT], some countries (including the
United States) are legally allowed to continue to possess nuclear weapons, while others
(including Iran and North Korea) are not. See State Compliance Report, supra note __, at 62-67
(Iran’s violations of NPT), 72-76 (North Korea’s violations).

69

In short, this is surely a case of a continuous “breach” of the CWC, even
though only one state, and no OPCW organ or international court, has labeled it
as such. The better view, moreover, is that it rises to the level of “material
breach,” based upon the violence that the violation does to the accomplishment
of an essential feature of the Convention.

b. Are there applicable legal excuses under general international law for
the U.S. material breach of the CWC? If the failure to meet the April 2012
deadline must be accounted as a breach or material breach of the CWC, can any
constructive use be made of the traditional “excuses” for non-performance of
treaty obligations? Three related mitigation doctrines are considered:
impossibility, changed circumstances, and force majeure.

The Vienna Convention establishes “supervening impossibility of
performance” as a valid basis for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty. 216 But
the conditions for invoking this doctrine are quite restrictive: the central concept is
216

Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 61. In the Vienna Convention, the doctrine is
expressed as a basis for a permissible termination or withdrawal from a treaty, but the same
concept would also be available as a justifying excuse for non-performance of a treaty obligation,
in defense against an allegation of breach. Cf Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, supra note __, paragraphs
51 and 101; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 1249-54 (relationship between VCLT and
rules of state responsibility). See also Restatement, supra note __, vol. 1, sec. 336, comment c
and reporters’ note 3, and sec. 337-38; Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 1382-1408; Sinclair,
supra note __, at 190-92; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 1051-65; Kirgis, supra note
__, at 566; VCLT, supra note __, article 73 (specifying that provisions of the VCLT are without
prejudice to the international law of state responsibility). The International Law Commission’s
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, November 2001,
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf [hereinafter, ILC
Draft Articles] Part I, Chapter V, present six circumstances that preclude the wrongfulness of
conduct that would otherwise amount to a breach of an international legal obligation; several of
these are considered, infra. The United States has no interest in terminating or withdrawing from
the CWC – quite the contrary; the United States seeks to sustain and support the treaty, while
resisting allegations that it is unjustifiably breaching it.
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applicable when an impossibility arises from “the permanent disappearance or
destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty.” 217 Nothing
of that sort is relevant here. Moreover, a treaty party is not privileged to invoke
impossibility when the situation is the result of that party’s own violation of the
treaty or of another international law obligation. 218

In the leading International Court of Justice (ICJ) 219 case in the field,
concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary vs. Slovakia) in 1997, 220
the court established a very high standard for claims of “impossibility.” Ruling
that Hungary was not justified in withdrawing from a joint project to construct an
elaborate system of locks on the Danube River, the ICJ conceded that the
project’s economic viability had greatly diminished over the years and that a new
environmental consciousness had altered the prior appreciation of the desirability
of the changes in navigation and flood control. Nonetheless, the Court held that
increased costliness did not make the project “practically impossible,” as
Hungary had asserted, and the heightened environmental sensitivity did not
provide an easy escape hatch, either. 221 The ICJ also noted that the underlying
agreement between Hungary and Slovakia had incorporated a provision dealing
217

Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 61.1. See Corten and Klein, supra note __, at
1387-94; Villiger, supra note __, at 755-58; Aust, supra note __, at 296-97; Dorr and
Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 1055-59 (considering concepts of “absolute” and “relative”
impossibility, and “objective” and “subjective” impossibility).
218
Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 61.2. See Corten and Klein, supra note __, at
1401-02; Villiger, supra note __, at 758-59; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 1060-61.
219
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) (sometimes referred to as the World Court) is the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations. All U.N. members are parties to the treaty that
creates the ICJ. Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3
Bevans 1153, Chapter XIV; Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179.
220
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, supra note __.
221
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, supra note __, paragraphs 94, 102-03.
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explicitly with changes or revisions that might become necessary in the life of the
project; the existence of this clause demonstrated that the parties had originally
envisioned the possibility for some alterations, but had deliberately determined
not to allow others. 222

Likewise, in the CWC context, the text of the treaty already contemplates
a concept akin to impossibility and incorporates what the negotiating states
considered an adequate response. The standard for granting an extension of
the early phases (for destroying 1, 20, and 45 percent of a party’s CW) is that “a
State Party, due to exceptional circumstances beyond its control, believes that it
cannot achieve the level of destruction specified.” 223 The Executive Council and
the Conference of the States Parties may then agree to modulate these
intermediate deadlines, as long as the ultimate deadline (to destroy all CW within
ten years) remains intact. 224 The criteria for requesting the one allowable
extension of the ten-year standard is that the party “will be unable to ensure the
destruction” as originally contemplated. 225 In granting no more than five years of
relief, the Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties shall set
“specific actions to be taken by the State Party to overcome problems in its
destruction programme.” 226 Thus, the treaty-makers expressly anticipated that
the process of fulfilling the goal of destroying CW on schedule could be difficult,
expensive, and time-consuming, and that a state’s initial estimates of its ability to
222
223
224
225
226

Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, supra note __, paragraph 103, 104.
CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.21.
CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.22-23.
CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.24.
CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.26.
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do the job could become inaccurate. They agreed to provide a limited amount of
“wiggle room,” but were unreceptive to any notion that rising costs or other
emerging challenges might provide a valid basis for lengthier or repeated
delay. 227

In tacit acknowledgement of this reality, American officials in the past have
been constrained not to assert that the United States is destroying the remaining
chemical weapons “as quickly as possible” (because it would, in fact, have been
quite possible to proceed even more quickly, if the United States were to devote
additional funding to the task, to improve the management and oversight of the
program, and/or to remove the self-imposed legislative barriers against
employing the established incineration technology at the final two sites or against
transporting the remaining CW inventory to already-functioning locations.) They
have, instead, resorted to more vague formulations, such as the insistence that

227

See Report 104-33, supra note __, at 7 (noting that the CWC “does allow flexibility in the
destruction process, permitting extension of the 10-year timeframe for up to 5 years.”) The CWC
negotiators also included another provision through which a party could indicate, at the early
stage of submitting its “general plan for destruction of chemical weapons” that there might be
“issues which could adversely impact on the national destruction programme.” CWC, supra note
__, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).A.6(h).
A slightly different jurisprudential theory would assert that the timetable provisions of the
CWC should be deemed invalid due to “error” or mistake. VCLT article 48 confirms this remedy
when “the error relates to a fact or situation which was assumed by that State to exist at the time
when the treaty was concluded and formed an essential basis of its consent to be bound by the
treaty.” VCLT, supra note __, article 48.1. Perhaps the United States could contend that its
projected (but ultimately mistaken) ability to destroy the CW stockpile within 10 (or 15) years was
a “fact or situation” within the meaning of this provision. However, the VCLT also specifies that
this escape is unavailable “if the State in question contributed by its own conduct to the error or if
the circumstances were such as to put that State on notice of a possible error.” Id. at article 48.2.
See also Restatement, supra note __, vol. 1, sec. 331(1)(a) and comment b. This doctrine would
therefore be inapplicable to the CWC deadline, for the same reasons discussed in the
accompanying text.
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the destruction is occurring as rapidly as “feasible” or “practicable.” 228 In short,
this is not an “impossibility” situation.

A second kind of justification for non-performance, changed
circumstances or rebus sic stantibus, is conceptually something of a “special
case” of the impossibility argument. It asserts that where something important
and fundamental has altered the viability of an original agreement, a party may
be allowed to vitiate its now-unappealing bargain. 229

The Vienna Convention validates this concept, but confines it to situations
in which: a) the change “was not foreseen by the parties”; 230 b) the original
circumstances “constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be

228

See, e.g., Mikulak July 12, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 1, 2 (saying that the United
States is committed to destroying its CW “as rapidly as practicable” and “as soon as practicable”);
Mikulak November 29, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 2, 5 (employing the phrase “as rapidly
as practicable”); Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States Delegation to the
th
OPCW at the 68 Session of the Executive Council, EC-68/NAT.15, May 1, 2012, p. 1 (same).
See also Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 27 (“A party may not invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”)
229
Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 1411-33; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at
1067-1104).
230
Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 62.1. See also, Restatement, supra note __, vol.
1, sec. 336 and reporters’ note 1 (identifying the “chief example of resort to rebus sic stantibus in
United States practice” as the suspension of the 1930 International Load Line Convention due to
the outbreak of World War II); Sinclair, supra note __, at 192-96 (recounting negotiators’
apprehensions about the concept of rebus sic stantibus, and the limits upon it that they inserted
into the Vienna Convention); Aust, supra note __, at 297-300 (noting that the doctrine has
routinely been recognized by international authorities and frequently invoked by states, but never
applied by an international tribunal); Villiger, supra note __, at 766-81; Richard D. Kearney and
Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 American Journal of International Law, 1970, p. 495,
542-44.
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bound by the treaty”; 231 and c) “[t]he effect of the change is radically to transform
the extent of the obligations still to be performed under the treaty.” 232

Here, regarding “foreseeability,” the negotiating states certainly did
anticipate that unfavorable conditions might lead to the CW elimination process
requiring more time than contemplated in a party’s original order of destruction.
They explicitly provided for the possibility of extension of the three-, five-, and
seven-year interim deadlines, and even of the final ten-year period. But when
the negotiators stared at the possibility that a party might request more than even
the allowable 15 years, they balked. They did “foresee” that hypothetical
contingency, and they explicitly rejected it, writing that “in no case” could more
than 15 years be tolerated. 233

Likewise, what circumstances that “constituted an essential basis” for the
treaty have changed? Costs have certainly risen, but when the ICJ addressed
changed circumstances in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, it concluded that
even a stark diminution of the originally-estimated economic feasibility of the

231

Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 62.1(a).
Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 62.1(b). The Vienna Convention also specifies
that the doctrine cannot be invoked to withdraw from a treaty that establishes an international
boundary or where the changed circumstances are the result of the party’s own prior violation of
its international legal obligations. Id. at article 62.2. See Villiger, supra note __, at 776 Dorr and
Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 1078-97 (identifying five conditions for invocation of the
doctrine).
233
CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.26; Dorr and
Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 1086 (it would be “manifestly unreasonable” to invoke the
doctrine of changed circumstances when the parties had foreseen the possible change of
circumstances).
232
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project was insufficient to vitiate the original consent to be bound. 234 Here,
satisfactory chemical neutralization technologies proved more elusive than
originally hoped, but they were certainly in contemplation when the treaty was
concluded in 1993. At that point, incineration was almost the entire focus of the
U.S. program, but Congress had already begun to require examination of
alternatives. The belated switch to new methods was wholly a unilateral U.S.
choice, not one forced upon it by the Convention, by Nature, or by any other
exogenous circumstances. 235

Similarly, the “extent of the obligations still to be performed” by the United
States under the CWC has not been “radically transformed” (except in the sense
that 90 percent of the U.S. stocks have already been disposed of). For example,
there have been no new “discoveries” of additional operational chemical
weapons that were surprisingly added to the pile to be destroyed (as did occur in
both Libya and Albania). So an argument about changed circumstances as a
valid exoneration for the United States missing the CWC deadline is also
unavailing.

Finally, the third related argument about legitimate non-performance of a
treaty is force majeure. Here, too, the notion is a variant of impossibility, but the
focus is specifically on the intervention of an “irresistible force or unforeseen
event,” beyond the control of the state, such as a major earthquake or tsunami,
234

Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, supra note __, paragraph 104.
See legislation, supra, note __, mandating pursuit of alternative technologies for CW
destruction.
235
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or the outbreak of a war, that suddenly renders the state physically unable to
fulfill its legal commitments. 236 This mitigation doctrine is also well-established in
international law, but it has important limits, too -- in particular the condition that it
is not applicable if the situation of force majeure is due to the conduct or neglect
of the state attempting to invoke it, or if that state has assumed the risk of the
situation occurring. 237 There must be “no element of free choice” in the
defaulting state’s behavior. 238

In the CWC case, the United States, unfortunately, brought most of the
compliance trouble upon itself. The belated decision to employ neutralization
technology at two sites, the earlier decision not to consolidate the CW inventories
at fewer locations, and the questionable management and oversight practices at
the sites were not inherent in the treaty. Those are self-inflicted wounds, not
ascribable to any external, uncontrollable agent, and not falling within the purview
of the doctrine of force majeure.

236

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not employ the term “force majeure,”
but the concept is familiar in international law, as recognized by the ILC Draft Articles, supra note
__, article 23. The ILC states that the doctrine is applicable when there is an “irresistible force”
that is beyond the control of the state concerned and that makes it “materially impossible” to
perform its obligations. It is not available where the performance has simply become more
difficult, as, for example, due to a political or economic crisis. Id. at Commentary, paras 2 and 3.
See also Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 1396-98.
See Rainbow Warrior arbitration, New Zealand/France, UNRIAA, Vol XX, Part III, April
30, 1990, p. 217, 253 (establishing a high standard for a claim of force majeure, “absolute and
material impossibility,” not including circumstances that simply render performance “more difficult
or burdensome.”) http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XX/215-284.pdf
237
ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, article 23.2. The doctrine of force majeure is inapplicable
in situations created by the neglect or default of the breaching state, even if the resulting injury
was accidental or unintended. Id., Commentary, paras. 3, 9 (stating that the doctrine might be
applicable where a state “may have unwittingly contributed to the occurrence of material
impossibility by something which, in hindsight, might have been done differently but which was
done in good faith.”)
238
ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, article 23, Commentary, para. 1.
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Thus, the most plausible candidate excuses for mitigating U.S. nonperformance of the CWC destruction obligations will not suffice. 239 More
importantly, the United States should not want them to suffice. If the CWC, and
treaties in general, were so malleable, so subject to escape whenever conditions
changed, they would not be worth very much. It is decidedly not in the U.S.
interest to cheapen the notion of pacta sunt servanda 240 in international
obligations in that way – even if doing so might help escape liability in this
particular instance. In the long run, the United States depends upon the
reliability of international legal instruments and should endeavor to make them
more secure, not enabling wrong-doers to slide blithely out of accountability.

c. Does the CWC provide another kind of relief, due to its unusual
combination of obligations? Even if the excuses for non-performance found in
general international law are unavailing, one peculiar feature of the CWC may
seem to offer yet another possible legal strategy.

239

The ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, discuss some additional circumstances precluding the
wrongfulness of a state’s act that might be considered briefly. Under articles 20 and 45, for
example, a state may “consent” to the act of another state, or may waive any objection to that act.
In the CWC case, however, the parties have expressly not agreed to or accepted the U.S. and
Russian violations of the destruction timetable; the December 1 Decision reflects no such release
or waiver of objection. Likewise, ILC article 25, regarding the defense of “necessity,” establishes
a very stringent benchmark, related to an act that “is the only way for the State to safeguard an
essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; and does not seriously impair an essential
interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international
community as a whole”; the CWC case does not fit that description.
240
Supra, note __.
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That is, it might be suggested that the 2012 deadline is “soft,” and that
running well past it should not be deemed culpable because the excess time is
due to fastidious adherence to other CWC obligations, namely the requirement to
“assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the
environment” 241 and the requirement to conduct the destruction and other treatymandated operations with full transparency, open to OPCW inspection and
accountability. 242

This argument has a certain facial attractiveness, and to some extent it is
grounded in the reality that safety, security, and verifiability take time and carry
costs. But there is treachery in the concept that one treaty obligation may be
traded off against others, and that a party has liberty to decide on its own which
legal obligations to fulfill and which to skimp or defer. The system of international
law requires that a party to a treaty comply with all the obligations, even when
there may be some unrecognized tension between them. If the negotiators
improvidently embrace genuinely conflicting obligations, so they cannot be
simultaneously honored, then wise states should not join the treaty, should join
subject to limiting reservations, or should pursue amendments to it. But once a
state has consented to a treaty such as the CWC, it must be obligated to find
some way – difficult as it may be – to reconcile the obligations, not unilaterally
cherry-picking the easiest among them. 243
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CWC, supra note __, article IV.10
CWC, supra note __, article IV.3.
243
See CWC, supra note __, article VII.1 (“Each State Party shall, in accordance with its
constitutional processes, adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this
242
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Still, the CWC requires carrying this analysis one step further, because the
treaty explicitly imports national standards about safety and environmental
protection into the international obligations. Article IV.10 specifies that “Each
State Party shall transport, sample, store and destroy chemical weapons in
accordance with its national standards for safety and emissions.” 244 Conformity
with the full array of relevant federal and state laws, regulations, and judicial
decisions is therefore built into the CWC. If the applicable U.S. national
standards simply do not allow the destruction to be accomplished within the time
frame articulated in the order of destruction, then perhaps the general reference
in article IV could be said to trump the specifics of the treaty’s Verification Annex.

That sort of outcome, however, should be inadmissible; standard maxims
of treaty interpretation require parties to attempt to effectuate all provisions in a
treaty simultaneously, to avoid constructions that contrapose different sections
against each other. 245 The different articles in the CWC – as with any lengthy
and complicated treaty – establish mandates that are cumulative, not alternative.
Convention.”) See also Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States Delegation
th
to the OPCW at the 69 Session of the Executive Council, EC-69/NAT.15, July 11, 2012, p. 2
(arguing against “contentious and pointless arguments about whether one provision or another [of
the CWC] is most important….All the provisions of the Convention must be effectively
implemented.”)
244
CWC, supra note __, article IV.10.
245
Linderfalk, supra note __, at 107-08 (treaty interpretation should assume that different parts
of a treaty were intended to be logically compatible). Under domestic U.S. contract law, “where
an integrated agreement has been negotiated with care and in detail and has been expertly
drafted for the particular transaction, an interpretation is very strongly rejected if it would render
some provisions superfluous,” American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second,
Contracts 2d, 1979, sec. 203, comment b, and
“an interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful and effective meaning to all the terms is
preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect,” id., at
sec. 203(a).
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The treaty-makers should be understood to require each party to reconcile its
various obligations – to find a way, somehow, to implement both the time-limited
destruction and the adherence to national safety and environmental standards. 246
The United States would certainly not tolerate some other CWC party’s attempt
to evade its fundamental treaty obligations via the simple expedient of drafting
very restrictive national “safety” or “emissions” standards that, as a practical
matter, succeeded in obliterating an underlying object and purpose of the
treaty. 247

d. What are the available responses to a breach of the CWC? If the U.S.
failure to destroy its CW stockpile by the final extended April 29, 2012 deadline
constitutes a breach of the treaty – indeed, a material breach -- and if none of the
putative excuses offers a sufficient defense, what recourse is available to the
aggrieved other parties to the treaty? A leading criticism of the efficacy of the
system of international law focuses on the paucity of effective restorative or
compensatory remedies for violation, 248 but both legal and political responses
must be evaluated.
246

See Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, p. 75, 109 (agreeing that the CWC allows each
party considerable discretion regarding the specific measures that will have to be adopted to fulfill
its treaty commitments, but concluding that a party lives up to its obligations only “when its
national measures ensure the implementation of the rather broad and complex field of diverse
obligations contained in all parts of the Convention, especially those in the complex verification
mechanism.”)
247
See also Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 27 (“A party may not invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”); ILC Draft Articles,
supra note __, articles 3 and 32 (compliance with domestic law is irrelevant to a determination
about compliance with international law); Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 692-95.
248
See generally, David Luban, Julie R. O’Sullivan, and David P. Steward, International and
Transnational Criminal Law (2010), p. 48-50; Barry E. Carter and Allen S. Weiner, International
th
Law (6 ed., 2011), p. 22-44.

81

First, consider the avenues specified in the CWC itself. Here, the
assessment is somewhat complicated by the fact that the treaty drafters did not
expressly confer upon the OPCW organs any clear authority to make official
findings about treaty compliance (as, for example, the Board of Governors of the
International Atomic Energy Agency is empowered to do. 249) Indeed, during the
CWC negotiations, the United States championed the concept that only individual
states – not the organization as a whole or the Executive Council or the
Conference of the States Parties within it – should exercise that important legal
and political power. 250 On the other hand, the CWC does contain numerous
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Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, signed October 26, 1956, entered into
force July 29, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 1093; TIAS 3873; 276 UNTS 3, available at
http://www.iaea.org/About/statute_text.html, article V.E (powers of General Counsel), VI (powers
of Board of Governors); International Atomic Energy Agency, Report of the Director General to
the Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant
provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, November 8, 2011,
GOV/2011/65, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-65.pdf (noting
that the IAEA Board of Governors has adopted ten resolutions regarding the implementation of
nuclear safeguards in Iran); International Atomic Energy Agency, Board of Governors, Resolution
on Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of United Nations
Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, November 18, 2011, GOV/2011/69,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-69.pdf; International Atomic
Energy Agency, General Council, Resolution on Implementation of the NPT safeguards
agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, GC(52)/21,
October 4, 2008; International Atomic Energy Agency, Verifying Compliance with Nuclear NonProliferation Undertakings, September 2011,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/Safeguards3/safeguards0408.pdf
250

See Report 104-33, supra note __, p. 228 (recalling that “The United States insisted during
the negotiations that the decision on determining a state’s compliance was a sovereign right of
individual state parties”); Department of State, Article-by-article analysis of Chemical Weapons
Convention, Treaty Doc. 103-21, http://dtirp.dtra.mil/TIC/treatyinfo/cwc.aspx (in explaining article
VIII.35-36, the Department of State observes “the Executive Council should address concerns
and situations related to compliance, as opposed to actually deciding whether or not there has
been compliance with the Convention”), Id. at article IX.22 (“the Executive Council is not given
any special powers in regard to determining compliance or non–compliance…The language in
paragraph 22 is a compromise between certain developing countries that wanted an international
body to decide whether a violation had occurred, and other negotiating states, including the U.S.,
that wanted decisions on violations to be left up to each State Party itself to determine.”) But see
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Fact Sheet:
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passages related to ensuring compliance with the treaty, redressing situations
contravening its provisions, and settling disputes under it, which implicitly
presume an ability to take official actions in deliberate response to recognized
breaches.

The first, most basic, power the CWC confers upon its parties and the
treaty organs is the ability simply to discuss compliance matters of any sort.
Article IX contemplates “consultations” “on any matter” that may affect the object
and purpose, or the implementation, of the Convention. 251 The U.S. Department
of State reports that “The United States has successfully used bilateral
consultations under Article IX to clarify and resolve concerns about the
compliance of various States Party.” 252 In addition to those “direct” consultations,
both the Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties have the
authority, in “regular” or “special” sessions to raise and debate issues affecting
the life of the organization and the CWC. 253 Conversely, no one has the

Verification and Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, October 1, 2005,
http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/vci/rls/prsrl/57328.htm (U.S. Department of State acknowledges that
the Conference of the States Parties “is authorized to “review compliance” with the CWC, and is
to “[t]ake the necessary measures to ensure compliance with this Convention and to redress and
remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions of this Convention….”, quoting CWC,
supra note __, article XII.1). See also Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 220-21 (noting
impasse among the CWC negotiators on the question of whether the Conference should be
empowered to find a violation, and observing that “The actual wording [of article XII] does not
require such a formal decision” as part of a determination about appropriate responsive
measures.)
251
CWC, supra note __, article IX.1. See Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 171-98
(discussing consultations features of CWC).
252
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Fact
Sheet: Verification and Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, October 1, 2005, p.
1, http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/vci/rls/prsrl/57328.htm
253
CWC, supra note __, articles VIII.36 and IX.4.f.
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automatic right to shut off debate arbitrarily, sweeping uncomfortable issues
under the rug.

For example, CWC article XII (“Measures to redress a situation and to
ensure compliance, including sanctions”) empowers the Conference of the States
Parties to “take the necessary measures…to ensure compliance…and to redress
and remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions of this
Convention.”254 If a party fails to take measures to “redress a situation raising
problems with regard to its compliance,” the Conference may “restrict or suspend
the State Party’s rights and privileges under this Convention until it undertakes
the necessary action to conform with its obligations under this Convention.” 255
Furthermore, in “cases where serious damage to the object and purpose” of the
Convention may result, the Conference “may recommend collective measures” to
the parties, 256 and “in cases of particular gravity,” the Conference may bring the
issue to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly and Security
Council. 257

In addition, under Article XIV (“Settlement of disputes”) parties to a
disagreement about the interpretation or application of the treaty shall consult
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CWC, supra note __, article XII.1. See Report 104-33, supra note __, p. 184-85 (rebutting
critics who argued that the Convention’s regime for sanctions and penalties for non-compliance
was too vague to constitute an effective deterrent, asserting that “the Convention’s sanctions and
provisions are more comprehensive than those of any other similar agreement.”); Krutzsch and
Trapp, supra note __, at 218-28.
255
CWC, supra note __, article XII.2.
256
CWC, supra note __, article XII.3.
257
CWC, supra note __, article XII.4.
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“with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute”258 and the Executive
Council may contribute its good offices or other support to that effort. 259 The
Executive Council and the Conference are also empowered to request an
advisory opinion from the ICJ on any legal question within the scope of the
OPCW activities. 260

Each party has the right to request the Executive Council “to assist in
clarifying any situation which may be considered ambiguous or which gives rise
to a concern about the possible non-compliance of another State Party.” 261 A
series of short deadlines applies to communications and responses between the
Executive Council and the party whose behavior is questioned. 262 The
concerned state may also call upon the Director-General to establish a “group of
experts” from within the Technical Secretariat or outside it, “to examine all
available information and data relevant to the situation causing concern.” 263

258

CWC, supra note __, article XIV.2; Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 231-38.
CWC, supra note __, article XIV.3.
260
CWC, supra note __, article XIV.5. Pursuant to the Agreement Concerning the Relationship
Between the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,
concluded in 2000 and entered into force in 2001, the Conference of the States Parties and the
Executive Council are authorized to transmit to the General Assembly of the United Nations a
request for an advisory opinion from the ICJ. Relationship Agreement, article VII, available at
http://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/un-opcw-relationship/#c4064
261
CWC, supra note __, article IX.3. Iran has invoked this set of procedures to challenge the
United States and United Kingdom regarding the validity under the CWC of those parties’ actions
to recover, examine, and destroy older CW items recovered in Iraq in 2003-09, without
application of the Convention’s transparency provisions. See supra, text accompanying notes
___. Jonathan B. Tucker, Iraq Faces Major Challenges in Destroying Its Legacy Chemical
Weapons, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Feature Stories, March 4, 2010.
262
CWC, supra note __, article IX.4.
263
CWC, supra note __, article IX.4(e).
259
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Finally, any party has the right to request a “challenge inspection” – an onsite observation of a facility or location in another state, for the purpose of
“clarifying and resolving any questions concerning possible non-compliance.” 264
Any such inspection would be conducted by the Technical Secretariat, and the
CWC elaborates the procedures for authorizing and conducting the inspection. 265
(To date, no challenge inspections have ever been requested or conducted
under the CWC.) Notably, a requested challenge inspection may be blocked
only by a three-quarters vote of the Executive Council, on the grounds that it
would be “frivolous, abusive or clearly beyond the scope” of the CWC. 266 In the
case of the missed U.S. destruction deadline, there would be little that an
inspection could reveal, beyond all the information that the United States has
been self-reporting.

Beyond the avenues specified in the CWC itself, treaty parties may also
take advantage of options available under general international law. The most
conspicuous category of these remedies is codified in article 60 of the Vienna
Convention, which deals with responses to a material breach. This therefore
constitutes the most important consequence of a determination that the failure to
destroy the CW on time constitutes a “material breach,” as opposed to a lesser
transgression. 267
264

CWC, supra note __, article IX.8.
CWC, supra note __, article IX.8-25 and Verification Annex, Part X.
266
CWC, supra note __, article IX.17. If the Executive Council determines that the request for
a challenge inspection is abusive, it may require the requesting party to bear the costs of the
inspection. CWC, supra note __, article IX.22(c) and 23.
267
See ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, articles 42 and 48; Gomaa, supra note __, p. 90-106;
Corten and Klein, supra note __, p. 1361-66; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 1021-41.
265
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Under the VCLT, three strands of response are available regarding a
multilateral treaty such as the CWC:
--the other treaty parties may, by unanimous consent, suspend the
operation of the treaty in whole or in part, or terminate it (either among all
the parties, or just with respect to the defaulting state); 268
--a party that is “specially affected” by the breach may suspend the
operation of the treaty, in whole or in part, in its dealings with the
breaching state; 269 and
--if the treaty is “of such a character that a material breach of its provisions
by one party radically changes the position of every other party with
respect to the further performance of its obligations,” then any party is
entitled to suspend the treaty in whole or in part. 270

There has been little operational experience in construing the key terms in
these provisions. 271 We cannot be confident, therefore, whether any individual
CWC party could legitimately contend that it was “specially affected” by the U.S.

Under the Vienna Convention, a material breach may be invoked by a party to suspend or
terminate a treaty, but the breach does not automatically accomplish those effects by itself.
Kearney and Dalton, supra note __, at 540.
268
Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 60.2(a).
269
Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 60.2(b).
270
Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 60.2(c).
271
See Restatement, supra note __, vol. 1, sec. 335; Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 1360;
Villiger, supra note __, at 749; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 1071 (referring to the
“scarcity of affirmative decisions” regarding the doctrine of changed circumstances). Note that
there is no requirement that a party’s response to a breach must be “proportional” to the
provocation. See Kearney and Dalton, supra note __, at 540; Gomaa, supra note __, at 120-21;
Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 1373-75.
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delay in destroying its CW or that the CWC is of such a character that this
particular violation “radically changes the position” of each of the other parties.

Commentators have suggested that these provisions might be particularly
applicable to arms control treaties, where a breach by any party might undermine
the entire treaty regime, even if the violation was not targeted at any particular
state and none of them was deliberately “specially affected.”272 Moreover, Iran,
for example, might assert that under the current conditions of political tension
between itself and the United States, it is “specially affected” by its adversary’s
retention, for an additional decade or more, of CW.273

The VCLT establishes obligatory procedures for a country wishing to
vindicate its article 60 rights, including requirements for written notice of its
intention; 274 a “cooling off” period of at least three months; 275 and recourse to the
full panoply of U.N. conciliation and dispute resolution facilities. 276 In the current
instance, no CWC party has initiated any such procedures; indeed, the
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Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 1365; Villiger, supra note __, at 745; ILC Draft Articles,
supra note __, at article 42, comment 13; Aust, supra note __, at 294; Gomaa, supra note __, at
104-05; Sinclair, supra note __, at 189.
273
In this sort of situation, it is not clear what it would mean for Iran or any other state to
suspend or terminate its CWC obligations only with respect to the United States, if its CWC
obligations would nonetheless remain intact with respect to all the other parties.
274
VCLT, supra note __, article 65.1, 67.1.
275
VCLT, supra note __, article 65.2.
276
VCLT, supra note __, article 65.3, 66. See also ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, article
43; Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 1483-1568; Villiger, supra note __, at 799-850; Aust,
supra note __, at 300-02; Gomaa, supra note __, at 157-73; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note
__, at 1131-76); Kirgis, supra note __, at 555-58. See International Court of Justice, Judgment in
Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (The Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia v. Greece), December 5, 2011, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/16827.pdf,
paragraph 164 (finding that Greece’s response to Macedonia’s violation of their treaty was not
justified under the doctrine countermeasures.)
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December 1 Decision represents precisely the opposite tack, reflecting the
parties’ near-consensus determination to sustain and strengthen the CWC, not to
suspend or terminate it.

Aside from the VCLT, another category of legal response to a breach –
material or otherwise -- arises from the general concept of “countermeasures.”
Under this unusual self-help rubric, a state may legitimately initiate an action that
would otherwise be illegal, if its step is a timely, temporary response to another
state’s prior violation of a legal obligation, is intended to induce that other state to
return to compliance with that original obligation, and is proportional to the gravity
of the initial offense. 277 Notably, a countermeasure need not be confined to
responding to a “material” breach (even a non-material violation can provide an
adequate predicate) and the responding state is not restricted to actions within
the scope of the same treaty that was the subject of the triggering breach (the
responding state may opt to derogate from some wholly different treaty or some
other type of international legal obligation, so long as the effort is to motivate the
first state to reform its behavior.) 278 A countermeasure must be non-forceful, and
directed solely at the state guilty of the original breach – the concept is that the
responding state may attempt to induce the breaching state to right the wrong,
but may not aim merely at inflicting retribution or imposing a penalty. Ordinarily,
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ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, article 22 and Part III, Chapter II; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros,
supra note __, paragraphs 82-87; Aust, supra note __, at 362-66.
278
Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 1376.
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a state seeking to exercise countermeasures must implement good faith
negotiation and dispute resolution procedures. 279

Again, it is largely speculation to contemplate what countermeasures
might be undertaken by CWC parties who were attempting to put additional
pressure on the United States to accelerate its CW destruction. But almost the
entire realm of international legal responsibilities, including trade concessions,
law enforcement cooperation, diplomatic relations, status of forces agreements,
and other arms control accords might legitimately be put onto the table. 280

Finally, it is worth noting that an aggrieved party could also respond to the
U.S. breach via a host of random political, as opposed to legal, measures and
policies. 281 It may be difficult to imagine the United States being the target,
instead of the protagonist, of economic or trade sanctions, or other types of
political punishments, but at least in principle, something of that sort could be
available. In a different vein, it is likely that the most grave ramifications of the
U.S. breach may emerge in the form of diminished respect by other countries for
the United States, for the CWC, for arms control efforts more broadly, and for
279

ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, at articles 52-53.
ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, article 50, specifies that countermeasures shall not affect
certain types of obligations, such as to refrain from the use of force or to protect fundamental
human rights. See, e.g., Victoria Nuland, Implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe, U.S. Department of State Press Statement, November 22, 2011,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/177630.htm (United States announces that it will cease
carrying out certain obligations under the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, with regard to
Russia, in response to Russia’s unjustified unilateral suspension of its performance under that
treaty).
281
The ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, Part III, Chapter II, uses the term “countermeasure,”
instead of “reprisal” (which refers to actions undertaken during armed conflict) and “retorsion”
(which refers to unfriendly conduct that is not inconsistent with a legal obligation.)
280
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international law in general. It may become harder for the United States to
champion effectively the cause of scrupulous adherence to other vital
disarmament and non-proliferation treaties. Other states could more readily
dismiss as hypocrisy the exhortations and demands they may receive from
Washington, D.C. about the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 282 the
1972 Biological Weapons Convention, 283 the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, 284 or the
CWC itself, 285 when the United States has been so egregiously unable to keep
its own house in order regarding the destruction demands of the CWC.

Indeed, Iran has already seized the moment to excoriate the United States
for its CWC violation, in a transparent attempt to deflect attention from the U.S.
charges that Iran is violating the NPT by pursuing a nuclear weapons program. 286
Iran’s apparent “offset” strategy has to date failed to gain any traction with the
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NPT, supra note __, is the most important instrument regulating the dissemination of
nuclear weapons, the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and a cap on the nuclear
arms race.
283
The BWC, supra note __, was the first international agreement to outlaw an entire category
of weapons of mass destruction and remains the single most important multilateral instrument
regarding biological weapons.
284
The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 18 U.S.T. 2410, TIAS No. 6347,
610 UNTS 205, entered into force October 10, 1967, incorporates the foundational principles
regarding arms control in outer space and peaceful exploration and use of space.
285
See Rademaker statement, supra note __ (asserting that over a dozen countries possess or
are actively pursuing chemical weapons, and exhorting that “If this Organization [the OPCW] is to
fulfill its promise, it must not shrink from the task of confronting those States Parties that are
violating the Convention.”)
286
See supra notes __, regarding Iran’s complaints about US violating CWC. See Mikulak
November 29, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 5 (linking Iran’s attitude on nuclear and
chemical treaties).
Regarding U.S. allegations that Iran is violating the NPT by pursuing a nuclear weapons
capability, see State Compliance Report, supra note __, at 62-67; U.S. Department of State,
Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements
and Commitments, August 2011, p. 20-21; U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and
Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and
Commitments, August 2005, p. 72-80.
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other CWC parties and remains largely an isolated irritant to the OPCW’s attempt
to deal with the 2012 issue in a businesslike fashion. Still, the danger to the
Convention, and to the integrity of arms control efforts in general, lingers
ominously.

Section 6: Weapons Destruction Obligations under Other Arms Control Treaties
How unusual is the CWC’s rigid insistence that a relatively short deadline
for destruction of regulated weapons may be extended only once? How have
other arms control treaties dealt with the balance between flexibility (to
accommodate legitimate reasons for delay) versus finality (to ensure that the job
does, in fact, get done on a meaningful timetable)?

Many (but not all 287) arms control treaties do numerically limit or totally
ban parties’ possession of particular types of weapons – that is, after all, often

287

Many arms control treaties are designed largely to regulate the testing, use or deployment
locations, rather than the possession, of the regulated arms, and do not require any destruction
operations. For example, the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons
Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, 14 U.S.T. 1313, TIAS 5433, 480
U.N.T.S. 43, signed August 5, 1963, entered into force October 10, 1963) and the 1996
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, (Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 35 I.L.M. 1439,
signed September 24, 1996 (not in force)) restrict the conduct of nuclear weapons test
explosions, but do not restrict continued possession of those weapons. Likewise, the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty, supra note __, and the 1971 Seabeds Arms Control Treaty (Treaty on the
Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on
the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No.
7337, 955 UNTS 115, 10 I.L.M. 146, signed February 11, 1971, entered into force May 18, 1972)
restrict parties’ deployment of weapons in outer space or under water, but do not require
destruction of the weapons. Other related non-legally-binding agreements are basically
“confidence-building measures,” intended to reassure nervous countries that a neighbor’s
ambiguous military deployment, training or other activities are not a prelude to a surprise attack;
again, these instruments do not mandate actual cuts in weaponry. See, e.g., 1975 Helsinki Final
Act (Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, adopted in Helsinki,
August 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975)); 1986 Stockholm Document on Confidence- and SecurityBuilding Measures and Disarmament in Europe (Document of the Stockholm Conference
on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, adopted
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the whole point of the exercise. Surprisingly, however, many of the most
important treaties do not incorporate any specifications about the weaponsdestruction process: some do not contain explicit mandates that countries must
rid themselves of excess armaments, and some do not affix particular timetables
for the necessary reductions. Even when a particular destruction schedule is
required, typically the “glide path” toward the obligatory end point is so gradual
that no problems have emerged for countries that adhere.

For example, the NPT, the cornerstone of the global effort to preclude the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, forbids its non-nuclear weapon state parties
from receiving, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons, 288 but it
does not explicitly address the question of what should happen if one of these
countries is nonetheless discovered to possess a nuclear weapon. 289
Presumably, that state should destroy the device immediately (consistent with
safety and security considerations), but the treaty is silent on the timing. In
contrast, the BWC, the most important instrument in the resistance to the
scourge of biological weapons, requires parties never to “develop, produce,

September 19, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 190 (1987)); and 1990 Vienna Document on the Negotiations on
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, adopted in Vienna, January 17, 1989, 28
I.L.M. 527 (1989)).
288
NPT, supra note __, article II.
289
The NPT allows “nuclear-weapon States Parties” to continue to possess nuclear weapons,
while “non-nuclear-weapon States Parties” are prohibited from doing so. “Nuclear-weapon State”
is defined as a country that manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon before January 1,
1967, NPT, supra note __, article IX.3. Therefore, states such as India and Pakistan, which came
to possess nuclear weapons after January 1, 1967, could not join the NPT as nuclear-weapon
States Parties. They would presumably have to abandon their nuclear weapons in order to join
the NPT, but the treaty has no provisions for dealing with this scenario.
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stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain”290 the relevant devices and agents. The
treaty includes a commitment to destroy or convert the contraband items “as
soon as possible but not later than nine months after the entry into force of the
Convention,”291 and an injunction that in effectuating that process “all necessary
safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the
environment. 292 Notably, there is no specification of verification measures or of
an international authority to oversee the destruction process, despite the fact that
at the time the BWC was concluded, several states were known to possess the
newly-contraband items. No country publicly reported any difficulties in meeting
the nine-month destruction deadline. 293

The 1981 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons294 offers a
diverse menu of illustrations here. 295 Its Protocol 1 (dealing with weapons that
produce fragments that are not detectable in the human body by x-rays), 296
Protocol 3 (on incendiary weapons), 297 and Protocol 4 (concerning blinding

290

BWC, supra note __, article I.
BWC, supra note __, article II.
292
BWC, supra note __, article II.
293
Defectors later revealed that the Soviet Union secretly violated the BWC by retaining and
continuing to develop biological weapons. Ken Alibek and Steven Handelman, Biohazard:
(1999), The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World Told from Inside by the Man Who Ran It, 1999.
294
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, signed
October 10, 1980, entered into force December 2, 1983, entered into force for the United States
September 24, 1995, 1342 UNTS 137,19 ILM 1523 (1980) [hereinafter, CCW].
295
The CCW has an unusual structure. The main treaty itself contains only basic
administrative provisions, as a chapeau for a series of five attached protocols dealing with
selected topics; each state may decide to join any or all of the protocols independently.
296
CCW, supra note __, Protocol 1.
297
CCW, supra note __, Protocol 3.
291
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lasers) 298 ban the use (or particular types of uses) of the regulated armaments,
but do not proscribe mere possession, and therefore do not address destruction.
Meanwhile, amended Protocol 2 (regulating anti-personnel land mines) 299 and
Protocol 5 (about explosive remnants of war), 300 although primarily concerned
with use, also contain obligations to clear, remove, destroy or maintain the mines
“[w]ithout delay after the cessation of active hostilities” 301 and to clear, remove or
destroy the explosive remnants of war “[a]fter the cessation of active hostilities
and as soon as feasible.” 302 But they do not describe any mandatory destruction
process or specific timetable.

Numerous bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet
Union or Russia regarding nuclear weapons have established numerical caps on
various categories of treaty-limited items:
--The first such effort, the 1969 SALT I Interim Agreement on Strategic
Offensive Arms 303 was mostly a “freeze” on existing arsenals of Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs),
without any requirement for elimination of existing systems. 304 The companion
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CCW, supra note __, Protocol 4.
CCW, supra note __, amended Protocol 2.
300
CCW, supra note __, Protocol 5.
301
CCW, supra note __, amended Protocol 2, article 10.1.
302
CCW, supra note __, Protocol 5, article 3.2.
Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic
303
Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3462 (entered into force Oct. 3,
1972) [hereinafter SALT I Interim Agreement].
304
SALT I Interim Agreement, supra note __, articles I, III.
299
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Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty 305 likewise capped, rather than reducing, ABM
systems, but it did spawn a Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement,
Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their
Components, and a series of exacting subsidiary agreements and statements.
These did not establish overall timetables or deadlines, but did contain some
time-bounded steps for the dismantling procedures. 306
--The 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty307 abolished the
entire category of land-based ballistic and cruise missiles in the 500-5500
kilometer range; it required each party to eliminate all such missiles and their
launchers and all related support structures and equipment within three years. 308

305

Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435,
signed May 26, 1972, entered into force October 3, 1972, no longer in force [hereinafter, ABM
Treaty].
306
Article VIII of the ABM Treaty, supra note __, specifies that ABM systems and components
in excess of those allowed “shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the
shortest possible agreed period of time.” Thereafter, the parties concluded a July 3, 1974
Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification
Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components, and a October 28, 1976 Supplementary
Protocol to establish certain timing standards, such as a requirement that destruction of excess
missile launchers shall be completed within three months after its initiation, Protocol, Procedures
Governing Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their
Components, Article I.3., and that destruction of ABM facilities at Malmstrom Air Force Base was
to be completed within six months of the agreement on procedures. Id., article II.5, available at
http://www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/abm/dord.htm.
307
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Dec. 8, 1987, United
States-Soviet Union, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 84 (1988) [hereinafter INF Treaty].
308
INF Treaty, supra note __, articles I, II, IV. There is also an interim deadline, requiring
destruction of a significant fraction of the banned weapons within the first 29 months after the
treaty entered into force. Id. at article IV.2(a). All the eliminations were completed by both
countries on time. Joseph P. Harahan, On-Site Inspections Under the INF Treaty: A History of
the On-Site Inspection Agency and INF Treaty Implementation, 1988-1991, 1993; U.S. General
Accounting Office, Arms Control: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Implementation,
GAO/NSIAD-91-262, September 1991.
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--The 1991 START I Treaty309 obligated the two parties to reduce their
holdings to no more than 1600 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers and
no more than 6000 warheads attributed to those weapons, in three sequential
phases, with interim levels to be reached after three, five and seven years. 310
The 2002 Moscow Treaty 311 then lowered the ceiling on strategic warheads to
1700-2200 within another ten years. 312
--The 2010 New START Treaty 313 reduced the number of deployed
ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers to 700 and the number of associated
warheads to 1550, within seven years. 314

Meeting these generous targets on time never proved especially
burdensome for either superpower. For example, Russia’s strategic nuclear
inventory was already almost at the desired end-state when New START entered
into force on February 5, 2011, 315 and further reductions have continued on both

309

Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, July 31, 1991, U.S.USSR, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-20 (1991) [hereinafter The START I Treaty].
310
START I Treaty, supra note __, article II. START I also included numerous other sub-limits
on categories such as warheads attributable to deployed mobile ICBMs, deployed heavy ICBMs,
and warheads on deployed heavy ICBMs, with fixed destruction timetables for each. Id.
311
Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, May 24, 2002, U.S.-Russia, S. Treaty Doc. No.
107-8 (2002) [hereinafter Moscow Treaty].
312
Moscow Treaty, supra note __, article I. This treaty did not require actual destruction of the
excess warheads; they could be removed from deployment and sent to storage.
313
Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
U.S.-Russia., S. Treaty Doc. No. 111-5 (2010), 50 ILM 340 (2011), signed April 8, 2010, entered
into force February 5, 2011 [hereinafter New START Treaty].
314
New START Treaty, supra note __, article II.
315
The New START Treaty parties’ initial exchange of data revealed that as of February 5,
2011, when the treaty entered into force, Russia possessed 521 deployed strategic delivery
systems (700 are allowed by the treaty), 865 deployed and non-deployed systems (800 are
allowed) and 1537 warheads on deployed systems (1550 are allowed). The United States data
were, respectively, 882, 1124, and 1800. U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: New START
Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms, June 1, 2011.
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sides. 316 In fact, one of the perceived problems with the original START I accord
had been that the treaty-established procedures for eliminating the weapons, to
remove them from accountability, were so exacting, and therefore so expensive,
that each country avoided performing them. Instead, each state carried on its
books numerous treaty-accountable items that were obsolete, unarmed, and
non-functional, because each was comfortably below its allowable ceilings, and it
was considerably cheaper to sustain these so-called “phantom weapons” than to
complete the prescribed elimination steps. 317 (The New START treaty
considerably simplified the mandatory dismantling standards, ameliorating the
problem.)

The multilateral 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty 318 and
its associated instruments 319 may incorporate more separate numerical limits

316

By March 1, 2012, the numbers were: for deployed strategic delivery systems, U.S. 812,
Russia 494; for deployed and non-deployed systems, U.S. 1040, Russia 881; for deployed
warheads, U.S. 1737, Russia 1492. U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: New START Treaty
Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms, April 6, 2012; Kingston Reiff, New START; One
Year Later, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 2, 2012; Tom Z. Collina, Russia Back
Below Treaty’s Warhead Limits, 42 Arms Control Today No. 4, May 2012, p. 39 (noting that
reported numbers of weapons can fluctuate, as individual systems are removed from deployed
status for maintenance or repair operations).
317
See Amy F. Woolf, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions,
Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, 7-5700, December 23, 2011, p. 6-9, 25
(describing how the United States and Russia had avoided the difficulty and expense of
complying with the exacting START I procedures for eliminating weapons from accountability, by
continuing to count under the treaty many systems that were no longer operational). Compare
START I supra note __, Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of
Items Subject to the Treaty with New START, supra note __, Protocol to the Treaty, Part Three,
Conversion or Elimination Procedures.
318
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 30 I.L.M. 1, signed November 19, 1990,
entered into force July 17, 1992.
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than any other arms control system. They establish individual caps for each of
the 30 parties, and for various combinations of them, on each of five categories
of weaponry: tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and
combat helicopters, all to be reached within 40 months. 320 Most of the reductions
were readily accomplished on time (where Russia failed to do so, it was not
because of financial or other impediments to the destruction process, but
because of political dissatisfaction with the operation of the treaty in the postCold War environment, when the prior military bloc structure had unraveled). 321
Some of the CFE reductions in treaty-limited items were accomplished not
through physical dismantling of excess systems, but through the simple
expedient of moving them out of the treaty’s geographic area, such as Russia’s
abrupt transfer of some 70,000 items to its military districts east of the Ural

319

The CFE Treaty was negotiated on a bloc-to-bloc (NATO and Warsaw Pact) basis, and
defined a series of concentric zones with specified numerical ceilings for each type of equipment.
In addition, an associated non-legally-binding instrument provided national limitations on military
manpower. This original structure became outmoded when the Cold War ended; a 1999
Adaptation Agreement focused on national, rather than bloc, limitations, but it has not entered
into force. Arms Control Association, The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
and the Adapted CFE Treaty at a Glance, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/cfe; Tom Z.
Colllina, CFE Treaty Talks Stall, 41 Arms Control Today No. 7, September 2011, p. 30,
http://www.armscontrol.org/2011_09/CFE_Treaty_Talks_Stall; GlobalSecurity.org, Conventional
Forces in Europe Treaty, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/cfe-treaty.htm
320
CFE Treaty, supra note __, articles I-VII. Reductions to meet the specified ceilings on
military equipment are to be carried out in three phases, with interim deadlines at 16, 28 and 40
months after the treaty entered into force. Id., article VIII.4.
321
Russia has objected to sustaining the original limitations on military equipment in the
various zones, now that the Warsaw Pact has collapsed and many of the Soviet Union’s former
allies have joined NATO. The 1999 Adaptation Agreement was designed to provide the
necessary adjustments, but it has not entered into force. See U.S. Department of State,
Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements
and Commitments, August 2005, p. 32 (regarding CFE generally), p. 38-47 (regarding Russian
activity under the CFE Treaty); U.S. Department of State, Condition (5)(C) Report, Compliance
with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, August 2011.
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Mountains, and thus out of Europe. 322 Still, the treaty incorporates excruciatingly
detailed procedures for severing, welding, removing, explosively detonating,
deforming, smashing, or otherwise disabling each type of limited equipment, 323
and has accounted for the destruction of some 52,000 pieces of military
hardware. 324

The most conspicuous example of a recent treaty for which the mandatory
dismantling timetable has proven problematic is the 1997 Ottawa Convention on
Anti-Personnel Land Mines (APL). 325 The Ottawa Convention has 160 parties,
including most members of NATO, but not the United States. 326 It incorporates
two different destruction obligations, with interestingly different schedules. First,
regarding stockpiled mines (those held in a warehouse, not yet deployed into an
operational minefield), each party is obligated to destroy all the APL that it owns
or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, “as soon as possible but
not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State

322

While the CFE Treaty negotiations were being concluded, Russia suddenly moved a large
quantity of soon-to-be-regulated military equipment from its European bases to Asian locations
east of the Ural Mountains, and therefore out of the treaty’s geographic coverage. Many
considered this to be a dangerous circumvention of the treaty (since the equipment could
presumably be returned to the European theater just as quickly); much of it was later destroyed.
GlobalSecurity.org, Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/cfe-treaty.htm
323
CFE Treaty, supra note __, Protocol on Procedures Governing the Reduction of
Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty.
324
Arms Control Association, The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the
Adapted CFE Treaty at a Glance, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/cfe.
325
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211 [hereinafter Ottawa
Convention].
326
International Campaign to Ban Landmines,
http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Universal/MBT/States-Parties.
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Party.” 327 There is no provision for extension of that four-year period. Second,
regarding mines already emplaced in minefields, each party must destroy all
mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no
later than ten years after the treaty becomes operational. 328 If a party “believes
that it will be unable” to accomplish that objective, it may request an extension for
up to another ten years, and a Meeting of the States Parties may vote (by simple
majority) to grant the request. 329 Moreover, such an extension may be renewed,
via the same process, apparently without limit. 330

The Ottawa Convention specifies that a request for an extension shall
contain: a) the duration of the proposed extension; b) a detailed explanation of
the reasons for it, including the status of the work already conducted, the
financial and technical means available to the country to conduct the necessary
destruction activities, and the “[c]ircumstances which impede the ability” of the
state to complete the process; c) the “humanitarian, social, economic, and
environmental implications of the extension”; and d) any other relevant
information. 331

To date, compliance with these two deadlines has been inconsistent.
Most Ottawa parties do not currently possess stockpiles of APL (64 parties
declared that they had never owned any such mines). But four states – Belarus,
327
328
329
330
331

Ottawa Convention, supra note __, article 4.
Ottawa Convention, supra note __, article 5.1.
Ottawa Convention, supra note __, article 5.3, 5.5.
Ottawa Convention, supra note __, article 5.6.
Ottawa Convention, supra note __, article 5.4.
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Greece, Turkey and Ukraine – are in violation of their Ottawa obligations, due to
failure to meet the four-year timetable, and only Turkey appears to be moving
close to compliance. (For Belarus, Greece and Turkey, the deadline was March
1, 2008; Ukraine joined the treaty later, and started violating this provision on
June 1, 2010.) 332

Regarding destruction of mines fielded in mined areas, 44 states have
declared themselves to be (or are otherwise considered to be) subject to the
treaty’s obligation to clear the mines within ten years, but 22 of these have
already requested and received one or more extensions, and several additional
petitions are pending. 333 Many of these countries are registering precious little
progress in the clearance task, and are falling behind their own generous
schedules. 334 At the treaty’s second Review Conference, in 2009, the parties
adopted the Cartagena Action Plan, which included Point 13, urging states to
work toward rapid implementation of their obligations to clear mines within ten
years (plus extensions), but little acceleration in the pace has been noted. 335
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, responsible for overseeing
implementation of the Ottawa Convention, concludes that even the states that

332

International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor 2011, p. 4-5, http://www.themonitor.org/lm/2011/resources/Landmine%20Monitor%202011.pdf
333

International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor 2011, p. 22, http://www.themonitor.org/lm/2011/resources/Landmine%20Monitor%202011.pdf
334
International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor 2011, p. 23, http://www.themonitor.org/lm/2011/resources/Landmine%20Monitor%202011.pdf
335
International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor 2011, p. 22, http://www.themonitor.org/lm/2011/resources/Landmine%20Monitor%202011.pdf
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have been granted extensions have made “disappointing progress,” 336 and that
“deadline extension requests are becoming the norm rather than the
exception.”337

The bifurcated Ottawa Convention structure was adapted in the 2008 Oslo
Convention on Cluster Munitions. 338 There, each party undertakes, first, to
destroy all its stockpiled cluster munitions as soon as possible and no later than
within eight years (and “to ensure that destruction methods comply with
applicable international standards for protecting public health and the
environment.”) 339 Unlike the Ottawa Convention, here the stockpile destruction
deadline may be extended, upon request to a Meeting of States Parties, for four
years, and “in exceptional circumstances,” for additional periods of four years,
where doing so is “strictly necessary” to complete the destruction. 340

336

International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor 2011, p. 22, http://www.themonitor.org/lm/2011/resources/Landmine%20Monitor%202011.pdf
337
International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor 2011, p. 30, http://www.themonitor.org/lm/2011/resources/Landmine%20Monitor%202011.pdf
338

Convention on Cluster Munitions, signed December 3, 2008, entered into force August 1,
2010, available at http://www.clusterconvention.org/files/2011/01/Convention-ENG.pdf [hereiafter
Oslo Convention].
A cluster munition is an explosive weapon that releases or disperses multiple, small submunitions, allowing it to strike numerous targets simultaneously over a wider area. Oslo
Convention, supra note __, article 2.2; Andrew Feickert and Paul K. Kerr, Cluster Munitions:
Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress,
RS22907, June 27, 2012.
339
Oslo Convention, supra note __, article 3.2.
340
Oslo Convention, supra note __, article 3.3. The request for an extension is to specify the
duration of the requested extension, the exceptional circumstances justifying it, the plan for
destroying the cluster munitions, the financial and technical resources available to the party to
complete the destruction, and the quantity of munitions and sub-munitions to be destroyed. Id. at
article 3.4.
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Second, regarding the cluster munition remnants in the field, the Oslo
Convention requires each party to clear and destroy all such items within ten
years; that period may be renewed for successive five-year increments. 341

What are the lessons to be learned from all this collective experience with
different forms of destruction obligations under arms control agreements? How
could conscientious treaty makers find the “sweet spot” that avoids both: a) the
excessive rigidity of an immoveable deadline that throws into a situation of
breach a country that behaves in good faith but simply cannot meet a projected
calendar that may have seemed perfectly reasonable when it was originally
established and b) the opposite danger of a too-squishy timetable that cavalierly
allows recalcitrant countries to defer indefinitely their obligations, cynically
appearing to honor the treaty while not truly pursuing one of its key desiderata?

The answer cannot be an automatic preference for either long deadlines
or short ones, or for waivable or immutable targets. Likewise, it is too simplistic
merely to call for negotiators to be “more realistic” in setting their timetables or for
countries to be “more responsible” in carrying out their destruction obligations.
With hindsight, it is abundantly clear that a 10- or even 15-year target for
destroying all U.S. and Russian chemical weapons was ambitious, perhaps
foolishly so. But in the early 1990s, when the time frame was picked, the experts
341

Oslo Convention, supra note __, article 4. The request for an extension is to specify the
proposed duration, the reasons for the extension, the work already conducted under national
clearance programs, the total area remaining to be cleared, the circumstances that have impeded
the party’s ability to complete the clearance, and the humanitarian, social, economic, and
environmental implications of the proposed extension. Id. at article 4.6.
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were confident; they regarded the single five-year extension as a probablyunnecessary extra margin of safety. What they apparently did not adequately
take into account was the inevitability that political factors, as well as technical
factors, would come into play. If NIMBY had not intervened, the deadline could
probably have been met.

It is clear that the political dynamics of modern arms control will not
tolerate asymmetric deadlines. That is, it would not be generally acceptable to
require countries with relatively small inventories of the regulated weapons to
destroy them immediately, while providing a significantly longer period for those
laboring under a larger legacy of now-excess armaments. Whatever freedom of
action is available to one will probably have to be extended to all. 342

Perhaps part of the solution may lie in drafting standards that allow
extensions, and renewals of extensions, but that specify the particular criteria
that the requester must satisfy, as well as procedures to ensure that applications
are well-vetted. Some may view the Ottawa and Oslo Conventions as providing
useful models here, but others are less sanguine, concluding that even strictsounding language may be susceptible to exploitation and endless delay.

342

The NPT, regulating nuclear weapons, is “discriminatory,” in that it allows the five states that
tested nuclear weapons first (the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom)
to retain nuclear weapons, while outlawing possession for all other parties. NPT, supra note __,
articles I, II, VI, IX.3. In contrast, the treaties regulating chemical and biological weapons are
“non-discriminatory,” treating all states identically, regardless of their history as possessors (or
not) of the regulated weapons. BWC, supra note __, article I; CWC, supra note __, article I.
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Section 7: Possible Paths Forward on the CWC
Returning now to the analysis of the CWC destruction mandate, what tools
and tactics may be available for resolving the U.S. and Russian 2012 violations?
Five clusters of options are considered.

a. Change the treaty obligations. The first obvious kind of response would
be to alter the mandate of the treaty – if the leading parties are unable to change
their behavior to conform to the treaty’s terms, then possibly they could change
the treaty’s terms to match better what those two chemical leviathans could
actually accomplish. The CWC provides three possible avenues.

First, the formal amendment provisions of the CWC outline the “front door”
mechanism for altering the text. Article XV of the treaty provides that any party
may propose an amendment, which is circulated to all parties. 343 If one-third of
the parties support it, an Amendment Conference is convened. 344 To be
adopted, the proposal must receive “a positive vote of a majority of all States
Parties with no State Party casting a negative vote.” 345 It must then be ratified by
all the parties who voted in favor of it at the Amendment Conference; 30 days
later, the amendment enters into force for all treaty parties. 346

343

CWC, supra note __, article XV.1 and 2; Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 239-47.
CWC, supra note __, article XV.2. With 188 states party to the treaty, 63 would have to
support the convening of an Amendment Conference.
345
CWC, supra note __, article XV.3(a). A majority vote would require 95 parties.
346
CWC, supra note __, article XV.3.
344
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As a formal matter, this procedure carries the notable virtue that an
amendment supported by a majority (and not opposed by any party) can enter
into force for all parties simultaneously – it avoids the irregularity that might occur
if a state that does nothing (neither supporting nor opposing the amendment)
would not be bound by it, while other parties would be. However, as a practical
matter, this mechanism makes amendments extremely difficult; it provides each
party two separate opportunities to veto any proposal – it may vote against the
amendment at the Amendment Conference, or it may vote in favor, but then
decline to ratify. Moreover, as a political matter, the United States and likeminded parties have been reluctant to propose any amendments to the CWC,
fearing that if the treaty text were opened up to alteration, other parties might
take the occasion to propound their own ideas for refinement of the obligations,
many of which would be unwelcome. The CWC has never been amended.

The second potential mechanism for modifying the treaty is the “changes”
procedure, also found in article XV. This provides an expedited mechanism to
“ensure the viability and effectiveness” 347 of the CWC, and is applicable only to
“matters of an administrative or technical nature.” 348 Under it, a proposal is
circulated to all parties, with an evaluation by the Director-General of the
Technical Secretariat, and the Executive Council makes a recommendation. 349 If
the Executive Council’s recommendation is favorable, the proposal is considered

347
348
349

CWC, supra note __, article XV.4.
CWC, supra note __, article XV.4.
CWC, supra note __, article XV.5(a)-(c).
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approved unless a party objects within 90 days, 350 and it enters into force for all
parties 180 days later. 351

This streamlined vehicle allows minor alterations in the CWC to be
implemented more quickly (in particular, it does not require an act of “ratification”
by the parties, thereby dodging the necessity of returning to national legislatures
for consent). But it again relies upon the absence of any objection, and it is
applicable only to relatively minor provisions in the Annexes of the CWC, not to
the text of the treaty itself. 352

In the current situation, oddly, the obligation to destroy all chemical
weapons within ten years is contained in article IV.6 of the treaty, 353 but the
provision for the one limited extension is housed in the Verification Annex, Part
IV(A).C.24-26. 354 It is not clear, therefore, whether the expedited procedure
could be legitimately implemented to address this matter.

Moreover, in CWC experience, this “viability and effectiveness change”
procedure has been employed only twice, regarding quite minor matters: to adapt

350

CWC, supra note __, article XV.5(d). If the Executive Council recommends that the
proposal be rejected, it is considered rejected unless a party objects within 90 days. If a party
disagrees with the recommendation of the Executive Council, the matter is referred to the
Conference of the States Parties. CWC, supra note __, article XV.5(d) and (e).
351
CWC, supra note __, article XV.5(g).
352
Some parts of the annexes are also exempt from the changes procedure, reflecting the
negotiators’ judgment that those particular passages were too important to be subject to the
expedited change operations. CWC, supra note __, article XV.4.
353
CWC, supra note __, article IV.6 (destruction “shall finish not later than 10 years after entry
into force of this Convention.”)
354
CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.24-26.
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the timetable for consideration of proposals to “convert” to benign applications,
rather than to “destroy,” a former chemical weapons production facility, in the
case of a state that joins the treaty after the initially-specified timetable for such
conversions; 355 and to allow international transfers of very small quantities (5
milligrams or less) of saxitoxin for medical diagnostic purposes to proceed with
notification at the time of transfer, rather than 30 days in advance. 356

It seems extremely unlikely that a change to the 15 year destruction
deadline (even though expressed in the Verification Annex, instead of in the
treaty text) would pass muster as an “administrative or technical” question. If
even a single party objected to the gambit, the matter – including the question of
whether the proposal truly meets the criteria for a “change” – would be referred to
the Conference of the States Parties, where it would be addressed as a matter of
substance, again affording any party the power to block an amendment. 357

A third, possibly less onerous or restrictive, option for altering the CWC
destruction obligations would rely upon an emergent pattern of practice among
the parties in interpreting or implementing the accord. That is, the Vienna
Convention contemplates that in construing a treaty text, there shall be taken into
account “[a]ny subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which

355

CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part V.D.72bis (added in
2005)
356
CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part VI.B.5bis (added in
1999 and corrected in 2000).
357
CWC, supra note __, article XV.5(e).
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establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.” 358 If the
observed “practice” of the leading CWC parties is to careen past the 15-year
timetable, without strenuous objection from others, perhaps that pattern could, de
facto amount to a revised understanding of the legal obligations. 359

Notably, this passage in the Vienna Convention relates to “interpretation”
of a treaty, rather to “alterations” in it, but perhaps it may be possible in practice
to fuzz the dividing line between ordinary implementation and modification – if the
parties were unanimous in their intentions. 360 However, it is a stretch to describe
the December 1 Document as a tacit “waiver” or foregiveness of the U.S. and
Russian violations, or as a consensus to alter the treaty’s demands. The
December 1 Document was not labeled or described in those terms, and it
seems unlikely that a general loosening of the 15-year deadline would have
commanded such universal assent. Even if most parties were disinclined to
pound the table about the major powers’ failures, some, at least, would continue,

358

Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 31.3(b). See also Restatement, supra note __,
vol. 1, sec. 325, comment c; Gardiner, supra note __, at 225-49; Villiger, supra note __, at 431;
Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 552-60. It would also be possible for the CWC parties
to conclude an overt “subsequent agreement” “regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the
application of its provisions” Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 31.3(a). However, it
seems extremely unlikely that all CWC parties would join in the negotiation and conclusion of
such an instrument.
359
The Albania case, discussed supra, text accompanying notes __, could be instructive as a
data point in helping to establish a possible pattern of precedents for this approach.
360
See Restatement, supra note __, vol. 1, sec. 334, reporters’ note 4 (concluding that “[t]he
question of modification by subsequent practice tends to merge into that of interpretation by
subsequent practice”), sec. 102, comment j, and reporters’ note 4 (new rule of customary
international law may supersede a prior treaty); Gardiner, supra note __, at 243-45; Aust, supra
note __, at 241-43; Georg Nolte, Third Report for the International Law Commission Study Group
on Treaties Over Time, Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice of States Outside of
Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Proceedings, ILC(LXIV)/SG/TOT/INFORMAL/1/REV.1, May 2, 2012, p.
43-45 (common practice among treaty parties can indicate agreement on non-application of the
treaty).
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with reason, to regard this chain of events as simply a “violation” of the CWC, not
as a covert consensual “re-interpretation” of one of its key provisions. In that
connection, OPCW organs have explicitly stressed that no action should be
taken, regarding some parties’ difficulties in meeting the revised deadlines for
destruction of chemical weapons, that would “lead to the rewriting or
reinterpreting of the Convention’s provisions.” 361

b. Escape the treaty obligations. A second device for addressing the
destruction problem would be to exercise the CWC’s withdrawal provision; this
approach could be contemplated either by the United States and Russia or by
any other party aggrieved by the prolongation of the CW destruction process.

Like many other modern arms control agreements, 362 the CWC allows its
parties to escape the obligations in an extreme situation, providing:
Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the
right to withdraw from this Convention if it decides that extraordinary
events, related to the subject-matter of this Convention, have jeopardized
the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal
90 days in advance to all other States Parties, the Executive Council, the
Depositary and the United Nations Security Council. Such notice shall
include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having
jeopardized its supreme interests. 363
361

th

OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Report of the 15 Session, December 3, 2010, C15/5, paragraph 9.8; Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States Delegation to
th
the OPCW at the 15 Session of the Conference of the States Parties, C-15/NAT.3, November
29, 2010, p. 4.
362
Cf. ABM Treaty, supra note __, article XV.2; NPT, supra note __, article X.1; BWC, supra
note __, article XIII.2; New START Treaty, supra note __, article XIV.3.
363
CWC, supra note __, article XVI.2. Such a withdrawal would not affect a state’s obligations
under the Geneva Protocol, supra note __ or under customary international law. CWC, supra
note __, article XVI.3.
Withdrawal from an arms control treaty is rare; the only two instances are North Korea’s
2003 withdrawal from the NPT and the United States’ 2002 withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. See

111

First, regarding the United States and Russia, it would be a stretch for
those states to characterize their own (or each other’s) violations of the treaty as
events that have jeopardized their supreme interests. A somewhat better
rationale might be to cite the unforeseen technical, financial, and organizational
difficulties that generated those breaches as “extraordinary events,” and assert
that withdrawal was preferable to overtly violating the CWC, because committing
a material breach could lead to adverse implications, as described above, casting
into disrepute the CWC, other vital arms control agreements, and by extension,
all of international law. 364

Notably, the concept of the withdrawal provision in arms control treaties
allows each state to be entirely “self-judging” in evaluating whether its supreme
interests have been jeopardized. It must express the reasons why it regards
withdrawal as necessary, but as long as it is behaving in good faith, there is no

Arms Control Association, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: North Korea,
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/northkoreaprofile; Wade Boese, Missile Defense Five
Years After the ABM Treaty, 37 Arms Control Today No. 5, June 2007,
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_06/MissileDefense.
364
This provision allows only for a complete “withdrawal” from a treaty, not for a temporary
“suspension” of its obligations. Russia has asserted an ability to suspend, not terminate, its
participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and the United States and other
parties have resolutely rejected that interpretation. Statement by the United States of America to
nd
the Joint Consultative Group, 682 Plenary Meeting, Agenda item 2(b), December 9, 2008; U.S.
Department of State, Condition (5)(C) Report, Compliance with the Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe, August 2011; Victoria Nuland, Implementation of the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, U.S. Department of State Press Statement, November 22,
2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/177630.htm (United States announces that it will
cease carrying out CFE obligations with regard to Russia, in response to Russia’s suspension).
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mechanism for the other parties to object effectively or to compel the state to
remain inside the treaty regime. 365

Here, to mitigate the political fallout from a withdrawal, the United States
and Russia might negotiate a new bilateral agreement committing themselves to
expeditious destruction of their CW inventories (perhaps akin to the 1989-90
bilateral agreements noted above 366) and they might conclude some sort of
agreement with the OPCW to apply the verification and related measures to their
prolonged extra-CWC functions. And they could make clear their intentions to rejoin the CWC as soon as their destruction operations reached fruition.

But any such defection, under any terms, would surely shake the CWC to
its core. Where the objective is to sustain the concept of an effective
international law prohibition against chemical warfare, any decision by the United
States and Russia to abandon the leading instrument in the field would hardly be
appreciated as a constructive approach.

Conversely, it is possible that other parties, perturbed by the failure of the
United States and Russia to comply with the mandatory destruction timetable,
would exercise the right to withdraw. The exiting state might, or might not,

365

Aust, supra note __, at 281-82. In 2006, after North Korea withdrew from the NPT and
conducted a nuclear weapons test explosion, the United Nations Security Council deplored the
withdrawal and demanded that North Korea rescind its action and rejoin the NPT. United Nations
Security Council, Resolution 1718, October 14, 2006, paragraphs 3-4. North Korea has not done
so.
366
Wyoming MOU and Bilateral Destruction Agreement, supra note __.
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decide to resume production of CW; perhaps it would announce an intention to
return to the Convention when the United States and Russia complete their
destruction operations. No state has yet insinuated that it might consider such
recourse, and in any neutral assessment, the prolonged possession of these
quantities of to-be-destroyed munitions and agents by the United States and
Russia does not pose any genuine threat to the security or other supreme
interests of any other party. The prospect that either the United States or Russia
would brandish or use any of these loathsome devices in combat is virtually nil,
and even if the U.S. chemical neutralization process consumes another decade
or more, no other state is genuinely threatened thereby.

Still, an outlier state may see things differently, and as noted, the
operation of the withdrawal power does not afford other states the opportunity to
gainsay that option. 367 One or more such defections would hardly “solve” the
destruction problem in any sense, but it cannot be dismissed as a possible
response by states that wanted to protest the U.S. and Russian dilatory behavior,
to punish them for it, or perhaps to incentivize them to improve it.

c. Excuse the violation. A third approach would be to convince the CWC
parties to waive or simply overlook the violation. At the most elementary level,
this could be a low-key political enterprise, to persuade other states that the

367

After North Korea withdrew from the NPT and conducted a nuclear weapons test explosion,
the United Nations Security Council deplored the withdrawal and demanded that North Korea
rescind its action and rejoin the NPT. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1718, October
14, 2006. North Korea has not done so.
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United States and Russia were behaving in an eminently reasonable fashion –
even if they were contravening the terms of the CWC, they were devoting so
much money, expertise and innovation to the effort, and were not seeking or
achieving any military, diplomatic or other benefit from the prolongation, so no
one else should care very much. The hoped-for response would be “nothing” –
not a whimper of protest or a wiggle of serious contrary action – in recognition
that pressing further on this issue would be both futile and unnecessary.

The world might thus appreciate this situation as a variation on the
concept of “efficient breach,”368 the notion that strict conformity with the exact
terms of a binding legal obligation could become wasteful, if the breaching party
stands to gain so much by the violation that it could compensate the innocent
parties for the loss of their expectations, and still come out ahead. Here, there
would be little tangible benefit to the other CWC parties, even if the United States
and Russia were now to pour even more billions into a largely futile effort to
somehow further accelerate their CW destruction processes. A more relaxed,
flexible attitude may therefore be deemed more appropriate.

In a more formal vein, the Executive Council, the Conference of the States
Parties, or the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat could go overtly on
the record with similarly benign conclusions. None of those bodies has any
368

Under the modern “law and economics” theory of “efficient breach,” a party may be excused
from performing a contract if breach would be economically more efficient – provided that it pays
th
compensatory damages to the injured party. Black’s Law Dictionary, 9 edition, 2009, p. 592. In
the case of the CWC, there is no specific injured party, and there is no procedure for assessing
compensatory damages.
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express power to expunge treaty violations, and the CWC dispute resolution
provisions do not contemplate a “Good Housekeeping seal of approval” for
breaches, but discretion and judgment might lead in that direction. The
Executive Council has the general authority “to promote the effective
implementation of, and compliance with, this Convention” 369 and to make
recommendations “regarding measures to redress the situation and to ensure
compliance.”370 The Conference of the States Parties has even broader
responsibilities; it may “take decisions on any questions, matters or issues
related to this Convention” 371 and “act in order to promote its object and
purpose.” 372 If those organs determined that little or no response was necessary
or appropriate in reaction to the 2012 issue, that wisdom could not be
overturned. 373

369

CWC, supra note __, article, VIII.C.30.
CWC, supra note __, article VIII.C.36(c).
371
CWC, supra note __, article VIII.B.19.
372
CWC, supra note __, article VIII.B.20.
373
The organs of the OPCW are not themselves parties to the treaty; they are merely the
agents of the states parties. Any legally operative determination to waive or forgive a violation
would have to be a decision of the parties themselves, perhaps expressed through the Executive
Council and the Conference of the States Parties. The Director-General has even less express
authority to bind the parties, but has used his “bully pulpit” to try to promote a consensus, low-key
solution. See OPCW, Executive Council, Opening Statement by the Director-General to the
st
Executive Council at Its 61 Session, EC-61/DG.17, June 29, 2010, paras. 10, 11 (saying that the
United States and Russia “will not be able to meet the 29 April 2012 deadline,” without labeling
that failure as a “breach” or “violation,” and opining that those two countries have shown an
excellent track record and firm commitment to the CWC, so “the key goal of achieving the total
and irreversible destruction of their declared stockpiles is, in my view, not in question….I have no
doubt that they will continue to stay on track.”) See also Georg Nolte, Third Report for the
International Law Commission Study Group on Treaties Over Time, Subsequent Agreements and
Subsequent Practice of States Outside of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Proceedings,
ILC(LXIV)/SG/TOT/INFORMAL/1/REV.1, May 2, 2012, p. 71-88 (surveying different types of
treaty implementation bodies and the powers they may wield in treaty interpretation and
modification).
370
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The closest precedent for the current situation arose in April 2007
regarding Albania’s small CW stockpile. There, the OPCW, in effect, closely
monitored Albania’s tardiness in meeting the deadline, but took no formal action,
despite the facts that Albania had clearly violated the treaty’s requirements
(albeit, by a very small margin) and that Albania had done so without even
bothering to request an extension (which would have easily fixed the problem.) A
pragmatic “watch and wait” posture by the Executive Council (it “reiterated its
concern”374 about the delays, but never addressed the possibility of any
sanctions) seems to have led to a satisfactory outcome.

The resolution of the Albania contretemps was found in the power of the
Executive Council to negotiate a viable response plan under article VIII.C.36:
In its consideration of doubts or concerns regarding compliance and cases
of non-compliance, including, inter alia, abuse of the rights provided for
under this Convention, the Executive Council shall consult with the States
Parties involved and, as appropriate, request the State Party to take
measures to redress the situation within a specified time. To the extent
that the Executive Council considers further action to be necessary, it shall
take, inter alia, one or more of the following measures:
(a) Inform all States Parties of the issue or matter;
(b) Bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference;
(c) Make recommendations to the Conference regarding measures to
redress the situation and to ensure compliance. 375
While this passage does not expressly authorize the Executive Council to
conclude, on behalf of the OPCW or the parties to the treaty, a binding

374

OPCW: Executive Council, Report of the Executive Council on the Performance of Its
Activities in the Period from 8 July 2006 to 29 June 2007, EC-50/3, C-12/3, September 26, 2007,
para. 2.16.
375
CWC, supra note __, article VIII.C.36.
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agreement, still less to waive a serious act of non-compliance, it may be
sufficient to provide a practical basis for reconciliation.

The Executive Council, in grappling with the Albania situation,
“emphasized the exceptional nature of this case, and stressed that it shall not set
a precedent for the future, nor in any other way affect the legally binding
obligations of the possessor States Parties to destroy their chemical weapons in
accordance with the provisions of the Convention, and within the deadlines as
extended by the Conference of the States Parties.” 376 Of course, the small
quantities of CW at stake in Albania, together with the very short duration of that
country’s overage in missing the deadline, are immensely different from the
situations of the United States and Russia. Still, in a context so starved of
authoritative legal guidance, even a remote bit of prior state practice may be
illuminating.

The Iraq case may also suggest a whiff of similar flexibility. There,
because Iraq joined the CWC after the original ten-year period for CW
destruction had already expired, it is bound by a different, more indeterminate,
set of rules. Under article IV.8, such a latecomer is to destroy its CW “as soon
as possible,” pursuant to an order of destruction to be determined by the
Executive Council. 377 Iraq has not yet begun, or even created a plan for, the

376

OPCW: Executive Council, Report of the Executive Council on the Performance of Its
Activities in the Period from 8 July 2006 to 29 June 2007, EC-50/3, C-12/3, September 26, 2007,
paras. 2.17.
377
CWC, supra note __, article IV.8.
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recovery and destruction of its bunkered CW.378 The United States and Russia
are not, of course, in that situation; the analogy suggests both that the concept of
flexibility is not entirely alien to the CWC, so perhaps it could be borrowed for
application here -- and conversely, that the negotiators knew how to modulate
the destruction timetable when necessary and they knowingly decided not to do
so for states that had joined the treaty at the outset.

A different procedural tack would be to convene a “special session” of the
Conference of the States Parties to address the issue. In addition to its annual
meetings and its every-five-years review sessions, 379 the Conference may
convene at any time in special session to evaluate the operation of the CWC,
taking into account “any relevant scientific and technological developments.”380
The powers of a special session do not exceed those of a regular session, but
the extraordinary, sole focus may help concentrate the minds of the participants
and generate additional possibilities. Likewise, a party may request a special
session of the Executive Council; 381 such a conclave would have no greater
powers than a regular session, but might carry an extra dollop of political visibility
and clout. To date, there have been no CWC special sessions regarding the

378

See discussion of Iraq’s damaged CW caches, supra, note __.
The CWC provides for special sessions of the Conference of the States Parties at five year
intervals to review the operation of the Convention. CWC, supra note __, article VIII.22; see
generally, OPCW, Second Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the
Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (Second Review Conference or RC-2), 7–18
April 2008, http://www.opcw.org/documents-reports/conference-states-parties/second-reviewconference/
380
CWC, supra note __, article VIII.B.22. The Executive Council may request a special
session. Id. at article VIII.C.33.
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2012 deadline, and the United States has resisted that recourse, favoring the
more low-key alternatives, but the option remains on the table.

The December 1 Decision has already begun the implementation of this
type of strategy. In that instrument, the Conference of the States Parties
balanced the competing political, legal, and operational considerations, and
determined – nearly unanimously – a path forward. The resolution does not
“forgive” the U.S. and Russian transgressions, but neither does it rebuke them or
invoke a litigious or enforcement-oriented approach. It demonstrates a strikingly
flexible, pragmatic approach to “law as politics,” rather than an insistence upon
strict compliance with the letter of the law. Whether this act solves the problem,
or merely kicks it further down the road, remains to be seen.

d. Go to a higher authority. The CWC contemplates that some especially
serious compliance issues may not be amenable to resolution within the context
of the treaty itself, but may benefit from referral to outside authorities. Under
article XII, “[t]he Conference shall, in cases of particular gravity, bring the issue,
including relevant information and conclusions, to the attention of the United
Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council.” 382 A 2/3
vote of the Conference of the States Parties would be required for any such
referral. 383

382
383

CWC, supra note __, article XII.4 and VIII.36.
CWC, supra note __, article VIII.18.
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Such a referral has never occurred under the CWC, and the experience
under the cognate provisions of other treaties is hardly promising. If the matter
were sent to the Security Council, the United States and Russia would, of course,
be immunized by their veto power against any unwelcome outcomes. 384 In the
General Assembly, in contrast, the superpowers are not guaranteed of the ability
to control the vote, but the General Assembly lacks the power to enforce legallybinding results. 385 The question is whether any useful political gain could be
achieved by opening these fora to a discussion – in whatever structured way that
could be managed – of the CWC compliance issues.

The other form of “higher authority” is the International Court of Justice.
Unlike many treaties, 386 the CWC does not incorporate a direct referral of
disputes to the court, and the other avenues for lodging a contentious case seem
unlikely. 387 However, the CWC does contemplate a mechanism for seeking an
advisory opinion from the ICJ “on any legal question arising within the scope of
384

UN Charter, supra note __, art. 27 (requiring the concurring votes of all permanent
members of the Security Council to adopt a substantive decision).
385
UN Charter, supra note __, art. 25 (all U.N. members “agree to accept and carry out”
decisions of the Security Council; there is no comparable undertaking regarding decisions of the
General Assembly).
386
Many treaties do contain provisions referring disputes to the ICJ. See, e.g., Genocide
Convention (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78
U.N.T.S. 277, 28 ILM 754, signed December 9, 1948, entered into force January 12, 1951,
entered into force for the United States February 23, 1989), article IX; Convention on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, 660 UNTS 195, 5 ILM 352 (1966), signed December 21, 1965, entered
into force January 4, 1969, entered into force for the United States November 20, 1994), article
22; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1249 U.N.T.S.
13, 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980), signed December 18, 1979, entered into force September 3, 1981, article
29.1.
387
Neither the United States nor Russia currently accepts the “compulsory jurisdiction” of the
ICJ pursuant to article 36 of the ICJ Statute, and a specific referral to the court of this matter by
those states is also unlikely. See ICJ Statute, supra note __, article 36; International Court of
Justice website, Jurisdiction: Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as
Compulsory, http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3
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the activities of the Organization.” 388 A variety of such legal questions might be
posed in this situation, either mischievously or in an honest attempt to reach
consensus – such as whether the U.S. and Russian defaults do rise to the level
of “material breach,” and whether any of the theoretical excuses surveyed above
would provide partial mitigation. The ICJ has recognized that sometimes,
resolution of the legal aspects of a controversy can help contribute to a larger
political solution. 389

Additionally, perhaps some creative use could be made of another CWC
organ, the Scientific Advisory Board. This Board, a relatively under-exploited
feature of the OPCW infrastructure, comprises 25 prominent experts, mandated
to provide scientific and technical advice to the Conference of the States Parties,
the Executive Council, and the Director-General. 390 Perhaps the Scientific
Advisory Board could be tasked to study independently the U.S. CW destruction
operations, evaluate the progress and problems encountered to date, and
provide “red team” analysis and recommendations to the OPCW. Such an
“outside” audit might be unlikely to generate revolutionary insights about the U.S.
activities, but might nonetheless provide another form of corroborating

388

CWC, supra note __, article XIV.5.
Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua vs. United States),
International Court of Justice, Preliminary Objections Judgment, 1984 ICJ p. 433, paragraphs 9397 (quoting from the ICJ’s earlier ruling in the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
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390
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reassurance that all avenues for alleviating the problem have been honestly
evaluated.

e. Negotiate a plea agreement. The final category of approaches would
be for the United States and Russia to “confess error” in missing the CWC
deadline, overtly apologize, and attempt to negotiate a package of responses
that would be more or less satisfactory to all concerned, even if they involved
some pain. Many of the steps noted below have already been incorporated into
the U.S. approach and the December 1 Decision; one key item that has been
conspicuously missing to date is a certain humility about the nation’s failure to
comply with its treaty obligations, and a willingness to “pay a price” to help set
things straight.

One element in the package, therefore, would be a public recital that
forthrightly accepts responsibility for the material breach of the CWC, and
commits to do what we can to clean up the current mess and to reform our
behavior in the future. This confession/apology/promise could come in the form
of a joint statement by the United States and Russia, or separate undertakings
from each of them. Valuable elements to stress could include:

--A renewed commitment to complete destruction of the remaining CW.
The United States and Russia have no interest in retaining chemical weapons;
this lagging destruction is not a treacherous abuse of the dismantling operation,
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designed to lull other states into disarming while the large powers sustain a
unique military advantage. Therefore, it should be easy to emphasize the two
countries’ good will and their unswerving allegiance to the object and purpose of
the CWC. They can affirm that they regard the CW as essentially toxic detritus,
an unwelcome legacy of an earlier era, providing no military benefit. The June
28, 2011 statement from outgoing Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and the
equally emphatic October 3, 2011 comments by Secretary of State Hillary
Rodham Clinton are solid illustrations of the necessary rhetoric; a presidential
statement, even if brief, would be even better. In any event, these are the type of
reassurances that will need to be reiterated frequently at senior levels in the
decade to come. 391

--A promise to destroy the remaining stockpiles promptly. Of course, the
issue remains: how prompt can we realistically be? At this point, it is probably
too late to revise the misbegotten decisions about employing the alternative, nonincineration technologies and about not transporting the chemicals to centralized
destruction facilities – reversing those choices now would likely cost more money
and take even more time than sticking resolutely to the current still-bumpy
course. But the United States should be earnest about avoiding any further
delays, and should undertake whatever oversight and management initiatives are
necessary to sustain or even accelerate the enterprise. Ironically, it may now be
391

See Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States Delegation to the OPCW
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at the 68 Session of the Executive Council, EC-68/NAT.15, May 1, 2012, p. 1 (reassuring
OPCW Executive Council that the U.S. “commitment to complete chemical weapons destruction
remains unwavering. We will faithfully implement this treaty obligation as well as the additional
measures contained in [the December 1 Decision].”
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appropriate for the United States to employ, once again, the rhetoric that it is
destroying the CW “as rapidly as possible” – because it may now, in fact, not be
possible to rearrange things and proceed any more quickly (but it should also
avoid the pitfall of going any more slowly.)

--A commitment to sustained high levels of funding. One obvious way in
which the United States could grievously compound its earlier failure would be to
relax its financial contribution to the destruction operations. 392 This is a particular
danger in the current economic emergency, but to date, the CW demilitarization
campaign has been spared the worst ravages of the budget cutting zeal. That
immunity needs to continue; otherwise, the promise to meet even the current,
quite extended, timetable will quickly prove illusory.

--Establishment of realistic, detailed deadlines. The most recurrent
feature of the U.S. campaign to destroy its CW has, unfortunately, been repeated
delays; if one were making prognostications, the safest (albeit, cynical) bet would
be that the current projections, like most of their predecessors, would fall by the
wayside. (The one conspicuous exception to this sorry record is the fact that in
2006, when requesting the five-year extension, the United States predicted that it
would be able to incinerate approximately two-thirds of its stockpile by April 29,
2012; in fact, the program reached the 90 percent level by that point.) It is hard
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See Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 21 (explaining how the need to meet
previously unfunded expenses for augmented community protection equipment at some CW
destruction sites resulted in reprogramming funds that had been allocated for systemization and
other activities at other sites, delaying work there.)
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to mandate that anyone should “be more realistic” in predicting the future; on
each occasion, those who issued the projections sincerely believed they were
doing the best they could.

At this point, the estimates (that the Pueblo facility will commence CW
destruction operations in 2015 and finish in 2019 and that Lexington will start in
2020 and finish in 2023) incorporate a margin of safety, to adapt to currentlyunforeseen contingencies; whether that “fudge factor” is sufficient remains to be
seen. Certainly, the long track record of disappointed expectations counsels
against trying to establish now a “firm” or “final” timetable for completing the
destruction – although some have called for such a definitive endpoint, it is
simply unrealistic to over-promise. At the same time, it might well be appropriate
to publish quite detailed incremental timetables for the two remaining CW
destruction facilities, so the world would receive “early warning” about any
additional slippages, not being again blindsided when a major, abrupt revision to
the announced schedule is suddenly unveiled.

--Submit to enhanced monitoring by the OPCW. The organization is
already observing the U.S. and Russian destruction operations quite closely, but
if there are any possibilities for even tighter monitoring, that is a price worth
paying. The inspected party is generally responsible for meeting the costs of
CWC verification operations, 393 and those are costs that the two possessor
countries should not try to shuck. Closer monitoring would not, in any practical
393
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sense, alter the reality on the ground, but in redressing a situation of messy noncompliance it is important to “look good,” as well as to “be good.” Perhaps a
permanent OPCW presence inside the facilities at the two sites, in addition to the
episodic leadership visits, would help provide appropriate reassurance to the
world community. Perhaps creative use of social media could assist in projecting
a favorable image of thorough transparency – a website or Facebook page with
live 24-hour closed-circuit TV coverage of construction activities, for example.
Perhaps a non-adversarial, even friendly, “challenge inspection” of U.S. CW
destruction facilities would be in order – it would not illuminate much information
that has not already been provided, but it could be a vehicle for exercising one of
the treaty’s main (and so far, never used) verification mechanisms. 394

The United States has already demonstrated a firm commitment to this
sort of transparency – it would not be quite accurate to call it “verification” or even
“confidence building,” because all parties should already enjoy 100% confidence
that the United States is dedicated to authentic compliance with the Convention
(just later, rather than now). The U.S. acceptance of the December 1 Decision
by the Conference of the States Parties promises even more accommodation.
But such good faith measures will assume even greater importance in the
decade to come – especially during the “gap year” periods (2012-2015 and 20192023) when construction and systemization of the final two neutralization facilities
are proceeding at Pueblo and Lexington, but when no actual destruction
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operations are yet underway, and no CW is then being destroyed for years at a
stretch.

--Protect the security and safety of the remaining CW stocks. Because
quantities of these terribly lethal substances will now linger for another decade
beyond their originally planned lifespans, it is essential that they be adequately
protected against the dangers of leaks, accidents, theft, attack, tornados, and
other misfortunes. 395 To date, most of the mishaps at the eight U.S. CW storage
and destruction sites have been minor, with minimal harm, but this would be a
good occasion to review again the security and safety procedures, to pre-empt
potential disasters (of the real, or the public affairs, varieties).

--Ensure adequate outreach to affected communities – both international
and local. The U.S. program is already quite transparent – the eight local
communities around the destruction sites and the leadership of the OPCW have
been regularly kept up to date via briefings, on-site visits and public
presentations. 396 But outreach is never “finished,” and the appetite for more
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where CW are stored, to inform and engage the local populations. U.S. Army Chemical Materials
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information is almost insatiable – and this is a function at which the U.S. program
should be able to excel; it should display the zeal and efficacy of the program
with clarity and pride.

Beyond those sorts of public undertakings, what additional terms and
conditions could be worth considering, as possible parts of a potential “plea
bargain”? Here are some more unconventional variants:

--Pay a fine. There is no precedent in modern arms control practice for a
country paying a financial penalty for violating a treaty, but it could be
considered. Numerous questions would emerge: How much money? (This
would be more in the nature of punitive damages, rather than measuring an
amount to “compensate” a particular “victim.”) To whom would the reparations
be paid? (If the OPCW received it, what would be appropriate applications of the
windfall?) What is the scope of the precedent created in this way? (Is it
appropriate to allow a country to “buy its way out” of a treaty that implicates
global security concerns?) One variant could be for the United States to
compensate the OPCW fully for the additional costs of extending the
Organization’s inspection capabilities for the period beyond their anticipated
expiration of April 29, 2012. That is, the United States could recompense the

Agency, Fact Sheet: Public Outreach and Participation,
http://www.cma.army.mil/fndocumentviewer.aspx?docid=003674289; National Defense
Authorization Act for FY 1993, Public Law 102-484, sec. 172 (legislation directing the Army to
establish Citizens’ Advisory Commissions).
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OPCW for salaries, overhead, travel and other expenses that the Technical
Secretariat would not have incurred, but for the U.S. violation.

--Enlarge the scope of existing security assurances and provide greater
financial support to international programs that oppose CW. CWC Article X
already commits the parties to facilitate “the fullest possible exchange of
equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning
means of protection against chemical weapons.” 397 Each party undertakes to
provide assistance through the OPCW, in the form of contributions to an
international fund, negotiation of a standing agreement to provide assistance
upon demand, or a declaration of the types of assistance it might be able to
provide in response to an appeal. 398 In addition, each party has the right “to
receive assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of chemical
weapons.” 399

But these commitments are vague, and the level of financial support is
unspecified. The question is whether the United States and Russia could
contemplate providing even more voluminous assistance than already required –
as the treaty’s developing countries have regularly solicited. 400 This could take
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the form of donating more money to the international fund, providing a more
comprehensive pledge to assist any victim of a CW attack, and assembling a
robust capability to dispatch promptly effective CW sensors, alarms, and
analytical equipment; protective and decontamination equipment and supplies;
and medical countermeasures. Additional assistance to other countries that are
(or may one day be) in the process of destroying their own CW residues might
also be put on the table.

--Provide additional economic, technical and development assistance.
Related to that concept, CWC article XI requires that the parties “Undertake to
facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of
chemicals, equipment and scientific and technical information relating to the
development and application of chemistry for purposes not prohibited under this
Convention.”401 Again, this rather vague language has not inspired a wellspring
of generosity, and economically developing states have complained that the
wealthier parties have not fulfilled the expectations about genuine assistance in
economic and technological growth. 402 In the same vein is the treaty’s
requirement that parties “Not maintain among themselves any restrictions,
including those in any international agreements, incompatible with the obligations
undertaken under this Convention, which would restrict or impede trade and the

Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in 2011, EC69/3, July 11, 2012, p. 15-22 (summarizing assistance programs undertaken in 2011).
401
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402
Statement of Cuba, supra note __, paras. 12-14. See generally OPCW, Executive Council,
Report by the Director-General, The Status of Implementation of Article XI of the Chemical
Weapons Convention as at 31 December 2010, EC-64/DG.6, April 11, 2011.
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development and promotion of scientific and technological knowledge in the field
of chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or
other peaceful purposes.” 403 Again, developing states had hoped this provision
would promote the dissolution of export control regimes that impede the
commerce in dual-use chemicals, but it has not. 404 Perhaps this would be the
time for the United States to pony up greater international economic and
chemical technological assistance to the developing world, and consider anew
whether the existing restraints on chemical trade could be relaxed somewhat.

--Lose some organizational privileges. CWC article XII.2 contemplates
that where a party fails to fulfill a request from the Executive Council that it take
particular measures to redress a situation raising problems about its compliance,
the Conference of the States Parties may “restrict or suspend the State Party's
rights and privileges under this Convention until it undertakes the necessary
action to conform with its obligations under this Convention.”405 Here, the
Executive Council has not made any such requests that the United States and
Russia have failed to honor, but the concept of suspending institutional privileges
may have some applicability.
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The Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties both
need the active participation of the United States and Russia in order to function
optimally, but perhaps a temporary suspension of some membership privileges
might have a salutary effect. Among the membership benefits that might be
reviewed for this purpose are: the right to vote in OPCW policy organs; 406 the
right to serve on the Executive Council; 407 the opportunity to have nationals of
your state be recruited to work in Technical Secretariat positions; 408 the right to
request clarification of ambiguous compliance situations in other states; 409 the
right to request a challenge on-site inspection; 410 the right to request assistance
under programs of international cooperation; 411 and the right to participate in
largely unrestricted international trade in chemicals. 412 In the extreme case,
article XII.3 contemplates that in cases “where serious damage to the object and
purpose of the Convention may result,” the Conference may recommend
unspecified “collective measures” to the parties. 413

--Admit the breach and apologize. To date, the United States has
declined to call a spade a spade and overtly admit that it has breached (or
violated or failed to comply with) the treaty. At this point, a frank admission and a
406
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willingness to employ the more direct language would not alter the objective
facts, but might appeal as a more forthright acceptance of international
responsibility. Political considerations, more than legal requirements, would push
the United States and Russia in the direction of humility and contrition, but any
vocabulary would be welcome that avoids any impression that those states are
attempting to minimize the significance of the transgression or to dismiss it as
some sort of “technical” or non-substantive anomaly. Sometimes, a sincere
confession and apology, not mincing words, can work wonders.

Overall, the general purpose of remedies for breach of a legal obligation is
to wipe out the effects of the illegal act, to restore the parties to the situation they
anticipated in the original bargaining. 414 In the criminal law context, the
comparable aphorism is to “make the punishment fit the crime.” Unfortunately,
both those objectives are largely inapplicable here – no one wants to return to
any variant of the pre-CWC status quo ante; it is just not possible to destroy the
lingering CW stocks more rapidly; and there is no “punishment” that truly
compensates other parties or inflicts a justifiable amount of suffering upon the
United States and Russia.

Section 8: Where Do We Go from Here?

414
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What is the path forward for chemical weapons disarmament efforts?
How do we minimize the damage done by the large, obvious and continuing U.S.
and Russian failures to complete the CW destruction mission on the original
timetable, and what can be done to prevent the harm from spiraling further?

A useful first step is to honestly acknowledge – to ourselves and to the
world at large -- that this is a treaty violation, that it is a “big deal,” and that we
should not attempt to minimize or shirk it. The overshoot on the destruction
timetable – especially when the United States will miss the promised 10 or 15
year commitment by an additional 11½ years or more – goes to the heart of the
CWC and undercuts the “object and purpose” of the treaty. The United States
has been parsimonious about talking publicly about this misjudgment, especially
when the train wreck was merely looming in the future – but now that it is upon
us, we have to acknowledge it and begin to pick up the pieces.

It is absurd that the politics of NIMBY have so delayed destruction of the
last ten percent of the U.S. CW stockpile, and it is absurdity on steroids that
elimination of the final 1.7 percent will sustain the United States in a position of
continuous breach of a solemn international law obligation until 2023. Now that
we know how safe and environmentally clean the incineration methodology has
been, it becomes doubly ironic that the local communities that had so
successfully insisted upon employment of a neutralization alternative technology
will be the sites at which the hazardous materials, vulnerable to leakage,
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tornadoes and other mishaps, are sustained for more than a decade beyond their
incineration-based peers.

On the other hand, this violation does not genuinely affect the national
security of any other CWC party – they are in no greater danger of being
victimized by U.S. or Russian chemical warfare, and the persistence of this
noxious stockpile for the additional years poses a greater threat to the workers at
the Lexington and Pueblo facilities and to the denizens of the neighboring
communities than it does to any potential U.S. enemies. The world will surely get
to zero chemical weapons at some point – the lurching toward that goal has not
been pretty, but the extended timetable should not be mistaken for ambivalence
about the ultimate achievement. U.S. Ambassador to the OPCW Robert Mikulak
has denied as “patently false” the Iranian “political rant” to the contrary and has
rightly dismissed as “poppycock” the notion that the United States intends to
retain an operational chemical warfare capability. 415

Critically, this issue should not become an excuse for the CWC to unravel.
That treaty has already performed a marvelous service for mankind, in
crystalizing the world’s rejection of chemical warfare and substantiating that
taboo by prompting a massive global CW disarmament campaign. The treaty
faces its own challenges (the incessant march of new technology, the fears of

415

Mikulak November 29, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 5; Chris Schneidmiller, Russia,
U.S. Under Microscope at Chemical Weapons Pact Meeting, Global Security Newswire,
November 30, 2011.

136

covert violation, the failure to reach complete universal membership, etc. 416) but
it should not also suffer defections – other states should not exercise their right to
suspend or withdraw from the regime, even though the two largest participating
states will stand in persistent, conspicuous violation. Instead, the two giants, and
all other parties, should take the occasion to reaffirm their enduring commitment
to the enterprise and help protect the treaty.

As a political matter, it would be far preferable for the United States and
Russia to stand tightly together on this matter. Neither could get much political
mileage out of trying to highlight the other’s violations – the United States had
destroyed a larger percentage of its inventory at the time the 2012 deadline was
reached, but Russia will probably manage to come into complete compliance
years sooner than the United States. Each state’s greater interest is in
sustaining the CWC and surviving this whirlwind; neither could deflect
international criticism by pointing the finger of blame at the other. Moscow and
Washington, D.C. should therefore develop a common approach and implement
common tactics. At the same time, the United States should not simply waive its
longstanding concerns about Russia’s CWC compliance, including the question
of the completeness of Russia’s neutralization process (ensuring that the
chemical reaction is practically irreversible) and ascertaining that the funds
416
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supplied by the United States and other foreign donors are being conscientiously
applied.

The world needs a political, not a legal, solution to this problem. 417 That
means not relying essentially upon the textual remedies built into the CWC itself
or the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Political accommodation, not
formal invocation of the dispute-resolution mechanisms, offers the path forward.
Most CWC parties – Iran is the conspicuous, and perhaps the sole, exception –
have anticipated a pragmatic, non-judgmental compromise. But legal
mechanisms can play a facilitative role, too. The Executive Council and the
Conference of the States Parties should not be barred from adopting the
language of legal obligation – including use of the powerful verb “shall” – in their
decision-making documents, and even measures that some might regard as
“punitive” should not be presumptively off the table.

To start, the Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties
should expressly find that each of the tardy parties has committed, and is
continuing to incur, a breach of the Convention, and should formally invoke the
compliance mechanisms of Article XII. The breaching parties should apologize,
admit their violations, and reimburse the organization for all the incremental costs
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of the monitoring and inspection activities, which would have largely expired by
now, but for the violations.

These confessions and criticisms will be embarrassing; in the short run, it
might be far preferable to finesse an issue of this sort via quiet diplomacy. But in
the long run, the continuing vitality of international law requires its vigorous
exercise. Among the few truly useful enforcement tools for the international
community are “naming and shaming” – public condemnation of violations and
censure of the guilty parties. In a perverse way, the United States should
welcome this ordeal, because it enhances the power of international law, making
arms control treaties including the CWC more reliable and meaningful. When
even the superpowers are called into account for treaty breaches, others will be
deterred from future non-compliance.

Certainly, the current impasse should not offer the occasion for the United
States or Russia to relax their destruction vigilance or to retrench their financial
commitments to the enterprise. Some might be tempted to propose, “Since we’re
going to miss the deadline anyway, and pay the associated political price, we
might as well slow down the process and proceed more cheaply.” But this is
decidedly not a situation in which “a miss is as good as a mile”; the only way to
escape global opprobrium is to demonstrate that we are, in truth, proceeding as
rapidly as possible. If anything can be done to accelerate the destruction
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operations at the last two sites, Pueblo and Lexington, that would be money well
spent.

There will, undoubtedly, be a political price to pay for the U.S. neglect of
this legal duty. It will diminish our ability to attract holdout states to join the CWC.
It will weaken U.S. credibility in challenging suspected violators of the treaty’s
primary and secondary obligations. It will undercut U.S. leadership in helping to
adapt the treaty to new technological challenges. More broadly, it will constitute
a lingering stain on the Obama Administration’s theme of “constructive reengagement” in multilateral affairs. 418 As the United States seeks to repair the
diplomatic damage of prior years, by becoming more positively involved in a
variety of international fora and agreements (the International Criminal Court, the
Ottawa Convention on land mines, and the U.N Human Rights Council, for
example) disquiet about violating the CWC will send an unwelcome,
contradictory message.

Most fundamentally, this unexcused violation will soil the U.S. reputation
as an advocate for the rule of law, for punctilious compliance with the CWC and
other arms control treaties, and for fealty to international law in general. How, for
418
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example, will the United States retain the moral high ground necessary to
effectively rebut Iranian challenges that seek to juxtapose the acknowledged U.S.
violation of the CWC with the alleged Iranian violation of the NPT? The two
cases are not, in any measure, equivalent, but a good deal of the favorable
diplomatic posture for insistence upon the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda has
been sacrificed amid Teheran’s stage thunder.

Even more importantly, what are the lessons for the future? How can the
international community develop a formula for insisting upon genuine
disarmament (compelling countries to follow through effectively on those rare
occasions when they accept a treaty commitment to destroy weaponry) without
creating a straightjacket in situations where good faith efforts simply fall short? A
timetable is often necessary to convert what could otherwise be simply an
abstract agreement in principle into a reliable, actionable undertaking, against
which government officials will be driven to commit funds and labor. Without
some rigidity in the deadlines, it would be too easy to postpone forever any real
(i.e., expensive) operations – but as the current problem illustrates, too much
rigidity is unsuitable, too.

One lesson would be to review any such treaty schedules with a jaundiced
eye, wary about unforeseen difficulties in the destruction process, especially
where large quantities and unproven technologies are at issue. The Ottawa
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Convention 419 on anti-personnel land mines offers a current example. The
United States is not a party to this treaty, but has undertaken a thorough review
of the desirability of acceding. 420 That treaty requires parties to destroy their
inventories of stockpiled mines within four years; no extensions are possible. 421
For the United States, this provision could require the abrupt destruction of up to
10 million mostly quite old mines. 422 These devices were not constructed with an
eye toward their eventual orderly disposal, and there are no existing processes,
equipment, or facilities for safely and expeditiously destroying them, at least not
on the scale contemplated by the Ottawa drafters. In these circumstances, it
would hardly be prudent for the United States to join the Ottawa Convention until
it had developed and at least initiated a suitable destruction procedure – until it
had sufficient experience to be confident that it was safely within four years of the
finish line.

Section 9: Conclusion
Under the U.S. Constitution, a treaty is “the supreme Law of the Land,” 423
and the president has the obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
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executed.”424 Successive administrations have conspicuously failed in this duty
with respect to the dismantling obligations of the CWC.

At the same time, treaties are the “coin of the realm” in international law,
and the United States is the leading practitioner of international agreements,
relying upon treaties to pursue its interests in the full range of global affairs, from
trade to human rights to environmental protection to war and peace. It hardly
makes sense to degrade this vital resource through neglect of our own legal
responsibilities.

Iran will likely seek to depict the United States as a “serial violator” of the
CWC, stapling together its accusations about U.S. and U.K. handling of the
obsolete CW devices uncovered in Iraq in 2003-09 with the complaints about
blowing past the April 29, 2012 deadline. There are enough shreds of truth in
that characterization that it might have legs; the obvious attempt to deflect
attention from Iran’s own violations of the NPT is unmistakable.

In truth, there is no real legal or moral congruence between the U.S.
posture regarding the CWC and Iran’s or North Korea’s violation of their
obligations to refrain from developing or possessing a nuclear weapons
capability. The United States is not being “sneaky,” is not attempting to retain
any viable CW military capacity, and has a transparent pathway toward complete
(if late) performance of its obligations. The United States is attempting (if poorly)
424
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to conform to the treaty, and is not deliberately defying the will of the international
community. The cases, therefore, are more unlike than like; one size of
response by the rest of the world would not fit all.

Still, the persistent U.S. and Russian violations of the CWC are not
“victimless offenses”; there is significant, if diffuse harm. Proceeding from the
aphorism that one should “never let a crisis go to waste,” the United States
should use this occasion to model how a good state should behave when it finds
itself, unfortunately, in a situation of materially breaching a treaty. A state that
wants to reassert its bona fides, wants to retain as much as possible of the
respect of its peers, and wants to strain the fabric of international law as little as
possible, would not try to dodge responsibility, not minimize the significance of its
wrongdoing, and not seek simply to deflect attention. It would forthrightly
acknowledge its misjudgments and take its medicine. That would be the tiny
silver lining on this otherwise miserable cloud – showing the world how a
dignified, law-abiding state attempts to restore its respectability. 425

The United States has invoked the “example setting” imagery to good
effect elsewhere in arms control. In 2006, when Libya’s notorious Muammar
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Gaddafi appeared to abandon decades of quixotic support for terrorism and
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, the George W. Bush Administration
welcomed his volte face with a cautious embrace. The United States removed
Libya from the official roster of state sponsors of terrorism, and restored full
diplomatic relations with the country (ending a 30 year hiatus). Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice announced these “tangible results that flow from the
historic decisions taken by Libya’s leadership in 2003,” saying that the world was
witnessing “the beginning of that country’s re-emergence into the mainstream of
the international community.” 426 Rice then proceeded to commend Gaddafi’s
example as a prototype for other pariah regimes that, she urged, should emulate
Libya’s renunciation of policies and practices that violate international legal
norms and embrace a new respect for international law, saying, “Just as 2003
marked a turning point for the Libyan people, so, too, could 2006 mark turning
points for the peoples of Iran and North Korea. Libya is an important model as
nations around the world press for changes in behavior by the Iranian and North
Korean regimes – changes that could be vital to international peace and
security.” 427
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Beyond that rhetoric, the United States is right to focus attention on treaty
compliance, particularly in the security realm. The United States has been the
self-appointed leader in monitoring other states’ behavior under arms control
treaty regimes, publishing detailed assessments of questionable, or flat-out
illegal, activities. 428 These have sometimes generated considerable
controversy, 429 but holding states to an exacting standard is the right thing to do
– and the United States should not allow accusations of hypocrisy, even when
they are well-grounded in the CWC experience, to deter it from continuing to
press the point. Reciprocity is a key principle in international law and
international politics, and the United States must take seriously the assertions of
its treaty partners about possible non-compliance. 430

In the addressing the CWC specifically, in 2005 – before the CWC
compliance issue had come to roost in the United States itself -- the Department
of State expressed the sentiment with robust clarity:
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State Compliance Report, supra note __; U.S. Department of State, Compliance with the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction, Condition (10)(C) Report, August 2011.
429
In response to the 2010 U.S. compliance report, Russia issued its own comparable
document, complaining about numerous alleged U.S. violations of arms control agreements.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, The Facts of Violation by the United States
of its Obligations in the Sphere of Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Arms
Control, August 8, 2010,
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/cc9c7d192f0ebc5ac325777a
0057e1ae?OpenDocument (alleging U.S. violations of the CWC, START I, the BWC and other
arms control agreements); Center for Strategic and International Studies, Russian Report Faults
U.S. Compliance with Arms Control Treaties, August 8, 2010, http://csis.org/blog/russian-reportfaults-us-compliance-arms-control-treaties.
430
State Compliance Report, supra note __, p. 5 (noting “There are processes within the U.S.
executive branch that operate to ensure U.S. plans and programs remain consistent with U.S.
international obligations….When U.S. treaty partners have raised compliance questions regarding
U.S. implementation activities, the United States has carefully reviewed the matter to confirm that
its actions were in compliance with its treaty obligations.”)
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Detecting a violation [of the CWC] is not an end in itself; it is a call to
action. Without strict compliance and without the concerted action of all
States Party to insist upon strict compliance – and to hold violators
accountable for their actions – the national security of all nations will erode
and global stability will be undermined. 431
President Obama put the matter more concisely in his celebrated April 5,
2009 Prague speech, “Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished.
Words must mean something.” 432 That is true, even for the United States.
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U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Fact
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especially denial of the benefits of their noncompliance, can they be expected to take compliance
seriously, and only by enforcing consequences will other would-be violators be deterred. These
consequences may be political, economic, or ultimately military, and may be undertaken by
international organizations or nations acting individually or together. If arms control,
nonproliferation and disarmament agreements and commitments are to support the security of all
nations, then all nations must respond when confronted with noncompliance.”)
See also Report 104-33, supra note __, p. 228 (Senate Foreign Relations Committee
concludes “Ultimately, the willingness of state parties to act in the face of noncompliance, more
than the sophistication of its inspection provisions or the extent of its data reporting requirements
will determine the CWC’s effectiveness. If the political will does not exist to make these
agreements important instruments of international policy, they are not worth the paper on which
they are written. If the political commitment to action is absent, all of the inspections they
mandate are so much unproductive frenzy. If the political strength to take on those who will not
abide by the rules has vanished, the penalties have the impact of a mosquito – inconvenient and
irritating perhaps, but no deterrent.”)
See also U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, August 2005, p. 5-9 (stressing
the importance of full compliance with arms control treaties as “a bedrock norm of international
relations,” and describing the organizations and programs of the U.S. government that are
designed to ensure U.S. compliance.)
432
Remarks by President Barack Obama, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-PragueAs-Delivered/. See also Remarks by President Obama at Hankuk University, Seoul, Republic of
Korea, March 26, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/26/remarkspresident-obama-hankuk-university (“For the global response to Iran and North Korea’s
intransigence, a new international norm is emerging: Treaties are binding; rules will be enforced;
and violations will have consequences.”)
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